New Economics Papers
on Neuroeconomics
Issue of 2007‒01‒13
two papers chosen by
Daniela Raeva

  1. Games in the Nervous System: The Game Motoneurons Play By Irit Nowik; Idan Segev; Shmuel Zamir
  2. Genetic Tests and Intertemporal Screening in Competitive Insurance Markets By Winand Emons

  1. By: Irit Nowik; Idan Segev; Shmuel Zamir
    Date: 2006–12–30
  2. By: Winand Emons
    Abstract: We consider successive generations of non-altruistic individuals carrying a good or bad gene. Daughters are more likely to carry their mother's gene than the opposite one. Competitive insurers can perform a genetic test revealing an agent's gene. They may condition their quotes on the agent's or on her ancestors' genetic status. In equilibrium generation one is bribed to take the test with an unconditional quote. The insurer uses this information to profitably screen a finite number of generations of their offspring. The offspring of good gene carriers subsidize the tested generation
    Keywords: genetic tests; insurance; screening; pooling
    JEL: D82 G22
    Date: 2006–12

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