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on Network Economics |
By: | Bahel, Eric; Gómez-Rúa, María; Vidal-Puga, Juan |
Abstract: | We study cost-sharing rules in network problems where agents seek to ship quantities of some good to their respective locations, and the cost on each arc is linear in the flow crossing it. In this context, Core Selection requires that each subgroup of agents pay a joint cost share that is not higher than its stand-alone cost. We prove that the demander rule, under which each agent pays the cost of her shortest path for each unit she demands, is the unique cost-sharing rule satisfying both Core Selection and Merge Proofness. The Merge Proofness axiom prevents distinct nodes from reducing their joint cost share by merging into a single node. An alternative characterization of the demander rule is obtained by combining Core Selection and Cost Solidarity. The Cost Solidarity axiom says that each agent's cost share should be weakly increasing in the cost matrix. |
Keywords: | Shortest path games, cost sharing, core, merge proofness, solidarity |
JEL: | C71 D85 |
Date: | 2024 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:120606&r=net |
By: | Sergio A. De Raco; Viktoriya Semeshenko |
Abstract: | In this paper we compare Skill-Relatedness Networks (SRNs) for selected countries, that is to say statistically significant inter-industrial interactions representing latent skills exchanges derived from observed labor flows, a kind of industry spaces. Using data from Argentina (ARG), Germany (DEU) and Sweden (SWE), we compare their SRNs utilizing an information-theoretic method that permits to compare networks of "non-aligned" nodes, which is the case of interest. For each SRN we extract its portrait, a fingerprint of structural measures of the distributions of their shortest paths, and calculate their pairwise divergences. This allows us also to contrast differences in structural (binary) connectivity with differences in the information provided by the (weighted) skill relatedness indicator (SR). We find that, in the case of ARG, structural connectivity is very different from their counterpart in DEU and SWE, but through the glass of SR the distances analyzed are all substantially smaller and more alike. These results qualify the role of the SR indicator as revealing some hidden dimension different from connectivity alone, providing empirical support to the suggestion that industry spaces may differ across countries. |
Date: | 2024–04 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2404.12193&r=net |
By: | James T. Wilkinson; Jacob Kelter; John Chen; Uri Wilensky |
Abstract: | We present a novel agent-based approach to simulating an over-the-counter (OTC) financial market in which trades are intermediated solely by market makers and agent visibility is constrained to a network topology. Dynamics, such as changes in price, result from agent-level interactions that ubiquitously occur via market maker agents acting as liquidity providers. Two additional agents are considered: trend investors use a deep convolutional neural network paired with a deep Q-learning framework to inform trading decisions by analysing price history; and value investors use a static price-target to determine their trade directions and sizes. We demonstrate that our novel inclusion of a network topology with market makers facilitates explorations into various market structures. First, we present the model and an overview of its mechanics. Second, we validate our findings via comparison to the real-world: we demonstrate a fat-tailed distribution of price changes, auto-correlated volatility, a skew negatively correlated to market maker positioning, predictable price-history patterns and more. Finally, we demonstrate that our network-based model can lend insights into the effect of market-structure on price-action. For example, we show that markets with sparsely connected intermediaries can have a critical point of fragmentation, beyond which the market forms distinct clusters and arbitrage becomes rapidly possible between the prices of different market makers. A discussion is provided on future work that would be beneficial. |
Date: | 2024–05 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2405.02480&r=net |