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on Network Economics |
| By: | Tanya Araújo; Rui Vilela Mendes |
| Abstract: | Networks with long-range connections obeying a distance-dependent power law of su¢ ciently small exponent display superdiffusion, Levy flights and robustness properties very di§erent from the scale-free networks. It has been proposed that these networks, found both in society and biology, be classified as a new structure, the fractional networks. Particular important examples are the social networks and the modular hierarchical brain networks where both short-and long-range connections are present. The anomalous superdi§usive and the mixed diffusion behavior of these networks is studied here as well as its relation to the nature and density of the long-range connections. |
| Date: | 2023–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ise:isegwp:wp022023&r=net |
| By: | Áureo de Paula; Imran Rasul; Pedro CL Souza |
| Abstract: | Social interactions determine many economic behaviors, but information on social ties does not exist in most publicly available and widely used datasets. We present results on the identification of social networks from observational panel data that contains no information on social ties between agents. In the context of a canonical social interactions model, we provide sufficient conditions under which the social interactions matrix, endogenous and exogenous social effect parameters are all globally identified. While this result is relevant across different estimation strategies, we then describe how high-dimensional estimation techniques can be used to estimate the interactions model based on the Adaptive Elastic Net Generalized Method of Moments. We employ the method to study tax competition across US states. We find that the identified social interactions matrix implies tax competition differs markedly from the common assumption of competition between geographically neighbouring states, providing further insights for the long-standing debate on the relative roles of factor mobility and yardstick competition in driving tax setting behavior across states. Most broadly, our identification and application show that the analysis of social interactions can be extended to economic realms where no network data exists. |
| Date: | 2023–01–18 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:azt:cemmap:02/23&r=net |
| By: | Camila Jericó-Daminello; Barbara Schröter; Maria Mancilla Garcia; Christian Albert |
| Abstract: | Stakeholder groups engage in ecosystem services coproduction as both coproducers and beneficiaries. Stakeholder group perceptions of their own and each other's roles in ecosystem services coproduction therefore influence how ecosystem services are provided in a given landscape. However, only a few studies have investigated self-perceived and attributed stakeholder group roles in this context. The aim of this paper is to assess the self-perceived and attributed engagement and importance of stakeholder groups in the coproduction of ecosystem services in a case study of the Lahn River landscape in Germany. The research questions address (i) local stakeholder group perceptions of their own engagement in the coproduction of ecosystem services and (ii) differences and commonalities between self-perceived and attributed stakeholder group importance in ecosystem services coproduction. Our method involves a survey local stakeholder groups regarding involvement in the coproduction of twelve ecosystem services and social network analysis to assess the survey data concerning network structures. Our findings indicate that self-perceived and attributed perceptions differ mainly regarding the central role of stakeholder groups in collaborative networks. We further identify differences in the self-perceived levels of importance of stakeholder groups within collaborative networks but similarities in the understanding of the overall stakeholder group network structure. We conclude by highlighting key implications for ecosystem services governance, including the need to address power imbalances and the need to foster collaborative engagement to ensure sustained and just ecosystem services delivery. |
| Keywords: | Collaboration; Ecosystem services coproduction; Lahn River landscape; Social network analysis; Stakeholder perspectives |
| Date: | 2021–10–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/331457&r=net |
| By: | Cero, Ian (University of Rochester Medical Center); Wyman, Peter |
| Abstract: | Agent-based simulations comparing the relative effectiveness of network-based and individual-focused interventions for preventing suicide. |
| Date: | 2023–01–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:osfxxx:r6v2e&r=net |
| By: | Antonio Cabrales; Esther Hauk |
| Abstract: | In this paper we model the interaction between leaders, their followers and crowd followers in a coordination game with local interaction. The steady states of a dynamic best-response process can feature a coexistence of Pareto dominant and risk dominant actions in the population. The existence of leaders and their followers, plus the local interaction, which leads to clustering, is crucial for the survival of the Pareto dominant actions. The evolution of leader and crowd followership shows that leader followership can also be locally stable around Pareto dominant leaders. The paper answers the questions (i) which Leader should be removed and (ii) how to optimally place leaders in the network to enhance payoff dominant play. |
| Date: | 2023–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bge:wpaper:1381&r=net |
| By: | Mounir Mahmalat (The Policy Initiative); Sami Atallah (Founding director of The Policy Initiative); Wassim Maktabi (Researcher at The Policy Initiative) |
| Abstract: | Power-sharing arrangements not only allocate political power but also economic resources from valuable state functions among powerful elites. Two broad hypotheses emerge from existing literature for how elites allocate such resources. Elites would either distribute the control over valuable institutions or share the rents they generate. This article investigates which mechanism prevails by focusing on a major source of such resources: public procurement of large infrastructure projects. We analyze an original dataset of infrastructure procurement contracts in Lebanon and investigate which politically connected firms receive larger contracts than nonconnected firms. We find that firms receive inflated contracts only when they are connected to elites with a “seat at the table” at the board of the implementing agency, rather than the wider set of powerful political elites. We argue that resource distribution depends on elites’ access to important institutional functions, rather than other conceivable mechanisms of resource sharing. By penetrating key positions with loyal personnel, elites serve as brokers in collusive networks, or cartels, that succeed in undermining a process as complex as infrastructure procurement |
| Date: | 2022–12–20 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:erg:wpaper:1624&r=net |