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on Network Economics |
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Issue of 2019‒04‒08
four papers chosen by Pedro CL Souza Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro |
| By: | Jochmans, K., Weidner, M.; Weidner, M. |
| Abstract: | This paper considers inference on fixed effects in a linear regression model estimated from network data. An important special case of our setup is the two-way regression model. This is a workhorse technique in the analysis of matched data sets, such as employer-employee or student-teacher panel data. We formalize how the structure of the network affects the accuracy with which the fixed effects can be estimated. This allows us to derive sufficient conditions on the network for consistent estimation and asymptotically-valid inference to be possible. Estimation of moments is also considered. We allow for general networks and our setup covers both the dense and sparse case. We provide numerical results for the estimation of teacher value-added models and regressions with occupational dummies. |
| Keywords: | connectivity, fixed effects, graph, Laplacian, limited mobility, teacher value-added, two-way regression model |
| JEL: | C23 |
| Date: | 2019–04–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cam:camdae:1938&r=all |
| By: | Sonja Brangewitz; Behnud Mir Djawadi; Angelika Endres; Britta Hoyer |
| Abstract: | We experimentally study the emergence of networks under a known external threat. To be more specific, we deal with the question if subjects in the role of a strategic Designer are able to form safe and efficient networks while facing a strategic Adversary who is going to attack their networks. This investigation relates theoretical predictions by Dziubinski and Goyal (2013) to actual observed behaviour. Varying the costs for protecting nodes, we designed and tested two treatments with different predictions for the equilibrium network. Furthermore, the influence of the subjects' farsightedness on their decision-making process was elicited and analysed. We find that while subjects are able to build safe networks in both treatments, equilibrium networks are only built in one of the two treatments. In the other treatment, predominantly safe networks are built but they are not efficient. Additionally, we find that farsightedness -as measured in our experiment- has no influence on whether subjects are able to build safe or efficient networks. |
| Keywords: | Research Methods/ Statistical Methods |
| Date: | 2017–06–23 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:feemth:258012&r=all |
| By: | Berliant, Marcus |
| Abstract: | We examine the fine microstructure of commuting in a game-theoretic setting with a continuum of commuters. Commuters' home and work locations can be heterogeneous. A commuter transport network is exogenous. Traffic speed is determined by link capacity and by local congestion at a time and place along a link, where local congestion at a time and place is endogenous. The model can be reinterpreted to apply to congestion on the internet. We find sufficient conditions for existence of equilibrium, that multiple equilibria are ubiquitous, and that the welfare properties of morning and evening commute equilibria differ on a tree. |
| Keywords: | Commuting; Internet traffic; Congestion externality; Efficient Nash equilibrium |
| JEL: | L86 R41 |
| Date: | 2019–03–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:92962&r=all |
| By: | Sidartha Gordon (Département d'économie); Emeric Henry (Département d'économie); Pauli Murto (Aalto University School of Business) |
| Abstract: | We introduce a neighborhood structure in a waiting game, where the payoff of stopping increases each time a neighbor stops. We show that the dynamic evolution of the network depends on initial parameters and can take the form of either a shrinking network, where players at the edges stop first, or a fragmenting network where interior players stop first. We find that, in addition to the coordination inefficiency standard in waiting games, the neighborhood structure gives rise to two other inefficiencies, the first linked to the order of exit and the second to the final distribution of remaining nodes. |
| Keywords: | Waiting games; Networks; Inefficiencies |
| JEL: | D85 C73 D83 |
| Date: | 2018–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/3lcrvb72lq9f08o6s7j1m8j4d7&r=all |