nep-net New Economics Papers
on Network Economics
Issue of 2018‒10‒08
two papers chosen by
Pedro CL Souza
Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro

  1. Social Networks and Entrepreneurship. Evidence from a Historical Episode of Industrialization By Javier Mejia
  2. Director Networks, Turnover, and Appointments By Renneboog, Luc; Zhao, Yang

  1. By: Javier Mejia (Division of Social Science)
    Abstract: This paper explores the relationship between social networks and entrepreneurship by constructing a dynamic social network from archival records. The network corresponds to the elite of a society in transition to modernity, characterized by difficult geographical conditions, market failures, and weak state capacity, as in late 19th- and early 20th-century Antioquia (Colombia). With these data, I estimate how the decision to found industrial firms related to the position of individuals in the social network. I find that individuals more important bridging the network (i.e. with higher betweenness centrality) were more involved in industrial entrepreneurship. However, I do not find individuals with a denser network to be more involved in this type of activity. The rationale of these results is that industrial entrepreneurship was a highly-complex activity that required a wide variety of complementary resources. Networks operated as substitutes for markets in the acquisition of these resources. Thus, individuals with network positions that favored the combination of a broad set of resources had a comparative advantage in industrial entrepreneurship. I run several tests to prove this rationale.
    Date: 2018–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nad:wpaper:20180020&r=net
  2. By: Renneboog, Luc (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research); Zhao, Yang
    Abstract: This paper analyzes the labor market (turnover and appointments) of executive and non-executive directors by means of social network methodology. We find that directors with strong networks are able to obtain labor market information that enables them to leave their firm more easily for better opportunities. Networks also mitigate information asymmetry problems of external director appointments. Furthermore, the strong impact of indirect connections is in line with the ‘strength of the weak ties’ theory. The fact that direct connections are less important signifies that the connections to people that are close and local are likely to convey redundant information, whereas connections to distant individuals are more efficient in terms of information acquisition and labor market performance improvement.
    Keywords: corporate governance; director networks; director turnover; director appointments
    JEL: G23 J4 J14
    Date: 2017
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tiu:tiucen:cbe90d43-2048-43b4-bee0-ce84f0b9cf6d&r=net

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