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on Network Economics |
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Issue of 2017‒03‒26
five papers chosen by Pedro CL Souza Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro |
| By: | Raphael A. Auer; Andrei A. Levchenko; Philip Sauré |
| Abstract: | We document that observed international input-output linkages contribute substantially to synchronizing producer price inflation (PPI) across countries. Using a multi-country, industry-level dataset that combines information on PPI and exchange rates with international and domestic input-output linkages, we recover the underlying cost shocks that are propagated internationally via the global input-output network, thus generating the observed dynamics of PPI. We then compare the extent to which common global factors account for the variation in actual PPI and in the underlying cost shocks. Our main finding is that across a range of econometric tests, input-output linkages account for half of the global component of PPI inflation. We report three additional findings: (i) the results are similar when allowing for imperfect cost pass-through and demand complementarities; (ii) PPI synchronization across countries is driven primarily by common sectoral shocks and input-output linkages amplify co-movement primarily by propagating sectoral shocks; and (iii) the observed pattern of international input use preserves fat-tailed idiosyncratic shocks and thus leads to a fat-tailed distribution of inflation rates, i.e., periods of disinflation and high inflation. |
| JEL: | F33 F41 F42 |
| Date: | 2017–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:23246&r=net |
| By: | Katarzyna Growiec; Jakub Growiec; Bogumil Kaminski |
| Abstract: | We provide a novel survey dataset of a representative sample of the Polish population (n = 1000), allowing for a detailed quantification of Bourdieu's (1986) definition of social capital as the aggregate of resources accessible to individuals through their social networks. Based on this data, we create an empirical 'map' of four distinct dimensions of social capital: network degree (number of social ties), network centrality, bridging social capital (ties with dissimilar others), and bonding social capital (ties with similar others, primarily with kin). Construction of the 'map' is based on mutual correlations among the four social capital dimensions as well as their diverse links with immediate outcomes – individuals' social trust and willingness to cooperate - and ultimate outcomes: individual incomes, life satisfaction and happiness. |
| Keywords: | social capital, social network structure, social trust, willingness to cooperate, new survey dataset |
| JEL: | D85 J31 Z13 |
| Date: | 2017–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sgh:kaewps:2016025&r=net |
| By: | Melguizo, Isabel |
| Abstract: | We study a dynamic model of attitude formation in which individuals average others' attitudes to develop their own. We assume that individuals exhibit homophily in sociodemographic exogenous attributes, that is, the attention they pay to each other is based on whether they possess similar attributes. We also assume that individuals exhibit homophily in attitudes, at the group level. Specifically, attributes that are salient, that is, that exhibit a substantial difference in attitudes between the groups of individuals possessing and lacking them, deserve high attention. Since we allow attention to evolve over time we prove that when there is, initially, a unique most salient attribute, it deserves growing attention overtime in detriment of the remaining ones. As a result, individuals eventually interact only with others similar to them across this attribute and disagreement persists. It materializes in two groups of thinking defined according to this attribute. |
| Keywords: | disagreement, homophily, average-based updating |
| JEL: | D83 D85 Z13 |
| Date: | 2017–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:77367&r=net |
| By: | Masaki Aoyagi; |
| Abstract: | Two firms engage in price competition to attract buyers located on a network. The value of the good of either firm to any buyer depends on the number of neighbors on the network who adopt the same good. When the size of externalities increases linearly with the number of adoptions, we identify the set of price strategies that are consistent with an equilibrium in which one of the firms monopolizes the market. The set includes marginal cost pricing as well as bipartition pricing, which offers discounts to some buyers and charges markups to others. We show that marginal cost pricing fails to be an equilibrium under non-linear externalities but identify conditions for an equilibrium with bipartition pricing to be robust against perturbations in the externalities from linearity. The idea of bipartition pricing is then applied to the analysis of platform competition in a two-sided market under local and approximately linear externalities. |
| Date: | 2017–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0993&r=net |
| By: | Petropoulos, G.; Willems, Bert (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research) |
| Abstract: | Coordinating the timing of new production facilities is one of the challenges of liberalized power sectors. It is complicated by the presence of transmission bottlenecks, oligopolistic competition and the unknown prospects of low-carbon technologies. We build a model encompassing a late and early investment stage, an existing dirty (brown) and a future clean (green) technology and a single transmission bottleneck, and compare dynamic efficiency of several market designs. Allocating network access on a short-term competitive basis distorts investment decisions, as brown firms will preempt green competitors by investing early. Dynamic efficiency is restored with long-term transmission rights that can be traded on a secondary market. We show that dynamic efficiency does not require the existence of physical rights for accessing the transmission line, but financial rights on receiving the scarcity revenues generated by the transmission line suffice. |
| Keywords: | network access; congestion management; renewable energy sources; power markets |
| JEL: | L94 L13 C72 D43 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tiu:tiucen:6d7117f0-0893-4db9-a668-ccbb7a977526&r=net |