nep-net New Economics Papers
on Network Economics
Issue of 2016‒06‒09
six papers chosen by
Yi-Nung Yang
Chung Yuan Christian University

  1. Tie creation versus tie persistence in cluster knowledge networks By Sándor Juhász; Balázs Lengyel
  2. Envious Preferences in Two-sided Matching By Ahamad, Mazbahul
  3. Networks and the macroeconomy: an empirical exploration By Acemoglu, Daron; Akcigit, Ufuk; Kerr, William R.
  4. Modeling Product Choices in a Peer Network By Fang, Di; Richards, Timothy; Carola, Grebitus
  5. The Laws and Economics of Payment Systems By Hiromi Yamaoka; Akihiko Watanabe; Chiharu Takeuchi
  6. Ronald H. Coase and the Economics of Network Infrastructures By Claude Menard

  1. By: Sándor Juhász; Balázs Lengyel
    Abstract: Knowledge networks in industrial clusters are frequently analyzed but we know very little about creation and persistence of ties in these networks. We argue that tie creation primarily depends on opportunities and thus the position ofactors in the network and in space; while tie persistence is influenced by the value of the tie. Accordingly, results from a Hungarian printing and paper product cluster suggest that reciprocity, triadic closure, and geographical proximity between firms increase the probability of tie creation. Tie persistence is positively affected by technological proximity between firms and the number of their extra-regional ties.
    Keywords: knowledge networks, clusters, network dynamics, stochastic actor-oriented models
    JEL: D85 L14 R11 O31
    Date: 2016–05
  2. By: Ahamad, Mazbahul
    Abstract: We develop a model of two-sided matching problem with individual-sided envious preferences that originate from an emulative envy effect in which a more desirable state that is preferred is owned by the other individual. We assume envious preferences influence an individual’s decision to enter into a two-sided network instead of being unassigned. In this paper, we show that an individual-sided envious preference leads to a stable matching under a two-sided market framework. Applying the mechanism of the model to behavioral contract theory, we show that individual-proposing envious acceptance leads to stable farmer-buyer contract matching considering buyer’s time invariant preference. We further argue that individual’s envious preference also contributes to herd-type acceptance that dominates individual’s logical preferences in participation decision under a less risky environment.
    Keywords: Behavioral contract design, Envious acceptance algorithm, Emulative envy effect, Envious preference, Herd-type acceptance, Market design, Network effect, Agribusiness, Agricultural and Food Policy, Industrial Organization, Institutional and Behavioral Economics, D47, D81, D86, L14,
    Date: 2016–05–23
  3. By: Acemoglu, Daron; Akcigit, Ufuk; Kerr, William R.
    Abstract: The propagation of macroeconomic shocks through input-output and geographic networks can be a powerful driver of macroeconomic fluctuations. We first exposit that in the presence of Cobb-Douglas production functions and consumer preferences, there is a specific pattern of economic transmission whereby demand-side shocks propagate upstream (to input-supplying industries) and supply-side shocks propagate downstream (to customer industries) and that there is a tight relationship between the direct impact of a shock and the magnitudes of the downstream and the upstream indirect effects. We then investigate the short-run propagation of four different types of industry-level shocks: two demand-side ones (the exogenous component of the variation in industry imports from China and changes in federal spending) and two supply-side ones (TFP shocks and variation in knowledge/ideas coming from foreign patenting). In each case, we find substantial propagation of these shocks through the input-output network, with a pattern broadly consistent with theory. Quantitatively, the network-based propagation is larger than the direct effects of the shocks. We also show quantitatively large effects from the geographic network, capturing the fact that the local propagation of a shock to an industry will fall more heavily on other industries that tend to collocate with it across local markets. Our results suggest that the transmission of various di¤erent types of shocks through economic networks and industry interlinkages could have first-order implications for the macroeconomy.
    Keywords: economic fluctuations, geographic collocation, input-output linkages, networks, propagation, shocks
    JEL: E32
    Date: 2015–12–09
  4. By: Fang, Di; Richards, Timothy; Carola, Grebitus
    Keywords: Consumer/Household Economics, Health Economics and Policy,
    Date: 2016
  5. By: Hiromi Yamaoka (Bank of Japan); Akihiko Watanabe (Bank of Japan); Chiharu Takeuchi (Bank of Japan)
    Abstract: In designing payment systems, it is necessary to address how legal and institutional frameworks incentivize economic entities, and how their payment activities influence the safety and efficiency of overall systems as well as financial stability and market developments. Such studies and analyses are becoming all the more important in line with progress in information technology and payment innovation. In particular, we need to design a framework that continuously moves payments forward without causing gridlock or unwinding, since smooth payment flows are critical especially when highly-frequent transactions are processed back-to-back. We should also pay careful attention to network externalities and systemic risks. Information security is also a key issue, regardless of whether payments are processed in a centralized or decentralized manner.
    Date: 2016–05–27
  6. By: Claude Menard (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)
    Abstract: The legitimate emphasis put on the two leading contributions from Ronald Coase, ‘The nature of the Firm’ and ‘The problem of social cost’, has its dark side: it has kept under the bushel the rich empirical investigations that provided the scaffolding of most Coasean analyses. With the possible exception of his often revisited assessment of the Federal Communications Commission (1959) and his economics of the lighthouses (1974), very little attention has been paid to the continuing investment that Coase made in the analysis of network infrastructures. Throughout his long intellectual life, Coase published over 30 notes, papers, books, and extensive reports on what we now identify as network infrastructures, mainly telecommunications and postal services, but also gas, electricity, or ‘public’ transportation. He started doing so very early, in a devastating review of a book on the institutional structure of public utilities (1938a) and continued to do so without major disruptions until his very last contributions. In this chapter, I propose an exploration of this abundant and rich material, with an emphasis on two major lessons: (1) the analyses developed by Coase remain particularly relevant for the modern analysis of network infrastructures; (2) they highlight an approach to regulation and policy a good deal more subtle than is often assumed.
    Keywords: Transaction costs, infrastructures, networks, institutions, meso-institutions
    Date: 2016

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