nep-net New Economics Papers
on Network Economics
Issue of 2015‒11‒15
eight papers chosen by
Yi-Nung Yang
Chung Yuan Christian University

  1. Mobile Access Charges and Collusion under Asymmetry By Edmond Baranes; Stefan Behringer; Jean-Christophe Poudou
  2. Network Effects on Worker Productivity By Lindquist, Matthew; Sauermann, Jan; Zenou, Yves
  3. Produzione, costi e performance delle principali reti ferroviarie dell’Unione Europea By Arrigo, Ugo; Di Foggia, Giacomo
  4. Asymmetric and Endogenous Within-Group Communication in Competitive Coordination Games By Cason, Timothy; Sheremeta, Roman; Zhang, Jingjing
  5. Voluntary Provision of Public Knowledge Goods: Group-Based Social Preferences and Coalition Formation By Tom Dedeurwaerdere; Paolo Melindi-Ghidi; Willem Sas
  6. Network-Motivated Lending Decisions By Ogura, Yoshiaki; Okui, Ryo; Saito, Yukiko Umeno
  7. Input-Output Networks and Growth Performances across Countries By Gül Ertan Özgüzer; Alper Duman
  8. Divergent Paths to a Network World. An Approach to the IT from Savings Banks Industry By Maixé-Altés, J. Carles

  1. By: Edmond Baranes; Stefan Behringer; Jean-Christophe Poudou
    Abstract: This paper considers collusion between asymmetric networks in the telecommunications industry. Its primary purpose is to fill the gap between the literature on collusion between asymmetric firms and the literature on collusion in the telecommunications industry. Employing the standard Hotelling framework of horizontal product differentiation with non-linear tariffs and network based price discrimination we allow for differentiation in a second dimension. Modulo locations, the subscribers to each network operator face an asymmetry parameter that directly impacts their demands and can capture asymmetries in demand elasticities, in demand size, or even both. The implications of these asymmetries for the possibility of sustaining collusion are investigated under alternative access pricing regimes.
    Date: 2015–10
  2. By: Lindquist, Matthew; Sauermann, Jan; Zenou, Yves
    Abstract: We use data from an in-house call center of a multi-national mobile network operator to study how co-worker productivity affects worker productivity via network effects. We also exploit data from a field experiment to analyze how exogenous changes in worker productivity due to on-the-job training affect co-worker productivity, including non-trained workers. We show that there are strong network effects in co-worker productivity. This effect is driven by conformist behavior. We also show that exposure to trained workers increases the productivity of non-trained workers. This effect works through strategic complementarities (knowledge spillovers). We demonstrate how our network model of worker productivity can be used to inform a variety of practical decisions faced by personnel managers including the design of optimal training policy.
    Keywords: on-the-job training; peer effects; social networks; worker productivity
    JEL: J24 M53 Z13
    Date: 2015–11
  3. By: Arrigo, Ugo; Di Foggia, Giacomo
    Abstract: The last decade has seen significant developments in the liberalisation and deregulation of the railway industry in Europe. One characteristic has been vertical disintegration and the separate regulation of previously state-owned companies. This study has focused on the measurement of the quality of rail infrastructure managers’ policies, infrastructure output and productivity. The objectives of the benchmarking have been targeted to determine what and where improvements are called for and to analyse the determinants of high performance levels in those organisations that have been shown to maintain high quality standards in their service delivery. That is why this paper has founded worthwhile to reclassify, using homogeneous criteria, the income statements of six European rail infrastructure managers. In an effort to fine-tune the analysis the paper has also rebuilt the traffic data in these countries in order to compute productivity and cost indicators for the rail infrastructure networks. The results, based on indicators of unit cost, suggest that the two most productive rail network is in Sweden, with a network that is efficiently managed leading to reduced cost, and Germany, which has a network characterised by significant rail traffic, which is then able to improve productivity and to bring down the unit cost. The Italian case is ranked third among the six networks and is also to be considered the only rail infrastructure in which traffic and productivity have increased while the production cost has decreased. The remaining three networks show mixed results. The cost of the Spanish rail network is relatively low but this advantage is eroded by weak traffic. Great Britain has a rail infrastructure that is fairly expensive in terms of production cost and this factor is only partially offset by an intense circulation. The French network, finally, has a production cost in line with the average, along with a productivity below the average in terms of trains per km of rail track and where only a higher average train load can rebalance this situation
    Keywords: reti ferroviarie, infrastruttura ferroviaria, ferrovie, trasporti, rail network, infrastructure manager
    JEL: H0 L52 L9
    Date: 2015
  4. By: Cason, Timothy; Sheremeta, Roman; Zhang, Jingjing
    Abstract: Within-group communication in competitive coordination games has been shown to increase competition between groups and lower efficiency. This study further explores potentially harmful effects of communication, by addressing the questions of (i) asymmetric communication and (ii) the endogenous emergence of communication. Our theoretical analysis provides testable hypotheses regarding the effect of communication on competitive behavior and efficiency. We test these predictions using a laboratory experiment. The experiment shows that although asymmetric communication is not as harmful as symmetric communication, it leads to more aggressive competition and lower efficiency relative to the case when neither group can communicate. Moreover, groups vote to endogenously open communication channels even though this leads to lower payoffs and efficiency.
    Keywords: between-group competition, within-group competition, communication, coordination, contests, experiments
    JEL: C70 D72 H41
    Date: 2015–11–05
  5. By: Tom Dedeurwaerdere (Université Catholique de Louvain and Fonds National de la Recherche Scientifique (FNRS)); Paolo Melindi-Ghidi (AMSE - Aix-Marseille School of Economics - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS) - Ecole Centrale Marseille (ECM) - AMU - Aix-Marseille Université); Willem Sas (Center for Economic Studies - CES - KU Leuven - CES - KU Leuven)
    Abstract: In this paper we develop a private-collective model of voluntary public knowledge production, where group-based social preferences have an impact on coalition formation. Our theoretical model builds on the large empirical literature on voluntary production of pooled public knowledge goods, including source code in communities of software developers or data provided to open access data repositories. Our analysis shows under which conditions social preferences such as 'group belonging' or 'peer approval' influence stable coalition size, as such rationalising several stylized facts emerging from large scale surveys of Free/Libre/Open-Source software developers (David and Shapiro, 2008), previously unaccounted for. Furthermore, heterogeneity of social preferences is added to the model to study the formation of stable, but mixed coalitions.
    Keywords: public knowledge goods,coalition formation,private-collective model,group belonging,peer approval,open source software
    Date: 2015–11
  6. By: Ogura, Yoshiaki; Okui, Ryo; Saito, Yukiko Umeno
    Abstract: We theoretically and empirically demonstrate that monopolistic or collusive banks will keep lending to a loss-making firm at an interest rate lower than the prime rate if the firm is located in an influential position in an inter-firm supply network. An influential firm generates a positive externality, and its exit damages the sales in the supply network. To internalize this externality, the banks may forbear on debt collection and/or bail out such influential firms when the cost to support the loss-making influential company can be recouped by imposing high interest on less influential companies. The analytical model shows that such forbearance can improve welfare. Our empirical study, performed using a unique dataset containing information about inter-firm transactions, provides evidence for such network-motivated lending decisions. In particular, this effect is more clearly observed at less credit-worthy firms whose main bank is a regional bank. Notably, we observe that such banks are often dominant lenders in the local loan market, and most of their clientele do not have direct access to the stock and bond market.
    Keywords: supply network, influence coefficient, centrality, forbearance, bailout
    JEL: D57 G21 G32 L13 L14
    Date: 2015–10
  7. By: Gül Ertan Özgüzer (Department of Economics, Izmir University of Economics); Alper Duman (Department of Economics, Izmir University of Economics)
    Abstract: This paper investigates the relationship between economic growth performances of countries and their structural input-output network characteristics. We employ a new centrality measure developed by Blöchl et al. (2011) for directed networks with self-loops to determine sectoral heterogeneities in IO tables of 33 OECD countries over the period 1995-2011. Relating the gini indices of these centrality measures to output growth reveals that countries with less heterogenous IO networks tend to grow faster. Such finding implies a key role for the inter-linkages across sectors in economic growth, and underlines the importance of designation of sectoral policy measures to counteract heterogeneity of IO networks.
    Keywords: input-output tables, networks, centrality, economic growth, heterogeneity
    JEL: C67 O50
    Date: 2015–11
  8. By: Maixé-Altés, J. Carles
    Abstract: This study provides information on how the process of technological globalization was implemented prior to the Internet and what its limits were, which certainly helps to understand how computers are changing the world. One can see divergent patterns in the process of introducing computers (using the worldwide savings bank industry as a reference). However, the foundations of this divergence should be situated within an idiosyncratic and not an asymmetric landscape as a consequence of the role that adoption/appropriation processes (the end-user as an active participant) play in the perspective of technological diffusion.
    Keywords: retail banking, world savings banks industry, computers, ICT, computing history
    JEL: N20 N70
    Date: 2015–11–09

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