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on Network Economics |
| By: | Nelson Sá (Department of Economics, Vassar College, Poughkeepsie, New York 12604, USA); Ana Paula Ribeiro (CEF.UP and FEP, Universidade do Porto, Portugal); Vitor Carvalho (CEF.UP and FEP, Universidade do Porto, Portugal) |
| Abstract: | This paper makes use of a sample of articles published between 1999 and 2013 by economists affiliated in Portuguese institutions to examine the impact of co-authorship over the quality of academic research. We build a unique database to characterize the role played by distinct affiliations and educational backgrounds on this process, while controlling for experience and individual quality levels. Mentoring relations are identified as one possible source of negative bias on the measurement of teamwork productivity, which we proxy for and quantify here for the first time. The empirical results also suggest that co-authorship across domestic institutions does not carry any significant impact on research quality, but international collaboration enhances it. A doctorate earned abroad is shown to directly improve publication outcomes, besides making it easier to establish partnerships across frontiers. These findings underscore the importance of accessing external knowledge networks in academia, offering relevant policy insights for a large number of small and less developed countries. |
| Keywords: | Knowledge Networks; Co-Authorship; Academic Productivity |
| JEL: | A11 J44 I23 |
| Date: | 2015–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:por:fepwps:565&r=all |
| By: | Alexei Kireyev; Andrei Leonidov |
| Abstract: | This paper proposes a method for assessing international spillovers from nominal demand shocks. It quantifies the impact of a shock in one country on all other countries. The paper concludes that the network effects in shock spillovers can be substantial, comparable, and often exceed the initial shock. Individual countries may amplify, absorb, or block spillovers. Most developed countries pass-through shocks, whereas low-income countries and oil exporters tend to block shock spillovers. The method is used to study demand shocks originating from a large and medium country, China and Ukraine respectively. |
| Keywords: | Spillovers;Ukraine;International trade;China;Demand;External shocks;Patterns of trade;Econometric models;Trade;shocks, spillover, network, balance of payments, imports, import, trading partners, Neural Networks and Related Topics, Country and Industry Studies of Trade, Open Economy Macroeconomics, International Policy Coordination and Transmission, Forecasting and Simulation, |
| Date: | 2015–07–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:15/149&r=all |
| By: | Luiza Antoun de Almeida |
| Abstract: | The recent financial crisis highlighted that balance sheet exposures can be a major shock transmission channel. Using sectoral accounts data in combination with data from the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey, International Investment Position, and BIS this paper estimates bilateral exposures between financial and non-financial sectors in three different financial instruments within and across G-4 economies (Euro Area, Japan, U.K. and U.S.). The generated financial networks represent a powerful tool for assessing financial stability, as they allow for the identification of systemically important sectors. The analysis suggests that after the financial crisis bilateral exposures in debt securities have increased, while exposures in loans and equities have declined. Shock simulations reveal that the vulnerability of the financial sector to the government sector has increased considerably since the outbreak of the financial crisis. |
| Keywords: | Cross country analysis;Debt securities;Euro Area;Financial instruments;Financial sector;Financial stability;Loans;Japan;International financial markets;Nonbank financial sector;Stocks;United Kingdom;United States;Balance sheet exposures, cross-border exposures, Data Gaps Initiative (DGI), financial networks, sectoral accounts, debt, financial crisis, Financial Aspects of Economic Integration, Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy, Government Policy and Regulation, |
| Date: | 2015–05–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:imf:imfwpa:15/111&r=all |
| By: | Boris van Leeuwen (Toulouse School of Economics); Abhijit Ramalingam (University of East Anglia); David Rojo Arjona (University of Leicester); Arthur Schram (Amsterdam School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | We investigate the effects of power on cooperation in repeated social dilemma settings. Groups of five players play either multi-player trust games or VCM-games on a fixed network. Power stems from having the authority to allocate funds raised through voluntary contributions by all members and/or from having a pivotal position in the network (centrality). We compare environments with and without ostracism by allowing players in some treatments to exclude others from further participation in the network. Our results show that power matters but that its effects hinge strongly on the type involved. Reminiscent of the literature on leadership, players with authority often act more cooperatively than those without such power. Nevertheless, when possible, they are quickly ostracized from the group. Thus, this kind of power is not tolerated by the powerless. In stark contrast, centrality leads to less cooperative behavior and this free riding is not punished; conditional on cooperativeness, players with power from centrality are less likely to be ostracized than those without. Hence, not only is this type of power tolerated, but so is the free riding it leads to. |
| Keywords: | power, cooperation, networks, public goods |
| JEL: | C91 D02 D03 H41 |
| Date: | 2015–03–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uea:wcbess:15-04&r=all |
| By: | Faridah Djellal (CLERSE - Centre lillois d'études et de recherches sociologiques et économiques - CNRS - Université Lille 1 - Sciences et technologies); Faïz Gallouj (CLERSE - Centre lillois d'études et de recherches sociologiques et économiques - CNRS - Université Lille 1 - Sciences et technologies) |
| Abstract: | Public-private innovation networks in services (PPINS) are a new expression of traditional innovation networks (INs) in contemporary service economies. There are a number of ways in which this new expression differs from the other. It differs from it, first of all, by its emphasis on market services and on public and non-market services in the dynamics of innovation. But PPINS differ from INs most of all in the nature of the innovation that is taken into account (which is the subject of the network implementation). This innovation is no longer limited to economic and technological innovation, but also includes non-technological and social innovation-which most often remain invisible to our traditional analytical tools. The purpose of this paper is to examine how PPINS contribute to the implementation of invisible innovations, and thus to the introduction of invisible/hidden innovation within the innovation network tradition. It addresses the following three points: i) the nature of the invisible innovation implemented within PPINS, ii) the invisible innovation organization modes within PPINS, iii) the public policy consequences of the focus on invisible innovation (and corresponding PPINS). |
| Date: | 2015–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01191137&r=all |
| By: | Günther, Michael (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University); Hellmann, Tim (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University) |
| Abstract: | Increasing concerns about climate change have given rise to the formation of International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) as a possible solution to limit global pollution effects. In this paper, we study the stability of IEAs in a repeated game framework where we restrict to strategies which are simple and invariant to renegotiation. Our main contribution to the literature on IEAs is that we allow for heterogeneous patterns of pollution such that additional to a global effect of pollution there are local pollution effects represented by a network structure. We show that stable IEAs exist if the network structure is balanced. Too large asymmetries in the degree of local spillovers may however lead to non-existence of stable structures. The generality of our approach allows for several applications to general problems in the provision of public goods. |
| Keywords: | Coalition structures, Networks, International environmental agreements, Weak renegotiation-proofness |
| Date: | 2015–09–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bie:wpaper:545&r=all |