nep-net New Economics Papers
on Network Economics
Issue of 2015‒09‒05
eight papers chosen by
Yi-Nung Yang
Chung Yuan Christian University

  1. The role of regional sectoral specialization on the geography of innovation networks: a comparison between firms located in regions in developed and emerging economies By Plechero, Monica; Chaminade , Cristina
  2. Where Do Social Preferences Come From? By Chaning Jang; John Lynham
  3. Moving to Opportunity or Isolation? Network Effects of a Randomized Housing Lottery in Urban India By Barnhardt, Sharon; Field, Erica; Pande, Rohini
  4. Autonomics: an autonomous and intelligent economic platform and next generation money tool By Benjamin Munro; Julia McLachlan
  5. Dispersion in macroeconomic volatility between the core and periphery of the international trade network By Chakrabarti, Anindya S.
  6. Exact P-Values for Network Interference By Athey, Susan; Eckles, Dean; Imbens, Guido W.
  7. Communication and coordination: Experimental evidence from farmer groups in Senegal: By Aflahagah, Fo Kodjo Dzinyefa; Bernard, Tanguy; Viceisza, Angelino
  8. Missions prescrites et expériences vécues : quelles collaborations professionnalisantes entre les institutions et les acteurs de terrain ? Le cas de directeurs de centres de formation des apprentis du bâtiment et des travaux publics (CFA-BTP) en France By Marek Lawinski

  1. By: Plechero, Monica (DEAMS – University of Trieste, Italy & CIRCLE, Lund University); Chaminade , Cristina (CIRCLE, Lund University)
    Abstract: Recently, there has been a rise of contributions in innovation and economic geography studies on how firms from specific industries and regional innovation systems (RISs) rely on international networks to innovate. So far, the focus has been on single cases, firms located in well-known RISs and international linkages, without really distinguishing those with geographically close partners from those with partners from distant locations. Using primary firm-level data, this article compares the patterns of collaboration for innovation in a selection of Swedish, Norwegian, Chinese and Indian regions with an ICT cluster specialization. The results show that firms in RISs in emerging economies tend to link more to innovation networks with a real global character, particularly in relation to new-to-the-world innovation. It also shows that firms in the most successful RISs in ICT clusters rely more than others on networks with organizations in close proximity.
    Keywords: Globalization; innovation networks; developed economies; emerging economies; China; India; Sweden; Norway; regional innovation system; cluster specialization; ICT; new-to-the-world innovation
    JEL: O18 O33
    Date: 2015–08–16
  2. By: Chaning Jang (Princeton University, Department of Psychology); John Lynham (University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics)
    Abstract: Where do preferences for fairness come from? We use a unique field setting to test for a spillover of sharing norms from the workplace to a laboratory experiment. Fishermen working in teams receive random income shocks (catching fish) that they must regularly divide among themselves. We demonstrate a clear correlation between sharing norms in the field and sharing norms in the lab. Furthermore, the spillover effect is stronger for fishermen who have been exposed to a sharing norm for longer, suggesting that our findings are not driven by selection effects. Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that work environments shape social preferences.
    JEL: Q2 C9 C7 B4 D1
    Date: 2015–08
  3. By: Barnhardt, Sharon (Indian Institute of Management); Field, Erica (Duke University); Pande, Rohini (Harvard University)
    Abstract: A housing lottery in an Indian city provided winning slum dwellers the opportunity to move into improved housing on the city's periphery. Fourteen years later, relative to lottery losers, winners report improved housing farther from the city center, but no change in family income or human capital. Winners also report increased isolation from family and caste networks and lower access to informal insurance. We observe significant program exit: 34% of winners never moved into the subsidized housing and 32% eventually exited. Our results point to the importance of considering social networks when designing housing programs for the poor.
    Date: 2015–08
  4. By: Benjamin Munro; Julia McLachlan
    Abstract: We propose a high level network architecture for an economic system that integrates money, governance and reputation. We introduce a method for issuing, and redeeming a digital coin using a mechanism to create a sustainable global economy and a free market. To maintain a currency's value over time, and therefore be money proper, we claim it must be issued by the buyer and backed for value by the seller, exchanging the products of labour, in a free market. We also claim that a free market and sustainable economy cannot be maintained using economically arbitrary creation and allocation of money. Nakamoto, with Bitcoin, introduced a new technology called the cryptographic blockchain to operate a decentralised and distributed accounts ledger without the need for an untrusted third party. This blockchain technology creates and allocates new digital currency as a reward for "proof-of-work", to secure the network. However, no currency, digital or otherwise, has solved how to create and allocate money in an economically non-arbitrary way, or how to govern and trust a world-scale free enterprise money system. We propose an "Ontologically Networked Exchange" (ONE), with purpose as its highest order domain. Each purpose is defined in a contract, and the entire economy of contracts is structured in a unified ontology. We claim to secure the ONE network using economically non-arbitrary methodologies and economically incented human behaviour. Decisions influenced by reputation help to secure the network without an untrusted third party. The stack of contracts, organised in a unified ontology, functions as a super recursive algorithm, with individual use programming the algorithm, acting as the "oracle". The state of the algorithm becomes the "memory" of a scalable and trustable artificial intelligence (AI). This AI offers a new platform for what we call the "Autonomy-of-Things" (AoT).
    Date: 2015–06
  5. By: Chakrabarti, Anindya S.
    Abstract: At the country level, macroeconomic volatility tends to correlate with trade openness although the direction of correlation is not stable across samples. Here I consider trade networks as sum of all pairwise trade linkages to emphasize that different linkages contribute differently to the transmission or mitigation of shocks, and show that across the network volatility is inversely related to centrality, a summary measure of strength of the linkages specific to a country. I study a multi-country, multi-sector trade model subject to idiosyncratic productivity and liquidity shocks, and characterize volatility as an explicit function of centrality, diversification and the Herfindahl of the trade network in equilibrium. With sufficient skewness in trade linkages across countries, similar shocks generate different levels of repercussions across the network. The conventional effect of diversification holds true that countries with better diversified portfolio fluctuate less compared. Centrality directly contributes to better aggregation of shocks. Combined effect of these two channels dominates the opposite effect that a more central country is also more exposed to shocks. The model calibrated to the E.U. generates and closely replicates the negative relationship between centrality and volatility. The theoretical model is then extended to capture stochasticity and sparsity in the trade networks.
  6. By: Athey, Susan (Stanford University); Eckles, Dean (Facebook); Imbens, Guido W. (Stanford University)
    Abstract: We study the calculation of exact p-values for a large class of non-sharp null hypotheses about treatment effects in a setting with data from experiments involving members of a single connected network. The class includes null hypotheses that limit the effect of one unit's treatment status on another according to the distance between units; for example, the hypothesis might specify that the treatment status of immediate neighbors has no effect, or that units more than two edges away have no effect. We also consider hypotheses concerning the validity of sparsification of a network (for example based on the strength of ties) and hypotheses restricting heterogeneity in peer effects (so that, for example, only the number or fraction treated among neighboring units matters). Our general approach is to define an artificial experiment, such that the null hypothesis that was not sharp for the original experiment is sharp for the artificial experiment, and such that the randomization analysis for the artificial experiment is validated by the design of the original experiment.
    JEL: C14 C21 C52
    Date: 2015–06
  7. By: Aflahagah, Fo Kodjo Dzinyefa; Bernard, Tanguy; Viceisza, Angelino
    Abstract: Coordination failures are at the heart of development traps. Although communication can reduce such failures, to date experimental evidence has primarily been lab based. This paper studies the impact of communication in stag hunt coordination games played by members of Senegalese farmer groups—a setting where collective commercialization has suffered from coordination failure, as in many rural contexts. We find that communication increases coordination only in larger experimental groups, where it matters most from the standpoint of poverty traps. We also find that these effects are driven by communication’s impact on perceptions of strategic uncertainty. Some policy implications are discussed.
    Keywords: coordination, communication, cooperatives, field experimentation, development, strategic uncertainty,
    Date: 2015
  8. By: Marek Lawinski (CUEEP SEFA - Université Lille 1 - Département Sciences de l'éducation et de la formation - Université Lille 1 - Sciences et technologies)
    Abstract: Between 2006 and 2014, we could observe, within the French network of the training centres coordinated by a national institution and providing curricula leading to the construction crafts, an emergence of the regional level of management and organisation. Progressively, interactions among all the levels concerned gave the directors of these training centres opportunities to reinforce and make evolve their professional postures and capacities. Within this communication, we intend to confront intentions as prescribed and their real impact and, therefore, to explain to which extent the collaborations that take place between both situations contributed to the professionalization of the directors concerned. The author of this article is in charge of the capacity building processes related to the staff of the training centres mentioned above and coordinated by the French National Committee for the Coordination of Apprenticeship in the Construction industry (CCCA-BTP).
    Abstract: Entre 2006 et 2014, dans le réseau français des CFA-BTP, piloté par une institution nationale, est apparu le niveau régional d’organisation et de gestion. Progressivement, les interactions entre les tous niveaux concernés par cette évolution ont fourni aux directeurs de ces CFA des opportunités de renforcer et de faire évoluer leurs postures et capacités professionnelles. Dans cette communication, les intentions prescrites et leurs effets réels seront mis en tension pour expliquer comment les collaborations qui ont eu lieu entre les deux ont été professionnalisantes pour les directeurs concernés. L’auteur de cet article est responsable du dispositif de développement professionnel des équipes de CFA-BTP, coordonné par le Comité de concertation et de coordination de l’apprentissage du BTP (CCCA-BTP), organisme français paritaire et national.
    Date: 2015–06–30

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