nep-net New Economics Papers
on Network Economics
Issue of 2015‒01‒31
seven papers chosen by
Yi-Nung Yang
Chung Yuan Christian University

  1. Role of Platform Providers in Software Ecosystems By Kibae Kim ; Jörn Altmann ; Sodam Baek
  2. Airport privatization competition including domestic airline networks By Akio Kawasaki
  3. An economic network in Nonth America By AROCHE REYES, FIDEL ; MARQUEZ MENDOZA, MARCO ANTONIO
  4. Transparency in food networks - where to go? By Schiefer, Gerhard ; Reiche, Robert
  5. Global environmental agreements and international trade: Asymmetry of countries matters By Thomas Eichner ; Rüdiger Pethig
  6. The Limits of Reputation in Platform Markets:An Empirical Analysis and Field Experiment By Chris Nosko ; Steven Tadelis
  7. Hearing the voice of future generations: A laboratory experiment of ``Demeny voting’’ By Yoshio Kamijo ; Yoichi Hizen ; Tatsuyoshi Saijo

  1. By: Kibae Kim (Technology Management, Economics, and Policy Program; College of Engineering; Seoul National University ); Jörn Altmann (Technology Management, Economics, and Policy Program; College of Engineering; Seoul National University ); Sodam Baek (Technology Management, Economics, and Policy Program; College of Engineering; Seoul National University )
    Abstract: Through the advancement of information technology, a new type of innovation could emerge. This innovation type suggests a leading company to open up its software service platform to customers as well as competitors. Many innovation studies have been performed in the past, in order to understand the structure of this interaction among platform users from a network science perspective. By focusing on the internal mechanisms of software vendors only, these studies missed the role of platform providers in the innovation process though. In this paper, we fill this gap by investigating the impact of platform providers on the structure of a software service network. The empirical data about the software services network has been gathered from AppExchange. It is used to identify the clusters in the network and the network position of each software service. Using the Kruskal-Wallis test, we infer from those results that the network position of the platform providers software services is different from the network position of software services of third party vendors. In particular, our results show that the software services released by the platform provider locate at hub positions, while those released by third party vendors locate at positions interconnecting clusters. These results imply a role division between platform providers and third party vendors in this innovation type. The former leads the overall innovation on the platform, while the third party vendors interconnect software services of different categories.
    Keywords: Open Innovation, Software Ecosystem, Platform-as-a-Service, Software-as-a-Service,, Platform Leadership, Network Analysis, Kruskal-Wallis Test.
    JEL: A12 C12 D85 L86 M15 O32
    Date: 2015–01
  2. By: Akio Kawasaki
    Abstract: This paper addresses the problem of hub airport privatization, similar to the studies by Matsumura and Matsushima (2012) and Mantin (2012). However, differentiating from their papers, this paper introduces a domestic airline network. That is, each country has one major hub airport and some local airports. The main result obtained in this paper is as follows. When at least one country has a small domestic airline network, the same result as that by Matsumura and Matsushima (2012) and Mantin (2012) is obtained. However, when both countries have a large domestic airline network, the public airport may be an equilibrium outcome. Furthermore, depending on the size of the airline network and the degree of airline competition, asymmetric equilibrium can also appear.
    Date: 2013–12
    Abstract: Economic structures can be studied as networks of industries linked through flows of commodities that - in turn - the consuming sectors use as inputs. The Input-Output (IO) model is a suitable framework for analysing those structures, because its main target is the study of interdependence between sectors. In this paper we use a North American multi-region IO table in order to identify an economic regional network that results from a subset of the links between sectors in the countries involved. Those are defined by the exchange of goods between industries. Further, a density measure is used as an indicator of the network complexity, explained by the integration level and shape between those economies. Our results show that the US is by far the most integrated economy in North America; it also determines the shape of the network structure. In contrast, Canada and Mexico maintain scarce direct relationships.
    Keywords: Economic structure, economic network, Input-Output model, North America
    JEL: C67 F15 O51
    Date: 2012
  4. By: Schiefer, Gerhard ; Reiche, Robert
    Abstract: One of the core requests in assuring competitiveness and sustainability in the food value chain is transparency. The complexity of the sector, the absence of focal players in the field,the complexity in the collection, processing and communication of information, and limitations in information and network technology have made it difficult to find concepts and solutions that could solve the transparency problem at consumers’ end. This is where the Future Internet provides opportunities that allowed to meet the challenge and to appropriately address the transparency problem. This paper introduces into the subject through a detailed outline of the transparency complexity of the food sector and the requirements on concepts and systems that could deal with it.
    Keywords: Transparency, food networks, information technology, Future Internet, Industrial Organization,
    Date: 2014–08
  5. By: Thomas Eichner ; Rüdiger Pethig
    Abstract: We investigate the formation of global climate agreements (= stable grand climate coalitions) in a model, in which climate policy takes the form of carbon emission taxation and fossil fuel and consumption goods are traded on world markets. We expand the model of Eichner and Pethig (2014) by considering countries that are identical within each of two groups but differ across groups with respect to climate damage or fossil fuel demand. Our numerical analysis suggests that climate damage asymmetry tends to discourage cooperation in the grand coalition. The effects of fuel-demand asymmetry depend on fossil fuel abundance. If fuel is very abundant, the grand coalition fails to be stable independent of the degree of fuel demand asymmetry. If fuel is sufficiently scarce, low degrees of fuel demand asymmetry discourage cooperation whereas higher degrees of asymmetry stabilize the grand coalition.
    Keywords: fuel demand, climate damage, international trade, asymmetry, stability, grand coalition
    JEL: C72 F02 Q50 Q58
    Date: 2014
  6. By: Chris Nosko ; Steven Tadelis
    Abstract: We argue that reputation mechanisms used by platform markets suffer from two problems. First, buyers may draw conclusions about the quality of the platform from single transactions, causing a reputational externality across sellers. Second, for a variety of reasons we discuss, reputations will be biased. We document these problems using eBay data and claim that platforms can benefit from identifying and promoting higher quality sellers. We create an unobservable measure of seller quality and demonstrate the benefits of our approach through a controlled experiment that prioritizes better quality sellers. We highlight the importance of reputational externalities and chart an agenda that aims to create more realistic models of platform markets.
    JEL: D82 L15 L21 L86
    Date: 2015–01
  7. By: Yoshio Kamijo (School of Economics and Management, Kochi University of Technology ); Yoichi Hizen (School of Economics and Management, Kochi University of Technology ); Tatsuyoshi Saijo (School of Economics and Management, Kochi University of Technology )
    Abstract: We report the first experimental evidence on the effect of ``Demeny voting,’’ wherein some people (e.g., parents) are given additional votes as proxy for the future generation (e.g., their children). In our experiment, three subjects are separated into the present and future generations, two of them regarded as the present generation. The present generation members are asked to determine the resource allocation between the present and future generations by majority voting. We compare voting behaviors and outcomes between ordinary majority voting (i.e., each of the two in the present generation has one vote) and Demeny voting (i.e., one of the two has two votes while the other has one vote). We obtain mixed evidence on whether the outcome of Demeny voting reflects the interest of the future generation. A remarkable finding is that half of the subjects who voted in favor of the future generation under ordinary voting reversed their decisions when they were given only one vote under Demeny voting; that is, they voted in favor of the present generation. This finding highlights the need, when planning to introduce Demeny voting, to consider the behaviors of not only people who are given additional votes but also those with only one vote. Finally, we compare voting behaviors between male and female subjects. We find that female subjects use their additional votes for the future generation more frequently than male subjects do, implying that women are less likely to abuse their proxy position than are men.
    Keywords: Aging Society, Demeny Voting, Laboratory Experiment
    JEL: C91 D72 J13
    Date: 2015–01

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