nep-net New Economics Papers
on Network Economics
Issue of 2015‒01‒19
six papers chosen by
Yi-Nung Yang
Chung Yuan Christian University

  1. Single Till or Dual Till at Airports: a Two-Sided Market By Estelle Malavolti
  2. Cooperation and Expectations in Networks: Evidence from a Network Public Good Experiment in Rural India By Stefano Caria; Marcel Fafchamps
  3. Network Structures in Regional Innovation Systems By Jérôme Stuck; Tom Broekel; Javier Revilla
  4. Asymmetric Neutrality Regulation and Innovation at the Edges: Fixed vs. Mobile Networks By Choi, Jay; Jeon, Doh-Shin; Kim, Byung-Cheol
  5. Which club should I attend, Dad?: Targeted socialization and production By Facundo Albornoz; Antonio Cabrales; Esther Hauk
  6. Evaluating Collaborations in Comparative Effectiveness Research: Opportunities and Challenges for Social Network Analysis By Joseph S. Zickafoose; Laura D. Kimmey; Amber Tomas; Dominick Esposito; Eugene Rich

  1. By: Estelle Malavolti (Ecole Nationale de l'Aviation Civile (ENAC))
    Abstract: Big airports profits are more and more often coming from commercial activities such as retailing. However, commercial services are relatively far from the original mission of the airport: providing airlines with aviation services such as ground handling, terminal management or airside operations, and being regulated for that because of an obvious dominant position with respect to airlines. For this reason, one can advocate for the separation of the two activities, i.e. for a dual till approach, in which only the aeronautical activity is regulated. We, instead, suggest that a single till regulation, in which the total profit of the airport is examined, is relevant because it allows to take into account the externalities existing between retailing and aeronautical services. Using a two-sided market approach (Armstrong 2006, Rochet-Tirole 2003, 2006), we show that the airport is a platform which makes the shops and the passengers meet. The retailing activity depends on how many passengers are circulating and connecting at the airport, as well as the time they spent in the airport, while passengers value the least connecting time as possible. We show that the aeronautical tax can be either higher or lower under single till depending on whether the impact of the passengers demand or of the waiting time is the more important for the shops.
    Keywords: two-sided market, network externalities, air transport economics
    JEL: L11 L12 L89
    Date: 2014–12
  2. By: Stefano Caria; Marcel Fafchamps
    Abstract: We play a one-shot public good game in rural India between farmers connected by an exogenous star network. Contributions by the centre of the star reach more players and have a larger impact on aggregate payoffs than contributions by the spoke players. Yet, we find that the centre player contributes just as much as the average of the spokes. We elicit expectations about the decisions of the centre player and, in randomly selected sessions, we disclose the average expectation of the farmers in the network. Farmers match the disclosed values frequently and do so more often when the monetary cost of making a contribution is reduced. However, disclosure is not associated with higher contributions. Our results support the predictions of a model of other-regarding preferences where players care about the expectations of others. This model is helpful to understand barriers to improvement in pro-social behaviour when groups expect low pro-sociality.
    Date: 2014
  3. By: Jérôme Stuck (1 Institute of Economic and Cultural Geography, Leibniz University, Hanover, Germany); Tom Broekel (Institute of Economic and Cultural Geography, Leibniz University, Hanover, Germany); Javier Revilla (Institute of Geography, University of Cologne, Cologne Germany)
    Abstract: While interactive learning and inter-organisational relations are fundamental building blocks in RIS theory, the framework is rarely related to investigations of regional knowledge network structures, because in RIS literature relational structures and interaction networks are discussed in a rather fuzzy and generic manner with the ‘network term’ often being used rather metaphorically. This paper contributes to the literature by discussing theoretical arguments about interactions and knowledge exchange relations in the RIS literature from the perspective of social network analysis. More precise, it links network theoretical concepts and insights to the well-known classification of RIS types by Cooke (2004). We thereby exemplarily show how the RIS literature and the literature on regional knowledge networks can benefit from considering insights of the respective other.
    Keywords: regional innovation system, network analysis, SNA, RIS
    JEL: O18 O33 R11 R12
    Date: 2014–12–17
  4. By: Choi, Jay; Jeon, Doh-Shin; Kim, Byung-Cheol
    Abstract: We study how net neutrality regulations affect a high-bandwidth content provider's (CP) investment incentives in quality of services (QoS). We find that the effects crucially depend on network capacity levels. With limited capacity, as in mobile networks, prioritized delivery services are complementary to the CP's investments and can facilitate entry of congestion-sensitive content; however, this creates more congestion for other existing content. By contrast, if capacity is relatively large, as in fixed-line networks, prioritized services reduce QoS investment as they become substitutes, but improves traffic management. These results are qualitatively robust to the extension of the ISP's endogenous choice of network capacity.
    Keywords: Net neutrality, asymmetric regulation, quality of service, investment incentives, queuing, congestion, mobile/fixed networks
    JEL: D4 K2 L1 L5 O3
    Date: 2014–08–31
  5. By: Facundo Albornoz; Antonio Cabrales; Esther Hauk
    Abstract: We study a model that integrates productive and socialization efforts with network choice and parental investments. We characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium of this game. We first show that individuals underinvest in productive and social effort, but that solving only the investment problem can exacerbate the misallocations due to network choice, to the point that it may generate an even lower social welfare if one of the networks is sufficiently disadvantaged. We also study the interaction of parental investment with network choice. We relate these equilibrium results with characteristics that we find in the data on economic co-authorship and field transmission between advisors and advisees.
    Date: 2014–12
  6. By: Joseph S. Zickafoose; Laura D. Kimmey; Amber Tomas; Dominick Esposito; Eugene Rich
    Abstract: Multidisciplinary, multi-institutional collaboration has become a key feature of comparative effectiveness research (CER), and CER funders have made promotion of these types of collaboration an implicit, and sometimes explicit, goal of funding. An important challenge in evaluating CER programs is understanding if and how different forms of collaboration are associated with successful CER projects. This article explores the potential use of social network analysis to address research questions about the associations between collaboration and the success of CER projects.
    Keywords: collaboration, multidisciplinary, network theory, social network analysis
    JEL: I
    Date: 2014–12–30

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