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on Network Economics |
| By: | Julie Beugnot; Bernard Fortin; Guy Lacroix; Marie-Claire Villeval |
| Abstract: | This paper extends the standard work effort model by allowing workers to interact through networks. We investigate experimentally whether peer performances and peer contextual effects influence individual performances. Two types of network are considered. Participants in Recursive networks are paired with participants who played previously in isolation. In Simultaneous networks, participants interact in real-time along an undirected line. Mean peer effects are identified in both cases. Individual performances increase with peer performances in the recursive network. In the simultaneous network, endogenous peer effects vary according to gender: they are large for men but not statistically different from zero for women. |
| Keywords: | Peer effects, social networks, work effort, piece rate, experiment., |
| JEL: | C91 J16 J24 J31 M52 |
| Date: | 2013–08–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cir:cirwor:2013s-27&r=net |
| By: | Bluhm, Marcel; Krahnen, Jan Pieter |
| Abstract: | We analyze the emergence of systemic risk in a network model of interconnected bank balance sheets. The model incorporates multiple sources of systemic risk, including size of financial institutions, direct exposure from interbank lendings, and asset fire sales. We suggest a new macroprudential risk management approach building on a system wide value at risk (SVaR). Under the SVaR metric, the contribution of individual banks to systemic risk is well defined and can be approximated by a Shapley value-type measure. We show that, in a SVaR regime, a fair systemic risk charge which is proportional to a bank's individual contribution to systemic risk diverges from the optimal macroprudential capitalization of the banks from a planner's perspective. The results have implications for the design of macroprudential capital surcharges. -- |
| Keywords: | systemic risk,systemic risk charge,macroprudential supervision,Shapley value,financial network |
| JEL: | C15 G01 G21 G28 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:safewp:48&r=net |
| By: | Fabio Sabatini; Francesco Sarracino |
| Abstract: | Studies in the social capital literature have documented two stylised facts: first, a decline in measures of social participation has occurred in many OECD countries. Second, and more recently, the success of social networking sites (SNSs) has resulted in a steep rise in online social participation. Our study adds to this body of research by conducting the first empirical assessment of how online networking affects two economically relevant aspects of social capital, i.e. trust and sociability. We find that participation in SNSs such as Facebook and Twitter has a positive effect on face to face interactions. However, social trust decreases with online interactions. Several interpretations of these findings are discussed. |
| Keywords: | social participation; online networks; Facebook; Internet-mediated communication; social capital; broadband; digital divide |
| JEL: | C36 D85 O33 Z13 |
| Date: | 2013–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:usi:wpaper:692&r=net |
| By: | Besancenot, Damien (University of Paris 13 and CEPN); Vranceanu, Radu (ESSEC Business School and THEMA) |
| Abstract: | In April 2013, all of the major academic publishing houses moved thousands of journal titles to an original hybrid model, under which authors of accepted papers can choose between an expensive open access track and the traditional track available only to subscribers. This paper argues that authors might use publication strategy as a quality signaling device. The imperfect information game between authors and readers presents several types of Perfect Bayesian Equilibria, including a separating equilibrium in which only authors of high quality papers are driven toward the open access track. The publishing house will choose the open-access publication fee that supports the emergence of the highest return equilibrium. Journal structures will evolve over time according to the journals' accessibility - quality profiles. |
| Keywords: | Academic publishing; Open access; Knowledge di¤usion; Imperfect information; Signaling |
| JEL: | A14 D52 L23 |
| Date: | 2014–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ebg:essewp:dr-14006&r=net |
| By: | Julia Hauberer (University of Hamburg - School of Business Administration); Alexander Tatarko (National Research University Higher School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | This article deals with the influence of cultural background on the sources of social capital. We analyse four different culture groups – Czechs and Russians representing post-modernized cultures and Dagestanis and Chechens representing traditional cultures. Applying univariate comparisons and Structural Equation Modelling, our results indicate a clear difference between post-modern and traditional cultures. Postmodernity seems to come along with less family network density and greater formal network size; however, also with higher family social capital access than traditionalism. No clear distinction can be drawn regarding size of friendship network and social capital accessed by the friendship network. |
| Keywords: | individual social capital, social networks, culture, modernization, tradition, resource generator |
| JEL: | D85 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hig:wpaper:38/soc/2014&r=net |
| By: | Dhillon, Amrita (Kings College, London); Peeters, Ronald (Maastrict); Muge Yukse, Ayse (Maastrict) |
| Abstract: | The use of social networks in the workplace has been documented by many authors, although the reasons for their widespread prevalence are less well known. In this paper we present evidence based on a lab experiment that suggests quite strongly that social networks are used by employers to reduce worker moral hazard. We capture moral hazard with a dictator game between the referrer and worker. The worker chooses how much to return under dierent settings of social proximity. Social proximity is captured using Facebook friendship information gleaned anonymously from subjects once they have been recruited. Since employers themselves do not have access to social connections, they delegate the decision to referrers who can select among workers with dierent degrees of social proximity to themselves. We show that employers choose referrals over anonymous hiring relatively more when they know that the referrer has access to friends, and are willing to delegate more often when the social proximity between referrer and worker is potentially higher. In keeping with this expectation, referrers also choose workers with a greater social proximity to themselves and workers who are closer to referrers indeed pay back more to the referrer. The advantage of the lab setting is that we can isolate directed altruism as the only reason for these results. |
| Keywords: | Eciency wage contracts, Moral hazard, Dictator game, Referrals, Altruism, Reciprocity, Directed altruism, Social proximity, Facebook, Experiment, Social networks, Strength of ties, Spot market. |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cge:wacage:183&r=net |