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on Network Economics |
| By: | Simon Hagemann; Christoph Weber (Chair for Management Sciences and Energy Economics, University of Duisburg-Essen) |
| Abstract: | This paper presents a theoretical and empirical analysis of liquidity in the German intraday market for electricity. Two models that aim at explaining intraday liquidity are developed. The first model considers the fundamental merit-order and intraday adjustment needs as the drivers of liquidity in a perfectly competitive market. The second model relaxes the assumption of perfect competition in the intraday market and assumes that the trading behavior of profit maximizing market participants influences the liquidity provision. The relevance of commonly used liquidity indicators like the bid ask-spread, resiliency, market depth, price variance, delay and search costs as well as trading volume and the number of trades are analyzed with respect to both models of liquidity. The empirical findings indicate that liquidity in the German intraday market can be explained by the trading model while the purely fundamental model is rejected. Hence, the question arises how these different sources of uncertainty will impact the network operator's replacement decision. Further it is of interest how much value can be attributed to the reduction of the uncertainty. In this paper, an optimal replacement strategy in an analytical stationary state model is derived explicitly with local and global optima. Based on a discrete mixture model of failure rates under perfect replacement, we show how different assumptions about the underlying type of uncertainty will affect the replacement decision. In a further step, the value of information representing the cost difference between a state of parameter certainty and the state of parameter uncertainty is derived. Trough the course of some applications, it is shown that the value of information increases with the level of uncertainty. Some exemplary calculations are presented to show that the magnitude of the value of information is significant. |
| Keywords: | Intraday market, electricity, liquidity, fundamental model, trading model |
| JEL: | L94 Q41 |
| Date: | 2013–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dui:wpaper:1317&r=net |
| By: | Ravanel, M. |
| Abstract: | In this paper, I study how the CEO's election can be biased if some directors in the board belong to the same network. I use a static Bayesian game. Directors want to elect the best candidate but they also want to vote for the winner. In that context, results show that, when no candidate is part of the network, boards with a network perform better in electing the right candidate. On the other hand, it becomes detrimental for stockholders if one candidate is part of the network. Indeed, compared to a situation where there are no interconnections between directors, the directors who are members of a network vote more often for the candidate they think is best, rather than for the one they think might win. The ones who are not part of the network follow their lead. Thus the network has power on the result of the election and therefore limits the power of the future CEO. |
| Keywords: | Networks, corporate governance. |
| JEL: | D71 G34 Z13 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bfr:banfra:459&r=net |
| By: | AOYAMA Hideaki; Stefano BATTISTON; FUJIWARA Yoshi |
| Abstract: | We present an analysis of the lending/borrowing relationship between Japanese banks and Japanese firms, which form a bipartite credit network. We introduce distress to some initial node(s) (banks or firms) and allow it to propagate and contaminate other nodes in this network according to the relative exposure. First, by choosing the initial node to be a bank and taking the weighted average of the resulting distress distribution, with the weight proportional to the size (total assets) of each node, we identify the bank's importance to the whole network at the time of crisis. This leads to a nonlinear relationship between the importance and the size of the bank, which implies that mergers with the same-sized partner would result the most in the increase in importance. Second, by introducing the initial distress to firms in certain industrial sector(s), we evaluate the vulnerability of banks and firms in other sectors due to the distress in the initial sectors. |
| Date: | 2013–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eti:dpaper:13087&r=net |
| By: | Manuel Förster (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Paris I - Panthéon-Sorbonne, CORE - Center of Operation Research and Econometrics [Louvain] - Université Catholique de Louvain (UCL) - Belgique); Ana Mauleon (CORE - Center of Operation Research and Econometrics [Louvain] - Université Catholique de Louvain (UCL) - Belgique, CEREC - Université Saint-Louis - Bruxelles); Vincent Vannetelbosch (CORE - Center of Operation Research and Econometrics [Louvain] - Université Catholique de Louvain (UCL) - Belgique, CEREC - Université Saint-Louis - Bruxelles) |
| Abstract: | We investigate the role of manipulation in a model of opinion formation where agents have opinions about some common question of interest. Agents repeatedly communicate with their neighbors in the social network, can exert some effort to manipulate the trust of others, and update their opinions taking weighted averages of neighbors' opinions. The incentives to manipulate are given by the agents' preferences. We show that manipulation can modify the trust structure and lead to a connected society, and thus, make the society reaching a consensus. Manipulation fosters opinion leadership, but the manipulated agent may even gain influence on the long-run opinions. In sufficiently homophilic societies, manipulation accelerates (slows down) convergence if it decreases (increases) homophily. Finally, we investigate the tension between information aggregation and spread of misinformation. We find that if the ability of the manipulating agent is weak and the agents underselling (overselling) their information gain (lose) overall influence, then manipulation reduces misinformation and agents converge jointly to more accurate opinions about some underlying true state. |
| Keywords: | Social networks; trust; manipulation; opinion leadership; consensus; wisdom of crowds |
| Date: | 2013–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00881145&r=net |
| By: | Belik, Ivan (Dept. of Business and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics); Hexmoor, Henry (Dept. of Computer Science, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale) |
| Abstract: | The analysis of social reasoning is at the core of understanding how to manage social networks. Since interpersonal relations are composed of multiple factors with different nature (i.e., structural and social factors), we explore their influence on the strategizing processes in social networks. We formalize interpersonal relations using the methods of structural and social analysis. As a part of the research, we develop the soft-ware application for the numerical visualization of the social network functioning based on the proposed mechanism. |
| Keywords: | Agent’s power; social networks; structural centrality; trust |
| JEL: | Z13 |
| Date: | 2013–10–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:nhhfms:2013_011&r=net |
| By: | Jens Leth Hougaard (Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen); Mich Tvede (Newcastle University Business School, Newcastle University) |
| Abstract: | In the present paper we consider the allocation of cost in connection networks. Agents have connection demands in form of pairs of locations they want to be connected. Connections between locations are costly to build. The problem is to allocate costs of networks satisfying all connection demands. We use three axioms to characterize allocation rules that truthfully implement cost minimizing networks satisfying all connection demands in a game where: (1) a central planner announces an allocation rule and a cost estimation rule; (2) every agent reports her own connection demand as well as all connection costs; and, (3) the central planner selects a cost minimizing network satisfying reported connection demands based on estimated connection costs and allocates true connection costs of the selected network. |
| Keywords: | axiomatic characterization, connection networks, cost sharing, implementation, truth-telling |
| JEL: | C70 C72 D71 D85 |
| Date: | 2013–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:foi:msapwp:03_2013&r=net |