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on Network Economics |
| By: | Clougherty, Joseph A.; Grajek, Michal |
| Abstract: | Empirical scholarship on the standards-trade relationship has been held up due to methodological challenges: measurement, varied effects, and endogeneity. Considering the trade-effects of one particular standard (ISO 9000), we surmount methodological challenges by measuring standardization via national penetration of ISO 9000, allowing standardization to manifest via multiple (quality-signaling, information/compliance-cost, and common-language) channels, and using instrumental variable, multilateral resistance and panel data techniques to overcome endogeneity. We find evidence of common-language and quality-signaling augmenting country-pair trade. Yet, ISO-rich nations (most notably European) benefit the most from standardization, while ISO-poor nations find ISO 9000 to represent a trade barrier due to compliance-cost effects. |
| Keywords: | Networks; Standards; Technical Trade Barriers |
| JEL: | C51 F13 L15 |
| Date: | 2012–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9047&r=net |
| By: | Valter Di Giacinto (Bank of Italy); Giacinto Micucci (Bank of Italy); Pasqualino Montanaro (Bank of Italy JEL classification: C32, E61, H54, R42, R53) |
| Abstract: | This paper contributes to the empirical literature on the magnitude of the network effects of public infrastructures, introducing a novel approach. After estimating the dynamics common to time series for the regional public capital stock, coordinated policy shocks are identified within a properly specified structural VEC model. The findings confirm previous evidence that transport infrastructures exert positive macroeconomic effects in the long run. At the same time, it is shown that this effect is attributable mostly to the impact of coordinated public policy shocks, as the literature on network externalities predicts. |
| Keywords: | public capital, transport infrastructure, public policy coordination, network externalities, VEC model. |
| Date: | 2012–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bdi:wptemi:td_869_12&r=net |
| By: | OECD |
| Abstract: | Since the Seoul Declaration, access to broadband networks and the Internet have constantly increased. In terms of fixed broadband, penetration levels are close to maturity. In addition, further deployments of fibre networks have taken place; however, overall deployment of fibre is still at an early stage. On the mobile broadband side, 3G coverage is high and data traffic is expected to grow significantly. In terms of policies, national broadband plans have contributed to increasing access to the Internet. Some countries have furthermore invested public funds in the deployment of fibre networks. |
| Date: | 2012–03–14 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oec:stiaab:201-en&r=net |
| By: | van den Berg, Vincent A.C. |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates regulation by auctions of private supply of congestible infrastructures in two networks settings: 1) two serial facilities, where the consumer has to use both in order to consume; and 2) two parallel facilities that are imperfect substitutes. There are four market structures: a monopoly and 3 duopolies that differ in how firms interact. The effects of an auction depend on what the bidders compete. With a bid auction, the bidders compete on how much money they transfer to the government. This auction leads to the same outcome as the unregulated game (for a given market structure), since this gives the maximum profit to transfer. An auction on the capacity of a facility leads to an even lower welfare than no regulation, because firms set very high capacities and usage fees. Conversely, an auction on generalised price or number of users leads to the first-best outcome. Moreover, these two auctions are robust: they attain the first-best regardless of whether the facilities are auctioned off to a single firm or to two firms, and for all market and network structures. On the contrary, the performances (relative to the first-best) of the bid and capacity auctions strongly depend on these considerations. |
| Keywords: | private supply; congestible facilities; auctions; serial facilities; parallel facilities; imperfect substitutes |
| JEL: | L51 L13 R42 R41 D43 |
| Date: | 2012–07–17 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:40103&r=net |