nep-net New Economics Papers
on Network Economics
Issue of 2012‒03‒14
six papers chosen by
Yi-Nung Yang
Chung Yuan Christian University

  1. Incentives for Quality over Time - The Case of Facebook Applications By Jörg Claussen; Tobias Kretschmer; Philip Mayrhofer
  2. Asymmetric R&D alliances and coopetitive games By Carfì, David; Bagileri, Daniela; Dagnino, Gianbattista
  3. Production Networks in East Asia : What We Know So Far By Fukunari Kimura; Ayako Obashi
  4. Did Zipf Anticipate Socio-Economic Spatial Networks? By P. Nijkamp; A. Reggiani
  5. Social interactions and complex networks By Opolot, Daniel
  6. The co-evolution of organizational performance and emotional contagion By Cowan, Robin; Jonard, Nicolas; Weehuizen, Rifka

  1. By: Jörg Claussen; Tobias Kretschmer; Philip Mayrhofer
    Abstract: We study the market for applications on Facebook, the dominant platform for social networking and make use of a rule change by Facebook by which high-quality applications were rewarded with further opportunities to engage users. We find that the change led to quality being a more important driver of usage while sheer network size became less important. Further, we find that update frequency helps applications maintain higher usage, while generally usage of Facebook applications declines less rapidly with age.
    Keywords: usage intensity, social media, platform management, two-sided markets
    JEL: L1 L50 O33
    Date: 2012–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cep:cepdps:dp1133&r=net
  2. By: Carfì, David; Bagileri, Daniela; Dagnino, Gianbattista
    Abstract: In this paper we show how the study of asymmetric R\&D alliances, that are those between young and small firms and large and MNEs firms for knowledge exploration and/or exploitation, requires the adoption of a coopetitive framework which consider both collaboration and competition. We draw upon the literature on asymmetric R&D collaboration and coopetition to propose a mathematical model for the coopetitive games which is particularly suitable for exploring asymmetric R&D alliances.
    Keywords: R&D alliances; coopetitive games
    JEL: D7 M1 D74 C7 O32 M54 O3 J5
    Date: 2012
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:37095&r=net
  3. By: Fukunari Kimura (Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI)); Ayako Obashi
    Abstract: Production networks in East Asia, particularly in the manufacturing and machinery industries, are well recognized as the most advanced in the world, in terms of their magnitude, extensiveness, and sophistication. This paper tries to link various economic studies on related topics, to see how much we understand about production networks in East Asia. After providing a brief overview of international trade statistics, the paper reviews a number of academic papers concerning (i) the structure and mechanics of production networks, (ii) the conditions for production networks, and (iii) the properties and implications thereof.
    Keywords: production network, East Asia, manufacturing, machinery
    JEL: F14 F15 F23
    Date: 2011–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eab:microe:23216&r=net
  4. By: P. Nijkamp; A. Reggiani
    Abstract: An avalanche of empirical studies has addressed the validity of the rank-size rule (or Zipf’s law) in a multi-city context in many countries. City size in most countries seems to obey Zipf’s law, but the question under which conditions (e.g. sample size, spatial scale) this ‘law’ holds remained largely underinvestigated. Another complementary question is whether socio-economic networks in space also show a similar hierarchical pattern. Against this background, the present paper investigates – from a methodological viewpoint – the relationship between network connectivity and the rank-size rule (or Zipf’s law) in an urban-economic network constellation. After a review of the literature, we address in particular the following methodological issues: (i) the (aggregate) behavioural foundation underlying the rank-size rule/Zipf’s law in the light of spatial-economic network theories (e.g. entropy maximization, spatial interaction theory, etc.); (ii) the nature of the analytical relationship between social-spatial network analysis and the rank-size rule/Zipf’s law. We argue that the rank size rule is compatible with conventional economic foundations of spatial network models. Consequently, a spatial-economic interpretation – as well as a network connectivity interpretation – of the rank-size rule coefficient is provided. Our methodological contribution forms the foundation for the subsequent empirical analysis applied to spatial networks in a socio-economic context. The aim here is to test the sensitivity of empirical findings for changes in scale, functional forms, time periods, and network structures. Our application is concerned with an extensive spatio-temporal panel database related to the evolution of urban population in Germany. We test the relevance of the rank-size rule/Zipf’s law, and its evolution over the years, and – in parallel – the related ‘socio-economic’ connectivity in these urban networks. In particular, we will show that Zipf’s law (i.e., with the rank-size coefficient equal to 1) is only valid under particular conditions of the sample size. The paper concludes with some retrospective and prospective remarks.
    Date: 2012–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp816&r=net
  5. By: Opolot, Daniel (UNU-MERIT, University of Maastricht,)
    Abstract: This paper studies the impact of interaction topologies on individual and aggregate behavior in environments with social interactions. We study social interaction games of an infnitely large population with local and global externalities. Local externalities are limited within agents' ego-networks while the global externality is derived from aggregate distribution in a feedback manner. We consider two forms of heterogeneity, that due to individual intrinsic tastes and that due to ego-networks. The agents know the potential number of other agents they will interact with but do not posses complete information about their neighbors' types and strategies so they base their decisions on expectations and beliefs. We characterize the existence, uniqueness and multiplicity of equilibrium distribution of strategies. By considering arbitrary interaction topologies, we show that the interaction structure greatly determines the uniqueness and multiplicity of equilibrium outcomes, as well as the equilibrium aggregate distribution of strategies as measured by the mean strategy.
    Keywords: Complex networks, Partial information, Local externality, Global externality, Adoption
    JEL: C72 D82 D84
    Date: 2012
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:unumer:2012014&r=net
  6. By: Cowan, Robin (UNU-MERIT, and SBE, Maastricht University); Jonard, Nicolas (University of Luxemburg); Weehuizen, Rifka (UNU-MERIT)
    Abstract: In this paper we model interactions between organizational structures, job stress, emotional contagion and organization performance. An organization is modelled as solving problems or performing tasks. Tasks enter the organization and can be addressed by a subset of its members. Organization structure determines which agents can address which problems. Members address the task by applying energy to it. An agent's available energy is determined by his stress level, which is in turn determined by his workload. However agents' stress levels are moderated by social interactions that take place in parallel to the work environment. Organizations can be structured as a group of specialized individuals or as hierarchies of varying depths. We explore the effects of organizational structure and social interactions on performance.
    Keywords: stress, emotional contagion, social networks, organization structure, productivity
    JEL: L22 L25 M14 M54 D23
    Date: 2012
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:unumer:2012012&r=net

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