nep-net New Economics Papers
on Network Economics
Issue of 2012‒02‒27
four papers chosen by
Yi-Nung Yang
Chung Yuan Christian University
  1. Market Leadership Through Technology - Backward Compatibility in the U.S. Handheld Video Game Industry By Jörg Claussen; Tobias Kretschmer; Thomas Spengler
  2. Network Neutrality and Network Management Regulation: Quality of Service, Price Discrimination, and Exclusive Contracts By Nicholas Economides; Joacim Tag
  3. Broken Punishment Networks in Public Goods Games: Experimental Evidence By Andrweas Leibbrandt; Abhijit Ramalingam; Lauri Sääksvuori; James M. Walker
  4. Regional trade and economic networks in West Africa By WALTHER Olivier
  1. By: Jörg Claussen; Tobias Kretschmer; Thomas Spengler
    Abstract: The introduction of a new product generation forces incumbents in network industries to rebuild their installed base to maintain an advantage over potential entrants. We study if backward compatibility moderates this process of rebuilding an installed base. Using a structural model of the U.S. market for handheld game consoles, we show that backward compatibility lets incumbents transfer network effects from the old generation to the new to some extent but that it also reduces supply of new software. We examine the tradeoff between technological progress and backward compatibility and find that backward compatibility matters less if there is a large technological leap between two generations. We subsequently use our results to assess the role of backward compatibility as a strategy to sustain market leadership.
    Keywords: backward compatibility, market leadership, network effects, video games, two-sided markets
    JEL: L15 L82 O33
    Date: 2012–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cep:cepdps:dp1124&r=net
  2. By: Nicholas Economides; Joacim Tag
    Date: 2011
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ste:nystbu:11-09&r=net
  3. By: Andrweas Leibbrandt (Department of Economics, Monash University, Australia); Abhijit Ramalingam (School of Economics and Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science, and University of East Anglia, Norwich, United Kingdom); Lauri Sääksvuori (Strategic Interaction Group, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena, Germany); James M. Walker (Department of Economics and Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, United States)
    Abstract: Abundant evidence suggests that high levels of contributions to public goods can be sustained through self-governed monitoring and sanctions. This experimental study investigates the effectiveness of decentralized sanctioning institutions where punishment opportunities are restricted to agents who are linked through alternative punishment networks. We find that the structure of the punishment network significantly impacts contributions to the public good, but not overall efficiencies. Contributions collapse over decision rounds in groups with limited punishment opportunities, even if the absolute punishment capacity corresponds to the complete punishment network where all agents are allowed to punish each other. However, after allowing for the costs of sanctions, efficiencies are similar across the different networks that allow for punishment and the no-punishment network.
    Keywords: public goods experiment, punishment, cooperation, networks
    JEL: C92 D01 D03 H41
    Date: 2012–02–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2012-004&r=net
  4. By: WALTHER Olivier
    Abstract: To date, most of the literature on economic networks in West Africa has considered networks in a metaphorical way. The aim of this paper is to go one step further by showing how network analysis may be applied to the study of regional trade in West Africa. After a brief review of the literature, this exploratory paper investigates two main issues related to regional trade. We start by discussing how recent developments in regional trade in West Africa, brought on by urbanization, liberalization, and globalization, have contributed to challenging the social structure of traders. We then discuss the changes that have affected the spatiality of regional trade by looking at the influence of spatial location and geographic scale on traders’ abilities to trade. In both cases, we argue that the value of social network analysis in exploring how traders have progressively adapted to social and spatial changes in economic activities has been greatly underestimated. Through the combination of social and spatial ties, we ultimately show that the structural position of economic actors can be used to reassess the centrality of places. By doing so, the relational approach developed in this paper invites scholarship to reconsider the geographic organization of West African societies.
    Keywords: regional trade; economic networks; social network analysis; border markets; West Africa
    JEL: F15 L26 N77 N97 R12 Z13
    Date: 2012–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:irs:cepswp:2012-07&r=net
This nep-net issue is ©2012 by Yi-Nung Yang. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
General information on the NEP project can be found at http://nep.repec.org. For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <director@nep.repec.org>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected.
NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Massey University in New Zealand.
This page is being maintained by Thomas Krichel. It was last updated on 2023‒07‒08 at 15:06.