nep-net New Economics Papers
on Network Economics
Issue of 2012‒02‒01
two papers chosen by
Yi-Nung Yang
Chung Yuan Christian University

  1. A New Class of Welfare Maximizing Stable Sharing Rules for Partition Function Games with Externalities By Eyckmans, Johan; Finus, Michael; Mallozzi, Lina
  2. Regulating advertising in the presence of public service broadcasting By Stühmeier, Torben; Wenzel, Tobias

  1. By: Eyckmans, Johan (Hogeschool-Universiteit Brussel (HUB), Belgium); Finus, Michael (University of Exeter Business School,UK); Mallozzi, Lina (University of Naples Federico II, Italy)
    Abstract: We propose a class of sharing rules for the distribution of the gains from cooperation for partition function games with externalities. We show that this class of sharing rules is characterized by three axioms: coalitional efficiency, additivity and anonimity which are adapted to the context of partition function games. The sharing rules stabilize, in the sense of d'Aspremont et al. (1983), the coalition which generates the highest global welfare among the set of potentially internally stable coalitions. The new class of sharing rules is particularly powerful for economic problems that are characterized by positive externalities from coalition formation (outsiders benefit from the expansion of the coalition) and which therefore often suffer from free-riding.
    Keywords: partition function; coalition formation; externalities; surplus
    JEL: C70 C71
    Date: 2011–07
  2. By: Stühmeier, Torben; Wenzel, Tobias
    Abstract: Television advertising levels in Europe are regulated according to the Audiovisual Service Media Directive where member states of the European Union usually impose stricter regulation on their Public Service Broadcasting (PSB) channels. The present model evaluates the effects of symmetric and asymmetric regulation of ad levels on competition for viewers and advertisers in a duopoly framework where a public and a private broadcaster compete. If both broadcasters face the same advertising cap, regulation can be profit-increasing for both channels. If the public broadcaster is more strictly regulated, this may benefit the commercial rival if higher revenues in the advertising market outweigh the loss in viewership. --
    Keywords: media markets,two-sided markets
    JEL: L82 L13 D43
    Date: 2012

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