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on Network Economics |
| By: | Dierk Bauknecht |
| Abstract: | Smart Grids require innovations in the electricity networks, mainly on the level of the distributed system operator (DSO). A main objective is to increase the share of distributed generation (DG) connected to that network level, but also to enable load management on the demand side. This paper analyses network innovations in the context of the regulatory framework, namely incentive regulation. It is structured as follows: The first section examines how cost-based and price-based regulatory schemes influence RD&D by regulated companies. This is followed by a discussion of various regulatory instruments to stimulate innovation. The third section provides a more general discussion of the pros and cons of promoting network innovations via network regulation. |
| Keywords: | incentive regulation; price-based regulation; cost-based regulation; Rd&D; network innovations |
| Date: | 2011–02–22 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rsc:rsceui:2011/02&r=net |
| By: | Francesco Lissoni; Patrick Llerena; Bulat Sanditov |
| Abstract: | · Using data on patent applications at European Patent Office, we examine the structural properties of networks of inventors in France in different technologies, and how they depend from the inventive activity of scientists from universities and public research organizations (PROs). We revisit earlier findings on small world properties of social networks of inventors, and propose more rigorous tests of such hypothesis. We find that academic and PRO inventors contribute significantly to patenting in science‐based fields. Such contribution is decisive for the emergence of small world properties. |
| Keywords: | networks, inventors, academic patenting, small world. |
| JEL: | O31 O34 |
| Date: | 2011 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2011-18&r=net |
| By: | Fabien MOIZEAU, University of Rennes 1 - CREM-CNRS; Fernando JARAMILLO, Universidad del Rosario, Bogota (Colombia); Hubert KEMPF, École Normale Supérieure de Cachan et Paris School of Economics |
| Abstract: | We study the relationship between the distribution of individuals' attributes over the population and the extent of risk sharing in a risky environment. We consider a society where individuals differing with respect to risk or their degree of risk aversion form risk-sharing coalitions in the absence of financial markets. We obtain a partition belonging to the core of the membership game. It is homophily-based: the less risky (or the more risk tolerant) agents congregate together and reject more risky ones (or less risk tolerant ones) into other coalitions. The distribution of risk or risk aversion affects the number and the size of these coalitions. It turns out that individuals may pay a lower risk premium in more risky societies. We also show that a higher heterogeneity in risk or risk aversion leads to a lower degree of partial risk-sharing. The empirical evidence on partial risk sharing can be understood when the endogenous partition of society into risk-sharing coalitions is taken into account. |
| Keywords: | Risk Sharing, Group Membership, Social Segmentation |
| JEL: | C71 D3 D71 D81 |
| Date: | 2011–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tut:cremwp:201111&r=net |