nep-net New Economics Papers
on Network Economics
Issue of 2011‒07‒27
four papers chosen by
Yi-Nung Yang
Chung Yuan Christian University

  1. Simultaneous Search and Network Efficiency By Pieter A. Gautier; Christian L. Holzner
  2. Externalities in the games over electrical power transmission networks By David Csercsik; Laszlo A. Koczy
  3. Exploring complex networks via topological embedding on surfaces By Tomaso Aste; Ruggero Gramatica; T. Di Matteo
  4. Examining the Technology Acceptance Model in the Adoption of Social Ne tworks By Pinho, José Carlos; Soares, Ana Maria

  1. By: Pieter A. Gautier (VU University Amsterdam, CEPR, IZA); Christian L. Holzner (University of Munich, Ifo Institute for Economic Research, CESifo)
    Abstract: When workers send applications to vacancies they create a network. Frictions arise because workers typically do not know where other workers apply to and firms do not know which candidates other firms consider. The first coordination friction affects network formation, while the second coordination friction affects network clearing. We show that those frictions and the wage mechanism are in general not independent. The wage mechanism determines both the distribution of networks that can arise and the number ofmatches on a given network. Equilibria that exhibit wage dispersion are inefficient in terms of network formation. Under complete recall (firms can go back and forth between all their candidates) only wage mechanisms that allow for ex post Bertrand competition generate the maximum matching on a realized network.
    Keywords: Efficiency; network clearing; random bipartite network formation; simultaneous
    JEL: D83 D85 E24 J64
    Date: 2011–07–12
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:uvatin:20110092&r=net
  2. By: David Csercsik (Process Control Research Group - Computer and Automation Institute, Hungarian Academy of Sciences); Laszlo A. Koczy (Institute of Economics - Hungarian Academy of Sciences)
    Abstract: An electrical transmission network consists of producers, consumers and the power lines connecting them. We build an ideal (lossless) DC load flow model as a cooperative game over a graph with the producers and consumers located at the nodes, each described by a maximum supply or desired demand and the power lines represented by the edges, each with a given power transmission capacity and admittance value describing its ability to transmit electricity. Today's transmission networks are highly interconnected, but organisationally partitioned into several subnetworks, the so-called balancing groups with balanced production and consumption. We study the game of balancing group formation and show that the game contains widespread externalities that can be both negative and positive. We study the stability of the transportation network using the recursive core. While the game is clearly cohesive, we demonstrate that it is not necessarily superadditive. We argue that subadditivity may be a barrier to achieve full cooperation. Finally the model is extended to allow for the extension of the underlying transmission network.
    Keywords: Energy transmission networks, Cooperative game theory, Partition function form games, Externalities
    JEL: C71 L14 L94
    Date: 2011–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:has:discpr:1125&r=net
  3. By: Tomaso Aste; Ruggero Gramatica; T. Di Matteo
    Abstract: We demonstrate that graphs embedded on surfaces are a powerful and practical tool to generate, characterize and simulate networks with a broad range of properties. Remarkably, the study of topologically embedded graphs is non-restrictive because any network can be embedded on a surface with sufficiently high genus. The local properties of the network are affected by the surface genus which, for example, produces significant changes in the degree distribution and in the clustering coefficient. The global properties of the graph are also strongly affected by the surface genus which is constraining the degree of interwoveness, changing the scaling properties from large-world-kind (small genus) to small- and ultra-small-world-kind (large genus). Two elementary moves allow the exploration of all networks embeddable on a given surface and naturally introduce a tool to develop a statistical mechanics description. Within such a framework, we study the properties of topologically-embedded graphs at high and low `temperatures' observing the formation of increasingly regular structures by cooling the system. We show that the cooling dynamics is strongly affected by the surface genus with the manifestation of a glassy-like freezing transitions occurring when the amount of topological disorder is low.
    Date: 2011–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:1107.3456&r=net
  4. By: Pinho, José Carlos; Soares, Ana Maria
    Abstract: Social networks allow users to build their own webpage and share information with other internet users. In the last years, multi-purpose social networks have appeared and been eagerly adopted by consumers and companies for multiple social, communication and marketing purposes. We focus on the determinants of adoption behavior of social networks. Notably, we examine the Technology Acceptance Model (TAM), a model specifically developed to explain adoption of information technologies, and test whether it can be used to explain consumers' use of Social Networks. Our results support the model and confirm that Perceived Usefulness and Perceived Ease of Use impact the attitude towards using Social Networks, leading to Intention to Use these tools.
    Keywords: attitudes and behavioural intention; beliefs; Technology Acceptance Model (TAM); Social Networks
    Date: 2011
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nsu:apasro:348&r=net

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