nep-net New Economics Papers
on Network Economics
Issue of 2011‒06‒25
five papers chosen by
Yi-Nung Yang
Chung Yuan Christian University

  1. e-voicing an opinion on a brand By Claire Roederer; Marc Filser
  2. Global Innovation Networks: what are they and where can we find them? (Conceptual and Empirical issues) By Barnard, Helena; Chaminade, Cristina
  3. Crowdfunding: disintermediated investment banking By Rubinton, Brian J
  4. The computational complexity of rationalizing Pareto optimal choice behavior By Thomas DEMUYNCK
  5. Referral-based Job Search Networks By Christian Dustmann; Albrecht Glitz; Uta Schoenberg

  1. By: Claire Roederer (HUMANIS - Université de Strasbourg); Marc Filser (LEG - Laboratoire d'Economie et de Gestion - CNRS : UMR5118 - Université de Bourgogne)
    Abstract: The development of social networks has tremendously expanding the potential for consumers to express opinions and ratings regarding brands. This research explores this phenomenon from the consumer point of view and suggests potential research themes for further investigation.
    Keywords: Internet; social networks; brands
    Date: 2011–06–16
  2. By: Barnard, Helena (GIBS, U. Pretoria); Chaminade, Cristina (CIRCLE, Lund University)
    Abstract: The rapid move of China and India from low-cost producers to innovators has triggered an increasing interest in the globalization of innovation activities and more specifically, on the surge of global innovation networks (GINs). However, hitherto most of the literature is either theoretical or based on a handful of cases. We do not know what are the different forms of GINs in which firms participate, both in terms of the various degrees of globalness, innovativeness and neworkedness as well as their main characteristics. In this paper, we propose a taxonomy of global innovation networks that takes into account these different dimensions. This paper provides empirical evidence about the characteristics of the different variants of global innovation networks, observed in seven European countries as well as Brazil, China, India and South Africa. It relies on firm-level data collected through a survey in 2010 and provides for the first time a theoretical and empirical overview of the different forms of global innovation networks.
    Keywords: Globalization; innovation networks; taxonomy; Europe; South Africa; Brazil; China; India
    JEL: O19 O32 O57
    Date: 2011–06–13
  3. By: Rubinton, Brian J
    Abstract: This paper introduces crowdfunding as a concept and model for the evolution of investment banking. Crowdfunding, an application of crowdsourcing, is defined as one party’s attempt to finance a project by offering three types of investment opportunities to potential investors. The investment opportunities are donations, passive investments, and active investments. From this foundation I develop a model in which interdependent agents operate in a dynamic, discrete setting. Potential investors decide whether or not to invest in one of three opportunities each period while the entrepreneur sets the parameters of the game to maximize the probability of successful financing. I then simulate the model to analyze the effects changes in key parameters have on the results of the game.
    Keywords: crowdfunding; crowdsourcing; network; finance; banking; relationship; evolution; investment; commercial; customer; participation
    JEL: O30 G32 L26 G24 P34
    Date: 2011–04–11
  4. By: Thomas DEMUYNCK
    Abstract: We consider a setting where a coalition of individuals chooses one or several alternatives from each set in a collection of choice sets. We examine the computational complexity of Pareto rationalizability. Pareto rationalizability requires that we can endow each individual in the coalition with a preference relation such that the observed choices are Pareto efficient. We differentiate between the situation where the choice function is considered to select all Pareto optimal alternatives from a choice set and the situation where it only contains one or several Pareto optimal alternatives. In the former case we find that Pareto rationalizability is an NP-complete problem. For the latter case we demonstrate that, if we have no additional information on the individual preference relations, then all choice behavior is Pareto rationalizable. However, if we have such additional information, then Pareto rationalizability is again NP-complete. Our results are valid for any coalition of size greater or equal than two.
    Date: 2011–06
  5. By: Christian Dustmann (University College London); Albrecht Glitz (Universitat Pompeu Fabra and Barcelona GSE); Uta Schoenberg (University College London and Institute for Employment Research (IAB))
    Abstract: This paper develops a model and derives novel testable implications of referral-based job search networks in which employees provide employers with information about potential job market candidates that they otherwise would not have. Using unique matched employeremployee data that cover the entire workforce in one large metropolitan labor market over a 20 year period, we find strong support for the predictions of our model. We first show that firms are more likely to hire minority workers from a particular group if the existing share of workers from that group employed in the firm is higher. We then provide evidence that workers earn higher wages, and are less likely to leave their firms, if they were hired by a firm with a larger share of minority workers from their own group and are therefore more likely to have obtained the job through a referral. The effects are particularly strong at the beginning of the employment relationship and decline with tenure in the firm. These findings have important implications in suggesting that job search networks help to reduce informational deficiencies in the labor market and lead to productivity gains for workers and firms.
    Keywords: Networks, Referrals, Uncertainty
    JEL: J61 J63 J31
    Date: 2011–06

This nep-net issue is ©2011 by Yi-Nung Yang. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
General information on the NEP project can be found at For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected.
NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Massey University in New Zealand.