nep-net New Economics Papers
on Network Economics
Issue of 2011‒06‒11
two papers chosen by
Yi-Nung Yang
Chung Yuan Christian University

  1. The Emergence of Leadership in Social Networks By T. Clemson; T. S. Evans
  2. Inside the black box of collective reputation By Stefano Castriota; Marco Delmastro

  1. By: T. Clemson; T. S. Evans
    Abstract: We study a networked version of the minority game in which agents can choose to follow the choices made by a neighbouring agent in a social network. We show that for a wide variety of networks a leadership structure always emerges, with most agents following the choice made by a few agents. We find a suitable parameterisation which highlights the universal aspects of the behaviour and which also indicates where results depend on the type of social network.
    Date: 2011–06
  2. By: Stefano Castriota; Marco Delmastro
    Abstract: The literature on collective reputation is still in its infancy. Despite the existence of a (limited) number of valuable theoretical works studying the process of collective reputation building, there is still no comprehensive analysis of this concept. In addition, due to data limitation, there are no empirical studies testing the determinants of group reputation. This work intends to provide a comprehensive analysis of reputational equilibria within coalitions of agents. In order to do so, we design a static and dynamic (over 30 years) study on the universe of coalitions of companies, within the wine market, looking at the role exerted by the characteristics of the coalition itself (its age and size), the rules set and the actions put forward by the group of agents in order to reach and maintain a certain level of collective reputation, and the context in which they operate. Results shed new lights into this ubiquitous phenomenon.
    Keywords: reputation, collective reputation, asymmetric information, quality standards, wine.
    JEL: L14 L15
    Date: 2011–04–15

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