nep-net New Economics Papers
on Network Economics
Issue of 2011‒06‒04
eleven papers chosen by
Yi-Nung Yang
Chung Yuan Christian University

  2. An Analysis of Transaction and Joint-Patent Application Networks (Japanese) By INOUE Hiroyasu; TAMADA Schumpeter
  3. Externalities in the games over electrical power transmission networks By László Á. Kóczy; Dávid Csercsik
  4. Electricity Distribution Networks: Investment and Regulation, and Uncertain Demand By Jamasb, T.; Marantes, C.
  5. Cooperative credit network: advantages and challenges in italian cooperative credit banks By Mitja Stefancic
  6. Internal Hierarchy and Stable Coalition Structures By Massimo Morelli; In-Uck Park
  7. Formation and Persistence of Oppositional Identities By Bisin, Alberto; Patacchini, Eleonora; Verdier, Thierry; Zenou, Yves
  8. Diversification, Networks and the Survival of Exporting Firms By Jorge Tovar; Luis Roberto Martínez
  9. Trade network and international R&D spillovers By Andrea Fracasso; Giuseppe Vittucci Marzetti
  10. Social Influence and Household Decision-Making: A Behavioural Analysis of Housing Demand By Baddeley, M.
  11. Il sistema di imprese della cooperazione sociale. Origini e sviluppo dei consorzi di cooperative sociali By Carlo Borzaga; Alberto Ianes

  1. By: Kenji Fujiwara (Kwansei Gakuin University)
    Abstract: This paper constructs a reciprocal market model of intra-industry trade in network goods to consider the implications of network externalities for an optimal tari policy and the welfare eects of bilateral tari reductions. We show that the degree of network externalities nontrivially aects the sign of the Nash equilibrium tari. Then, we prove that network externalities amplify the gains from tari reductions. These results help better understand the implications of traderelated issues in network industries.
    Date: 2010–05
  2. By: INOUE Hiroyasu; TAMADA Schumpeter
    Abstract: Many firms these days, forced by increasing international competition and an unstable economy, are opting to specialize rather than generalize as a way of maintaining their competitiveness. Consequently, firms cannot rely solely on themselves, but must cooperate by combining their advantages.<br /><br />To obtain the actual conditions for this cooperation, a multi-layered network based on two different types of data was investigated. The first type was transaction data from Japanese firms. The network created from the data included 961,363 firms and 7,808,760 links. The second type of data was from joint-patent applications in Japan. The joint-patent application network included 54,197 nodes and 154,205 links. These two networks were merged into one network. We analyzed the data from the viewpoint of input-output tables, the ERG model, and Bayesian networks.
    Date: 2011–03
  3. By: László Á. Kóczy (Óbuda University); Dávid Csercsik
    Abstract: An electrical transmission network consists of producers, consumers and the power lines connecting them. We build an ideal (lossless) DC load ow model as a cooperative game over a graph with the producers and consumers located at the nodes, each described by a maximum supply or desired demand and the power lines represented by the edges, each with a given power transmission capacity and admittance value describing its ability to transmit electricity. Today's transmission networks are highly interconnected, but or- ganisationally partitioned into several subnetworks, the so-called bal- ancing groups with balanced production and consumption. We study the game of balancing group formation and show that the game con- tains widespread externalities that can be both negative and positive. We study the stability of the transportation network using the recur- sive core. While the game is clearly cohesive, we demonstrate that it is not necessarily superadditive. We argue that subadditivity may be a barrier to achieve full cooperation. Finally the model is extended to allow for the extension of the underlying transmission network.
    Keywords: Energy transmission networks, Coop- erative game theory, Partition function form games, Externalities; Energy transmission networks, Coop- erative game theory, Partition function form games, Externalities
    Date: 2011
  4. By: Jamasb, T.; Marantes, C.
    Abstract: Electricity distribution networks are capital intensive systems and timely investments are crucial for long-term reliability of their service. In coming years, in the UK, and elsewhere in Europe, many networks are in need of extensive investments in their aging assets. Also, aspects of energy policy concerning climate change, renewable energy, energy efficiency, demand side management (DSM), network energy loss reduction, quality of service standards, and security of supply require active, flexible, and smart networks that can be achieved through investments. This paper is a chapter in the forthcoming book "Jamasb T. and Pollitt, M. G. (2011) Eds., The Future of Electricity Demand: Customers, Citizens and Loads, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge" and describes a network investment assessment model developed as a tool to identify and assess the investment requirements of distribution networks. A broadening of the scope of network investments to include demand-related measures that can reduce the need for investments.
    JEL: L94
    Date: 2011–01–31
  5. By: Mitja Stefancic
    Abstract: This paper provides an outline of both the competitive advantages and challenges currently faced by Italian cooperative credit banks. These banks play an important role for the stability of the financial system at the level of regions. They provide credit to individuals and households, as well as capital to SMEs. Italian cooperative credit banks are integrated into a distinct sui generis network, which grants them an adequate level of competitiveness in the; and Visiting PhD student market. By effectively implementing democratic principles of governance and by focusing on retail banking, these banks foster responsible behaviour, which is crucial in times of crisis. This paper suggests that a better understanding of their specifics highlights their contribution to sound cooperation in economics. Finally, the paper provides policy recommendations for a qualitative supervision of cooperative credit banks to further increase the stability of the cooperative credit network and, thus, of the Italian financial system.
    Keywords: Italian cooperative credit network, competitive advantages; governance, challenges
    JEL: G21 G28 P13
    Date: 2011
  6. By: Massimo Morelli; In-Uck Park
    Abstract: When an agent decides whether to join a coalition or not, she must consider both i) the expected strength of the coalition and ii) her position in the vertical structure within the coalition. We establish that there exists a positive relationship between the degree of inequality in remuneration across ranks within coalitions and the number of coalitions to be formed. When coalition size is unrestricted, in all stable systems the endogenous coalitions must be mixed and balanced in terms of members' abilities, with no segregation. When coalitions must have a fixed finite size, stable systems display segregation by clusters while maintaining the aforesaid feature within clusters.
    Keywords: Stable Systems, Abilities, Hierarchy, Cyclic Partition
    JEL: C71 D71
    Date: 2011
  7. By: Bisin, Alberto; Patacchini, Eleonora; Verdier, Thierry; Zenou, Yves
    Abstract: We develop a dynamic model of identity formation that explains why ethnic minorities may choose to adopt oppositional identities (i.e. some individuals may reject or not the dominant culture) and why this behavior may persist over time. We first show that the prevalence of an oppositional culture in the minority group cannot always be sustained in equilibrium. Indeed, because the size of the majority group is larger, there is an
    Keywords: cultural transmission; Ethnicity; peer effects; racism; role models
    JEL: A14 J15
    Date: 2011–05
  8. By: Jorge Tovar; Luis Roberto Martínez
    Abstract: There is abundant empirical evidence testing models where comparative advantage arises from firm heterogeneity. As of today it is relatively clear who exports and why a firm decides to export. But, what determines the survival of a firm in the export market? This paper exploits a detailed developing economy monthly firm-level dataset for the period 2001 – 2008 in order to explore the importance of trade networks and product and market diversification on the survival of exporting firms. We find that market diversification prevails over product diversification while trade network effects, measured in various ways, are highly correlated to the survival of new exporting firms. From a policy perspective our findings suggest that government aid in the exporting process should focus on expanding into new markets, not on promoting new export products.
    Date: 2011–03–06
  9. By: Andrea Fracasso; Giuseppe Vittucci Marzetti
    Abstract: Following Coe and Helpman (International R&D Spillovers, EER, 39, 859-887, 1995), the literature on the trade-related channels of international knowledge flows has flourished. Departing from Coe and Helpman's tenets on the proportionality of trade and productivity spillovers and thus relaxing the implicit assumption that the knowledge transferred internationally is physically embodied in the exchanged products, we test whether relatively strong bilateral trade relationships are significantly associated with important international R&D spillovers. Notably, we focus on refined measures of bilateral trade that account for country size, time-invariant pair-specific factors and time-varying country-specific factors. By distinguishing closer and more distant trade partners without weighting their R&D stocks for the bilateral trade flows, we show that trade is indeed an international transmission channel of knowledge even when distance and other pair specific time-invariant factors are taken into account.
    Keywords: International R&D spillovers, Total Factor Productivity, International trade network
    JEL: C23 F01 O30 O47
    Date: 2011
  10. By: Baddeley, M.
    Abstract: Housing markets are subject to many interrelated sources of instability on both a microeconomic and macroeconomic scale. Housing decisions of different individuals will be interdependent, generating non-linearities, discontinuities and feedback effects. This paper focuses in on some behavioural factors that contribute to complexity in housing demand. In particular, the impact of herding and social influence is captured using a model incorporating the impact of social information on willingness to pay. This model is tested in an experimental context and this experimental evidence confirms first, that social information has a statistically significant impact and, second, this impact is determined by a person’s individual characteristics including gender and personality traits.
    JEL: D70 D83 D85 R21
    Date: 2011–01–31
  11. By: Carlo Borzaga; Alberto Ianes
    Abstract: Il saggio si propone di studiare la struttura organizzativa, cioè l’integrazione tra imprese sviluppata dalla cooperazione sociale in Italia nel corso dei suoi trent’anni di storia. Accanto a una rappresentanza politico-sindacale il movimento della cooperazione sociale ha sentito il bisogno di integrarsi in un sistema consortile organizzato su più livelli. Per espletare al meglio i propri compiti, infatti, le cooperative sociali si avvalgono del Consorzio, un soggetto imprenditoriale che quasi mai opera nella parte finale della filiera, raramente si colloca sul mercato dei servizi finiti, preferisce stare nel mezzo: per produrre servizi alle imprese. L’articolo evidenzia infine l’evoluzione del ruolo del sistema consortile: da un compito di tipo promozionale e politico-sindacale si è passati ad uno più mirato. Il consorzio tende a svolgere un numero minore di funzioni, e sempre più specifiche, soprattutto per rafforzare il profilo imprenditoriale delle cooperative sociali e della rete nel suo complesso.
    Keywords: Social enterprises, Business history, Italian cooperatives, Networks
    JEL: N24 N84 P13 L31 L14
    Date: 2011

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