nep-net New Economics Papers
on Network Economics
Issue of 2011‒05‒07
three papers chosen by
Yi-Nung Yang
Chung Yuan Christian University

  1. Internet access and investment incentives for broadband service providers By Edmond Baranes; Jean-Christophe Poudou
  2. Coordination structures By Rosa-García, Alfonso; Kiss, Hubert Janos
  3. Coalition formation in the U.S. Supreme Court: 1969-2009 By Brams, Steven J.; Camilo, Gustavo; Franz, Alexandra D.

  1. By: Edmond Baranes; Jean-Christophe Poudou
    Abstract: This paper studies a model of the Internet broadband market as a platform in order to show how di¤erent pricing schemes from the so-called "net neutrality " can increase economic e¢ ciency by allowing more investment of access providers and enhancing consumers surplus and social welfare. We show that departing from the "net neutrality", where at rates are used, introducing termination fees can increase incentives to invest for the ISP and enhance social surplus. Keywords : Network neutrality, Flat rates, Termination fees.
    Date: 2011–04
  2. By: Rosa-García, Alfonso; Kiss, Hubert Janos
    Abstract: We study a coordination problem where agents act sequentially. Agents are embedded in an observation network that allows them to observe the actions of their neighbors. We find that coordination failures do not occur if there exists a sufficiently large clique. Its existence is necessary and sufficient when agents are homogenous and sufficient when agents differ and their types are private. Other structures guarantee coordination when agents decide in some particular sequences or for particular payoffs. The coordination problem embodied in our game is applied to the problems of revolts and bank runs.
    Keywords: social networks; coordination failures; multiple equilibria; revolts; bank runs
    JEL: D82 D85 C72
    Date: 2011–04–23
  3. By: Brams, Steven J.; Camilo, Gustavo; Franz, Alexandra D.
    Abstract: We apply a fallback model of coalition formation to decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, focusing on the seven natural courts, which had the same members for at least two terms, between 1969 and 2009. The predictions of majority coalitions on each of the courts are generally bourn out by the 5-4 decisions, whereas the predictions of the Martin-Quinn (2002) model, which assumes a single underlying dimension along which the justices can be ordered, are not. The present model also provides insight into the dynamic process by which subcoalitions build up into majority coalitions and, in addition, identifies "kingmakers” and “leaders” on the natural courts.
    Keywords: coalition formation; U.S. Supreme Court; Martin-Quinn scores; single-peakedness
    JEL: D71 C78 D63 D74 D02 C61
    Date: 2011–04

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