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on Network Economics |
| By: | Böhme, Enrico; Müller, Christopher |
| Abstract: | We propose both a monopoly and a duopoly model of a two-sided market. Both settings are fully comparable, as we impose a homogeneous good produced at zero costs without capacity constraints, as well as identical parameterization of market sizes. We determine the duopoly equilibrium and the monopoly optimum in terms of the parameters and obtain solutions with and without subsidization (prices below marginal cost) of one market side. We show that there exists a continuum of economically plausible parameter sets for which duopoly equilibrium prices exceed optimal monopoly prices and one with no observable price effect of competition, i.e. one where optimum and equilibrium prices become equal. Despite the fact that virtually everything except for the number of platform operators is identical in the latter situations, total demand on both market sides in the duopoly market exceeds total demand in the monopoly market. Furthermore, even though there is no observable price effect, there is still a competitive effect in so far that total profits in the duopoly equilibrium are strictly smaller than monopoly profits. The relationship of total welfare is ambiguous in subsidization cases, while it is strictly greater in duopoly, if no subsidization takes place. Our results sharply contradict economic intuition and common economic knowledge from one-sided markets. |
| Keywords: | two-sided markets; platform competition; price-concentration relationship; welfare analysis |
| JEL: | K20 L51 L13 D42 D43 L12 |
| Date: | 2010–06–29 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:23568&r=net |
| By: | Michel BEINE (CREA,University of Luxembourg, IRES and CES-Ifo); Sara SALOMONE (IRES, UniversitŽ catholique de Louvain and Tor Vergata University) |
| Abstract: | This paper analyses the impact of networks on the structure of international migration flows to OECD countries. In particular, we look at whether diaspora effects are different across education levels and gender. Using new data allowing to include both dimensions, we are able to analyze the respective impact of networks on the proportion of each category of migrant. Therefore, unlike the preceding literature on macro determinants of international migration, we can identify the factors that influence the selection in terms skills and in terms of gender. We find that network effects vary by education level but not by gender. |
| Keywords: | Migration,Human capital, network/diaspora externalities, Gender |
| JEL: | F22 O15 |
| Date: | 2010–05–26 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ctl:louvir:2010022&r=net |
| By: | Christophe J. Godlewski; Bulat Sanditov; Thierry Burger-Helmchen |
| Abstract: | We investigate the network structure of syndicated lending markets and evaluate the impact of lenders’ network centrality, considered as measures of their experience and reputation, on borrowing costs. We show that the market for syndicated loans is a “small world” characterized by large local density and short social distances between lenders. Such a network structure allows for better information and resources flows between banks thus enhancing their social capital. We then show that lenders’ experience and reputation play a significant role in reducing loan spreads and thus increasing borrower’s wealth. |
| Keywords: | agency costs, bank syndicate, experience, loan syndication, reputation, small world, social network analysis. |
| JEL: | G21 G24 L14 |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2010-16&r=net |
| By: | Michel Grabisch (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I); Agnieszka Rusinowska (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I) |
| Abstract: | In the paper, we study a model of influence in a social network. It is assumed that each player has an inclination to say YES or NO which, due to influence of other players, may be different from the decision of the player. The point of departure here is the concept of the Hoede-Bakker index - the notion which computes the overall decisional `power' of a player in a social network. The main drawback of the Hoede-Bakker index is that it hides the actual role of the influence function, analyzing only the final decision in terms of success and failure. In this paper, we separate the influence part from the group decision part, and focus on the description and analysis of the influence part. We propose among other descriptive tools a definition of a (weighted) influence index of a coalition upon an individual. Moreover, we consider different influence functions representative of commonly encountered situations. Finally, we propose a suitable definition of a modified decisional power. |
| Keywords: | influence function, influence index, decisional power, social network |
| Date: | 2010–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-00496560_v1&r=net |