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on Network Economics |
| By: | Christ, Julian P.; Slowak, André P. |
| Abstract: | Extensive research has been conducted on the economics of standards in the last three decades. To date, standard-setting studies emphasize a superior role of demand-side-driven technology diffusion; these contributions assume the evolution of a user-driven momentum and network externalities. We find that consumers wait for a dominant standard if they are unable to evaluate technological supremacy. Thus, supply-side driven activities necessarily need to address a lacking demand-side technology adoption. Our paper focuses on Blu-ray vs. HD-DVD as an illustrative case of consortia standard wars. One central role of consortia is to coordinate strategic behavior between heterogeneous agents, e.g. incumbents, complementors (content providers) and others, but also to form a coalition against other standard candidates. More precisely, we argue for signalizing activities through consortia events. We depict the essential role of consortia structures for the recently determined standard war between the High-Definition disc specifications Blu-ray and HD-DVD. Therefore, the paper suggests that unique supply-side dynamics from consortia structures, consortia announcements and exclusive backing decisions of firms determined the standard-setting process in the Blu-ray vs. HD-DVD standard war. This study is based on the following data: movie releases and sales numbers, membership affiliation for structural consortia analysis, and an in-depth event study. A detailed comparison of the technological specifications of both standard specifications supports our argument that there was no technological supremacy of one standard candidate from a consumer-oriented usecase perspective. We furthermore clarify that content providers (complementors) such as movie studios and movie rental services feature a gate-keeping position in the Blu-ray vs. HD-DVD standard war. In the case of Blu-ray, film studios decided the standard war because the availability of movie releases, but not technological supremacy, made the standard attractive to consumers. Finally, we find that there is a co-evolution of the consortia in terms of membership dynamics. Particularly, firm allegiance of heterogeneous agents plays a crucial role. -- |
| Keywords: | Blu-ray,HD-DVD,standard wars,co-evolution,consortia,event study |
| JEL: | B52 D84 L15 O33 |
| Date: | 2009–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:hohpro:y2009i29p1-34&r=net |
| By: | Christian Jaag; Urs Trinkner |
| Abstract: | This paper provides a general framework to understand, assess and develop regulations in network industries. |
| Keywords: | Regulation, Network Industries, Universal Service, Access, Bottleneck |
| JEL: | K23 M21 L00 L51 |
| Date: | 2009–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chc:wpaper:0016&r=net |
| By: | Christ, Julian P. |
| Abstract: | This paper contributes with empirical findings to European co-inventorship location and geographical coincidence of co-patenting networks. Based on EPO co-patenting information for the reference period 2000-2004, we analyze the spatial configuration of 44 technology-specific co-inventorship networks. European co-inventorship (co-patenting) activity is spatially linked to 1259 European NUTS3 units (EU25+CH+NO) and their NUTS1 regions by inventor location. We extract 7.135.117 EPO co-patenting linkages from our own relational database that makes use of the OECD RegPAT (2009) Files. The matching between International Patent Classification (IPC) subclasses and 44 technology fields is based on the ISI-SPRU-OST-concordance. We confirm the hypothesis that the 44 co-inventorship networks differ in their overall size (nodes, linkages, self-loops) and that they are dominated by similar groupings of regions. The paper offers statistical evidence for the presence of highly localized European co-inventorship networks for all 44 technology fields, as the majority of linkages between NUTS3 units (counties and districts) are within the same NUTS1 regions. Accordingly, our findings helps to understand general presence of positive spatial autocorrelation in regional patent data. Our analysis explicitly accounts for different network centrality measures (betweenness, degree, eigenvector). Spearman rank correlation coefficients for all 44 technology fields confirm that most co-patenting networks co-locate in those regions that are central in several technology-specific co-patenting networks. These findings support the hypothesis that leading European regions are indeed multi-field network nodes and that most research collaboration is taking place in dense co-patenting networks. -- |
| Keywords: | co-patenting,co-inventorship,networks,linkages,co-location,RegPAT |
| JEL: | C8 O31 O33 R12 |
| Date: | 2009–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:hohpro:y2010i31p1-40&r=net |
| By: | Bode, Alexander; Talmon l'Armee, Tobias; Alig, Simon |
| Abstract: | The cluster concept has steadily increased its importance during the past years – both from practitioners’ and researchers’ perspective. Simultaneously many corporate networks have been established. Researchers from different areas (business management, economics, social and geographical science) are trying to explain both phenomena. As a result of different disciplines’ varying research objects many definitions of clusters exist. Furthermore, the terms cluster and network are often not clearly distinguished. Some authors even merge the terms. Based on a profound literature review, our paper structures the manifold definitions, differentiating between clusters and networks, and provides first practical insights at the case of the Hessenmetall Cluster-Initiative how to integrate the two concepts. |
| Keywords: | Cluster, Network, Cooperation, Organization, Cluster-Management, Porter, Porter Diamond, Social Network, Value Chain, Industrial District, Cluster-Initiative, Social Relationship |
| Date: | 2010–05–26 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dar:wpaper:42559&r=net |
| By: | Franklin Allen; Ana Babus; Elena Carletti |
| Abstract: | An important source of systemic risk is overlapping portfolio exposures among financial institutions. We develop a model where institutions form connections through swaps of projects in order to diversify their individual risk. These connections lead to two different network structures. In a clustered network groups of financial institutions within a cluster hold identical portfolios. Defaults occur together but the number of states where this happens is small. In an unclustered network defaults are more dispersed but they occur in more states. With long term finance there is no difference between the two structures in terms of total defaults and welfare. In contrast, when short term finance is used, the network structure matters. Upon the arrival of a signal about banks' future defaults, investors update their expectations of the ability of financial institutions to repay them. If their updated expectations are low, they do not to roll over the debt and there is systemic risk in that all institutions are early liquidated. We compare the clustered and unclustered networks and analyze which is better in welfare terms. |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:eui:euiwps:eco2010/26&r=net |
| By: | Markus Lampe |
| Abstract: | This study investigates the empirical determinants of the treaty network of the 1860s and 1870s. It makes use of three central theories about the determinants of PTA formation, considering economic fundamentals from neoclassical and ‘new’ trade theory, political-economy variables, and international interaction due to trade diversion fears (dependence of later PTAs on former). These possible determinants are operationalized using a newly constructed dataset for bilateral cooperation and non-cooperation among 13 European Countries and the US. The results of logistic regression analysis show that the treaty network can be explained by a combination of ‘pure’ welfare-oriented economic theory with political economy and international interaction models. |
| Keywords: | Preferential trade agreements, Anglo-French treaty of Commerce, Bilateralism, Political economy, Qualitative choice models |
| JEL: | N73 F13 F5 |
| Date: | 2010–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cte:whrepe:wp10-06&r=net |
| By: | László Á. Kóczy (Óbuda University) |
| Abstract: | While they use the language of game theory the known measures of a priory voting power are hardly more than statistical expectations assuming the random behaviour of the players. Focusing on normalised indices we show that rational players would behave dierently from the indices' predictions and propose a model that captures such strategic behaviour. In our model players do not automatically participate in every winning coalition they are members of, but have the possibility to block the formation of such a coalition. The strategic use of such blocks can increase voting power, when the latter is dened over the game with the remaining winning coalitions. In our model players do not automatically participate in every winning coalition they are members of, but have the possibility to block the formation of such a coalition. The strategic use of such blocks can increase voting power, when the latter is defined over the game with the remaining winning coalitions. |
| Keywords: | Banzhaf index, Shapley-Shubik index, a priori voting power, rational players. |
| Date: | 2010 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pkk:wpaper:1001.rdf&r=net |