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on Network Economics |
| By: | Hurkens, Sjaak (Institute for Economic Analysis); Jeon, Doh-Shin (Toulouse School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we study how access pricing affects network competition when subscription demand is elastic and each network uses non-linear prices and can apply termination-based price discrimination. In the case of a fixed per minute termination charge, we find that a reduction of the termination charge below cost has two oppos- ing effects: it softens competition but helps to internalize network externalities. The former reduces mobile penetration while the latter boosts it. We find that firms al- ways prefer termination charge below cost for either motive while the regulator prefers termination below cost only when this boosts penetration. Next, we consider the retail benchmarking approach (Jeon and Hurkens, 2008)that determines termination charges as a function of retail prices and show that this approach allows the regulator to increase penetration without distorting call volumes. |
| Keywords: | Mobile Penetration; Termination Charge; Access Pricing; Networks; Interconnection; Regulation; Telecommunications; |
| JEL: | K23 L51 L96 |
| Date: | 2009–09–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ebg:iesewp:d-0816&r=net |
| By: | Alberto Baccini |
| Abstract: | An exploratory analysis of the crossed presence (interlocking editorship) of the same scholars in the editorial boards of Italian and international economic journals is developed. The position and the degree of integration of Italian journals in the worldwide network of economic journals is studied with network analysis techniques and a ranking of Italian journals, based on a measure of centrality, is proposed. Then relatively compact groups of international journals are individuated, representing different specialized sub-field or different methodological approaches to the study of economics. The analysis of the relative position of Italian journals in those groups suggests that Italian journals are not connected to the cores of the various schools operating at an international level, with the only exception of the history of economic thought |
| Keywords: | Economic journals; Italian economic journals; ranking of journals; editorial boards |
| JEL: | A14 |
| Date: | 2009–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:usi:wpaper:574&r=net |
| By: | Arribas, Iván; Pérez, Francisco; Tortosa-Ausina, Emili |
| Abstract: | Over the last two decades, the degree of international financial integration has increased substantially, becoming an important area of research for many financial economists. This paper explores the determinants of the asymmetries in the international integration of banking systems. We consider an approach based on both network analysis and the concept of geographic neutrality. Our analysis focuses on the banking systems of 18 advanced economies from 1999 to 2005. Results indicate that banking integration should be assessed from the perspective of both inflows and outflows, given that they show different patterns for different countries. Using standard techniques, our results reinforce previous findings by the literature—especially the remarkable role of both geographic distance and trade integration. Nonparametric techniques reveal that the effect of the covariates on banking integration is not constant over the conditional distribution which (in practical terms) implies that the sign of the relationship varies across countries. |
| Keywords: | banking integration; geographic neutrality; network analysis; nonparametric regression |
| JEL: | F15 F21 Z13 F36 |
| Date: | 2009 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:18717&r=net |
| By: | Emanuela Michetti |
| Abstract: | Our paper models the relationship between price and quality regulation in a physical network industry. The analysis is closely inspired by some of the major regulatory features of the current organisation of the British railways industry, even though its insights have more general implications. Our model focuses on the combination of price and quality regulation and accounts for the existence of entry costs which create a competitive advantage for the incumbents in the competitive franchise bidding. We show that the effectiveness of the quality control is nonmonotone in the quality standard set by the Regulator. Moreover, we advance that price regulation negatively affects the extent to which the service quality can be controlled. By partially subsidising the entry costs, the Regulator can intensify the competition for the market and improve the regulation of the service quality. Nevertheless, since entry costs subsidisation involves social costs (e.g., distortionary taxation), the Regulator faces a trade-off between price regulation, on the one hand, and quality regulation and entry costs subsidisation, on the other hand. |
| JEL: | D44 L5 L9 |
| Date: | 2009–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:usi:wpaper:578&r=net |