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on Network Economics |
| By: | Yan Liu; Guangâ€Zhen Sun |
| Abstract: | We develop a framework, extending the conventional duopoly model by replacing the Hotelling line with a simplex in highâ€dimension spaces, to study the competition and access regulation of multiple networks. We first characterize the competitive equilibrium when the substitutabilities of the networks are not too high, or the access charges are nearly costâ€based. We then analyse how the equilibrium market shares respond to marginal variations in the access charges under various regimes of access regulation, and thereby examine the efficiency implications of such regulation regimes. In particular, we analyze the asymmetric scenario in which some networks are incumbent and some are entrants. It is shown that some existing results of the duopoly do not extend to a multiâ€firm setting, largely because regulation of multiple networks is structurally far richer. |
| Keywords: | Telecommunications, oligopoly, network competition, access regulation. |
| JEL: | L96 L51 D43 |
| Date: | 2009–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mos:moswps:2008-25&r=net |
| By: | Domenico Scalera (Universit… del Sannio); Alberto Zazzaro (Universit… Politecnica delle Marche, Department of Economics, MoFiR) |
| Abstract: | Does participation in inter-firm networks make access to credit easier for firms? Is finance a motivation driving the formation of inter-firm networks? During the last twenty years these two questions have been hotly debated by economists both theoretically and empirically. In this paper, we selectively review the literature on inter-firm networking, internal capital markets and access to external credit. |
| Date: | 2009–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:anc:wmofir:25&r=net |
| By: | Dyuti Banerjee; Anupama Sethi |
| Abstract: | In this paper we consider different forms of intra-group transfers and the resulting type of group formation. We introduce the concept of partial joint liability and revenue sharing and show that this form of intra-group transfer may result in heterogeneous group formation. Its uniqueness is established by the fact that other transfer schemes always result in homogenous group formation. |
| Keywords: | Heterogeneous group formation, partial joint liability and revenue sharing |
| JEL: | O12 O16 |
| Date: | 2009–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mos:moswps:2008-24&r=net |
| By: | Robin A. Prager; Mark D. Manuszak; Elizabeth K. Kiser; Ron Borzekowski |
| Abstract: | In many countries around the world, electronic card-based payments have been replacing older types of payments at a rapid rate. In the United States, use of both debit cards and credit cards has been rising rapidly, while check volumes have been declining. The increased use of electronic payment methods has generated a number of public policy debates. One prominent debate concerns interchange fees. This paper is intended to provide background for understanding the interchange fee debate. The paper describes the operation of a typical payment card system, presents a summary of the economic theory underlying interchange fees, and discusses various developments in the U.S. payment cards industry, as well as legal and regulatory developments abroad. The paper concludes with a discussion and critical evaluation of a number of potential policy interventions. |
| Date: | 2009 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedgfe:2009-23&r=net |
| By: | Stefan Bauernschuster (University of Jena, Graduate College "The Economics of Innovative Change"; Max Planck Institute for Economics); Oliver Falck (Ifo Institute for Economic Research, Munich); Niels Daniel Grosse (University of Jena, Graduate College "The Economics of Innovative Change") |
| Abstract: | There is extensive literature, both theoretical and empirical, on the effects of social identity on a wide range of economic and non-economic outcomes. However, there is only scarce knowledge about how social identity is affected by policies or market structure. We address the question how competition among suppliers of finance interacts with trust and trustworthiness in a laboratory one-shot trust game. In order to disentangle pure effects of competition and effects of competition that concern social identity, we apply a 2 x 2 treatment design. We induce social identity by letting subjects play coordination games with clear focal points, which leads to higher investments and trustworthiness in the trust game. Our results show that competition has no significant effects on trust and trustworthiness of individuals in a strangers' framework. However, in a framework with competition of in-group and out-group investors we see that competition leads to crowding out of social identity by reducing trustworthiness. We suggest that once competition comes into play, trustees see in-group trustors' investments as the outcomes of a competitive bidding process rather than voluntary trust, which crowds out reciprocity. |
| Keywords: | Trust Game, Social Identity, Competition |
| JEL: | C92 G11 Z13 L14 |
| Date: | 2009–07–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2009-052&r=net |