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on Network Economics |
| By: | Krafft Jackie (GREDEG (Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion)); Quatraro Francesco (University of Turin); Saviotti Paolo (Unité Mixte de Recherche GAEL (Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquée de Grenoble)) |
| Abstract: | This paper applies the methodological tools typical of social network analysis within an evolutionary framework, to investigate the dynamics of the knowledge base of the biotechnology sector. Knowledge is here considered a collective good represented as a co-relational and a retrieval-interpretative structure. The internal structure of knowledge is described as a network the nodes of which are small units within traces of knowledge, such as patent documents, connected by links determined by their joint utilisation. We used measures referring to the network, like density, and to its nodes, like degree, closeness and betweenness centrality, to provide a synthetic description of the structure of the knowledge base and of its evolution over time.Eventually, we compared such measures with more established properties of the knowledge base calculated on the basis of co-occurrences of technological classes within patent documents. Empirical results show the existence of interesting and meaningful relationships across the different measures, providing support for the use of social network analysis to study the evolution of the knowledge bases of industrial sectors and their lifecycles. |
| Date: | 2009–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uto:labeco:200909&r=net |
| By: | Helmut Elsinger (Oesterreichische Nationalbank, Economic Studies Division, P.O. Box 61, A-1010 Vienna,) |
| Abstract: | I discuss a network of banks which are linked with each other by financial obligations and cross holdings. Given an initial endowment the value of the obligations and the equity values of the banks are determined endogenously in a way consistent with the priority of debt and the limited liability of equity. Even though neither equity values nor debt values are necessarily unique the value of debt and equity holdings of outside investors is uniquely determined. An algorithm to calculate debt and equity values is developed. |
| Keywords: | Financial Network; Credit Risk; Systemic Risk. |
| JEL: | G21 G33 |
| Date: | 2009–05–29 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:onb:oenbwp:156&r=net |
| By: | Jean-Michel Glachant |
| Abstract: | The regulation of network industries has undergone profound transformation in the past twenty years. The regulated industry is no longer the same, being exposed to new competitive dynamics having revolutionized their industrial framework, technology and interactions with users. There also have been fundamental changes in what regulation is feasible. In an information society a model devised in the 19th century to set prices for monopoly infrastructures such as bridges, roads and railways no longer captures the essential: the interactive dynamics created by technologies, uses, and markets. |
| Keywords: | energy policy; regulation |
| Date: | 2009–02–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:erp:euirsc:p0207&r=net |
| By: | John Duffy; Huan Xie; Yong-Ju Lee |
| Abstract: | How do norms of trust and reciprocity arise? We investigate this question by examining behavior in an experiment where subjects play a series of indefinitely repeated trust games. Players are randomly and anonymously matched each period. The parameters of the game are chosen so as to support trust and reciprocity as a sequential equilibrium when no reputational information is available. The main questions addressed are whether a social norm of trust and reciprocity emerges under the most extreme information restriction (community-wide enforcement) or whether trust and reciprocity require additional, individual-specific information about a player’s past history of play and how long that history must be. In the absence of such reputational information, we find that a social norm of trust and reciprocity is difficult to sustain. The provision of reputational information on past individual decisions significantly increases trust and reciprocity, with longer histories yielding the best outcomes. Importantly, we find that making reputational information available at a small cost may also lead to a significant improvement in trust and reciprocity, despite the fact that most subjects do not choose to purchase this information. |
| JEL: | C72 C91 C92 |
| Date: | 2009–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pit:wpaper:384&r=net |