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on Network Economics |
| By: | Armin Falk (University of Bonn); Urs Fischbacher (University of Konstanz); Simon Gaechter (University of Nottingham) |
| Abstract: | Field evidence suggests that people belonging to the same group often behave similarly, i.e., behavior exhibits social interaction effects. We conduct a laboratory experiment that avoids the identification problem present in the field and allows us to study the behavioral logic of social interaction effects. Our novel design feature is that each subject is simultaneously a member of two randomly assigned and identical groups where only members (‘neighbors’) are different. We study behavior in a coordination game with multiple equilibria and a public goods game, which has only one equilibrium in material payoffs. We speak of social interactions if the same subject at the same time makes group-specific decisions that depend on their respective neighbors’ decisions. We find that a majority of subjects exhibits social interaction effects both when the game has multiple equilibria in material payoffs and when it only has one equilibrium. |
| Keywords: | Social interactions, identification, experiments, coordination, cooperation |
| JEL: | C91 H41 K42 H26 |
| Date: | 2009–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cdx:dpaper:2009-01&r=net |
| By: | Yann Bramoullé; Brian W. Rogers |
| Abstract: | Homophily, the tendency of linked agents to have similar characteristics, is an important feature of social networks. We present a new model of network formation that allows the linking process to depend on individuals types and study the impact of such a bias on the network structure. Our main results fall into three categories: (i) we compare the distributions of intra- and inter-group links in terms of stochastic dominance, (ii) we show how, at the group level, homophily depends on the groups size and the details of the formation process, and (iii) we understand precisely the determinants of local homophily at the individual level. Especially, we find that popular individuals have more diverse networks. Our results are supported empirically in the AddHealth data looking at networks of social connections between boys and girls. |
| Keywords: | Social networks, Network formation, Homophily, Diversity |
| JEL: | A14 D85 I21 |
| Date: | 2009 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lvl:lacicr:0903&r=net |
| By: | Claus-Jochen Haake (Institute of Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University); Bettina Klaus (Baker Library, Harvard Business School) |
| Abstract: | We consider two-sided matching markets with couples. First, we extend a result by Klaus and Klijn (2005, Theorem 3.3) and show that for any weakly responsive couples market there always exists a "double stable" matching, i.e., a matching that is stable for the couples market and for any associated singles market. Second, we show that for weakly responsive couples markets the associated stable correspondence is (Maskin) monotonic and Nash implementable. In contrast, the correspondence that assigns all double stable matchings is neither monotonic nor Nash implementable. |
| Keywords: | matching with couples, (Maskin) monotonicity, Nash implementation, stability, weakly responsive preferences |
| JEL: | C62 C78 D78 J41 |
| Date: | 2008–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bie:wpaper:399&r=net |