nep-net New Economics Papers
on Network Economics
Issue of 2008‒12‒14
eight papers chosen by
Yi-Nung Yang
Chung Yuan Christian University

  1. A model of influence in a social network By Michel Grabisch; Agnieszka Rusinowska
  2. The efficiency and evolution of R&D Networks By Michael D. König; tefano Battiston; Mauro Napoletano; Frank Schweitzer
  3. Globalization, Education, and the Topology of Social Networks By Vigier, A.
  4. Flexible Decision Support in Dynamic Interorganizational Networks By Collins, J.; Ketter, W.; Gini, M.
  5. The Value of Power in China: How Do Party Membership and Social Networks Affect Pay in Different Ownership Sectors? By Shuang LI; Ming LU; Hiroshi Sato
  6. Bargaining, coalitions and externalities: A comment on Maskin By Geoffroy de Clippel; Roberto Serrano
  7. The extended and generalized Shapley value: Simultaneous consideration of coalitional externalities and coalitional structure By McQuillin, Ben
  8. Dividends and Weighted Values in Games with Externalities By Inés Macho-Stadler; David Pérez-Castrillo; David Wettstein

  1. By: Michel Grabisch (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - Paris I); Agnieszka Rusinowska (GATE - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - CNRS : UMR5824 - Université Lumière - Lyon II - Ecole Normale Supérieure Lettres et Sciences Humaines)
    Abstract: In the paper, we study a model of influence in a social network. It is assumed that each player has an inclination to say YES or NO which, due to influence of other players, may be different from the decision of the player. The point of departure here is the concept of the Hoede-Bakker index - the notion which computes the overall decisional "power" of a player in a social network. The main drawback of the Hoede-Bakker index is that it hides the actual role of the influence function, analyzing only the final decision in terms of success and failure. In this paper, we separate the influence part from the group decision part, and focus on the description and analysis of the influence part. We propose among other descriptive tools a definition of a (weighted) influence index of a coalition upon an individual. Moreover, we consider different influence functions representative of commonly encountered situations. Finally, we propose a suitable definition of a modified decisional power.
    Keywords: Influence function, influence index, decisional power, social network.
    Date: 2008–11
  2. By: Michael D. König (ETH Zurich); tefano Battiston (ETH Zurich); Mauro Napoletano (Observatoire Français des Conjonctures Économiques); Frank Schweitzer (ETH Zurich)
    Date: 2008
  3. By: Vigier, A.
    Abstract: The present paper suggests a possible framework to analyze the impact of changes to the economic and social environment on the topology of networks formed. Economic (costs) and social (norms) constraints bind individuals in their ability to create ties with others. When global phenomena affect these constraints, the overall shapes of resulting networks naturally alter. I attempt to shed light on this relationship.
    Date: 2008–09
  4. By: Collins, J.; Ketter, W.; Gini, M. (Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), RSM Erasmus University)
    Abstract: We present the design of a service oriented architecture which facilitates flexible managerial decision making in dynamic business networks. We have implemented and tested this architecture in the MinneTAC trading agent, which is designed to compete in the Trading Agent Competition for Supply Chain Management (Collins et al., 2005). Our design enables managers to decompose decision behaviors into separate, configurable components, and allows dynamic construction of analysis and modeling tools from small, single-purpose “evaluator†services. The result of our design is that the network can easily be configured to test a new theory and analyze the impact of various approaches to elements of the agent’s decision processes, such as procurement, sales, production, and inventory management. Additionally we describe visualizers that allow managers to see and manipulate the configuration of the network, and to construct economic dashboards that can display the current and historical state of any node in the network.
    Keywords: intelligent agents;decision support systems;business networks;human-agent interaction;service composition
    Date: 2008–12–05
  5. By: Shuang LI; Ming LU; Hiroshi Sato
    Abstract: Party membership and social networks, as two forms of nonmarket power, have significant effects on personal income. Do the effects vary across different ownership sectors (suoyouzhi xingzhi)? Using a nationally representative survey of urban households (China Household Income Project surveys in 1995 and 2002), we find that (1) party membership can significantly increase personal income, but this effect does not significantly differ between different ownership sectors or between the years 1995 and 2002 and (2) social networks are insignificant in State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), while they contribute significantly to personal income in non-SOE sectors.
    Keywords: Income, Party membership, Social networks, Ownership, Maketization
    JEL: J40 O15 P26 Z13
    Date: 2008–11
  6. By: Geoffroy de Clippel (Brown University); Roberto Serrano (Brown University)
    Abstract: We first observe that two of Maskin´s results do not extend beyond three players: we construct a four-player partition function with nonpositive externalities whose unique solution is inefficient, as well as a four-player characteristic function that has a unique efficient solution for each ordering of the players, but for which the payoff vector obtained by averaging these solutions over the different orderings does not coincide with the Shapley value. On the other hand, we reinforce Maskins insight that externalities may play a crucial role in generating inefficiency. Many existing solutions on how to share profits assume or derive the property of efficiency. Yet we argue that players may have an interest to choose with whom to bargain. We illustrate how this may trigger inefficiency, especially in the presence of externalities, even if bargaining among any group of agents results in an efficient distribution of the surplus they can produce. We also provide some sufficient conditions for efficiency.
    Keywords: externalities; coalition formation; Shapley value
    JEL: C7 D62
    Date: 2008–11–20
  7. By: McQuillin, Ben
    Abstract: The Shapley value assigns, to each game that is adequately represented by its characteristic function, an outcome for each player. An elaboration on the Shapley value that assigns, to characteristic function games, a "partition function" outcome is broadly established and accepted, but elaborations to encompass games with externalities (represented by partition functions) are not. Here, I show that simultaneous consideration of the two elaborations ("generalization" and "extension") obtains a unique Shapley-type value for games in partition function form. The key requirement is that the "Extended, Generalized Shapley Value" (EGSV) should be "recursive": the EGSV of any game should be the EGSV of itself. This requirement forces us to ignore all but the payoffs to bilateral partitions. The EGSV can be conceptualized as the ex ante value of a process of successive bilateral amalgamations. Previous Shapley value extensions, if generalized, are not recursive; indeed, they iterate to the EGSV.
    Keywords: Coalition structure; Externalities; Partition function games; Recursion; Shapley value
    JEL: D62 C71
    Date: 2008–11–11
  8. By: Inés Macho-Stadler; David Pérez-Castrillo; David Wettstein
    Abstract: We consider cooperative environments with externalities (games in partition function form) and provide a recursive definition of dividends for each coalition and any partition of the players it belongs to. We show that with this definition and equal sharing of these dividends the averaged sum of dividends for each player, over all the coalitions that contain the player, coincides with the corresponding average value of the player. We then construct weighted Shapley values by departing from equal division of dividends and finally, for each such value, provide a bidding mechanism implementing it.
    Keywords: Shapley value, dividends,  games with externalities, implementation
    JEL: D62 C71
    Date: 2008–12–01

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