nep-net New Economics Papers
on Network Economics
Issue of 2008‒08‒21
two papers chosen by
Yi-Nung Yang
Chung Yuan Christian University

  1. Network Structure and Design in the Deregulated U.S. Airline Industry: an Argument for Re-Regulation? By Sayed Ajaz Hussain; Serkan Bahceci
  2. Licensing and Business Models By Onetti Alberto; Verma Sameer

  1. By: Sayed Ajaz Hussain; Serkan Bahceci
    Abstract: This paper develops a model to explain and analyze the evolution of network structure (connectivity)and design (flight frequency, aircraft size, prices) in the post-deregulation U.S. airline industry. We show that legacy carriers choice of Hub-and-Spoke networks and the emergence of low cost carriers (LCCs) operating Point-to-Point networks were optimal choices. We demonstrate that LCCs need not necessarily charge lower prices, and their entry impacted legacy carriers’ prices in all markets, even those where there is no direct competition. We show that in response to entry, legacy carriers optimally lower flight frequency, leading to longer wait times between flights for which passengers are compensated by lower prices; conversely, if the entrant later exits, legacy carriers raise flight frequency and therefore prices, which may erroneously appear to be predatory pricing when in fact it is the consequence of optimal network redesign. Finally, we demonstrate that even though low cost carriers lower prices, total social welfare with competing network structures can also be lowered. In other words, the poor financial performance of legacy carriers is not due to their inefficiency per se but due to an efficient Hub-and-Spoke network undermined by competition from inefficient Point-to-Point networks. We argue that social welfare may have been, and still can be, higher if entry and exit in air passenger travel industry is regulated.
    Keywords: Networks, Airlines, Regulation
    JEL: L4 L5 L9 C6 M2
    Date: 2008–08–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tor:tecipa:tecipa-325&r=net
  2. By: Onetti Alberto (Department of Economics, University of Insubria, Italy); Verma Sameer (Associate Professor in Information Systems – San Francisco State University – College of Business)
    Abstract: License affects software companies’ business activities. While proprietary software vendors create custom licenses, open source companies have less flexibility. The Open Source Initiative (OSI) defines a list of 72 licenses as open source (“OSI approved”). For a project to follow open source licensing, it has to pick licenses from this set. Logically, we expect that an open source company defines its business model around the license that it selects. Thus, we can assume that business model decisions follow license choice. In our research we find that in some cases open source companies remove these license constraints for business reasons. We observed cases of open source companies moving from one OSI-approved license to another or companies innovating by adding additional terms. In all these cases, the decision of change is based on the license being a poor fit with their business goals. Not all open source companies are entitled to change the license because this option is available only to companies that own intellectual property. If they do not, they can try to reshape their business model, but that remains a suboptimal option. Whether cognizant of it or not, organizations are implicitly choosing a business model when they select a license. Therefore, it is very important to address licensing and business model decisions as one system instead of a disjointed two-step process. For this purpose we introduce (1) an evolutionary model where license selection and business model impact each other and (2) a taxonomy that addresses both licensing and business models. Our approach helps practitioners include revenue considerations in the licensing choice and researchers to more accurately study the antecedents and consequences of license choice.
    Date: 2008–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ins:quaeco:qf0805&r=net

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