nep-net New Economics Papers
on Network Economics
Issue of 2008‒05‒24
three papers chosen by
Yi-Nung Yang
Chung Yuan Christian University

  1. Mixed Matching Markets By Winfried Hochstättler; Robert Nickel; David Schiess
  2. Towards A knowledge-Based Economy - Europe and Central Asia - Internet Development and Governance By Larissa Kapitsa
  3. Bargaining Set Solution Concepts in Dynamic Cooperative Games By Hellman, Ziv

  1. By: Winfried Hochstättler; Robert Nickel; David Schiess
    Abstract: We introduce a new model for two-sided markets that generalizes stable marriages as well as assignment games. Our model is a further generalization of the model introduced by Eriksson and Karlander [2]. We prove that the core of our model is always non-empty by providing an algorithm that determines a stable solution in O(n4).
    Keywords: stable marriage, assignment game, core
    Date: 2008–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:usg:dp2008:2008-10&r=net
  2. By: Larissa Kapitsa (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe)
    Abstract: The diversity and socio-economic differentiation of the real world prevents the full-scale cultivation of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) to the benefit of all. Furthermore, the lack of determination and political will in some countries and slowness of responses to new technological opportunities in some others are responsible for the creation of another social divide – a digital one. The above problems were fully acknowledged by the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS). The Summit called for a joint international effort to overcome the digital divide between and within the United Nations Member States under the Digital Solidarity umbrella. This report was prepared as a follow-up to the Summit and represents a brief review of the status and trends in the area of ICT and Internet development in the UNECE region and provides background information on the state of the art in some relevant ICT subsectors in the Member States. The report focuses on the state of the Internet critical resources and, consequently, on the ICT and Internet penetration across countries and social groups. It also looks into existing Internet governance arrangements and makes some recommendations. The report contains three parts and conclusions. The first part, “Towards a Knowledge-based Economy: Progress Assessment”, highlights the situation in the region with regards to the digital divide, both between and within countries, and national strategies and actions aiming at overcoming barriers to accessing the Internet. The second part, “Internet Development: Current State of Critical Internet Resources in the UNECE Region”, concentrates on reviewing the physical Internet backbone, interconnection and connectivity within the Internet in the UNECE Member States. The third part, “Governing the Evolving Internet in the UNECE Region”, focuses on the issues of Internet Governance in the countries of the region, challenges faced by the countries and participation of key stakeholders in ICT and Internet policy formulation and implementation. The final part contains conclusions and recommendations.
    Keywords: Internet, governance, knowledge-based economy, Europe, Central Asia, transition economies
    JEL: D02 H19 L96 L98 O38
    Date: 2008–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ece:dispap:2008_1&r=net
  3. By: Hellman, Ziv
    Abstract: This paper is concerned with the question of defining the bargaining set, a cooperative game solution, when cooperation takes place in a dynamic setting. The focus is on dynamic cooperative games in which the players face (finite or infinite) sequences of exogenously specified TU-games and receive sequences of imputations against those static cooperative games in each time period. Two alternative definitions of what a ‘sequence of coalitions’ means in such a context are considered, in respect to which the concept of a dynamic game bargaining set may be defined, and existence and non-existence results are studied. A solution concept we term ‘subgame-stable bargaining set sequences’ is also defined, and sufficient conditions are given for the non-emptiness of subgame-stable solutions in the case of a finite number of time periods.
    Keywords: Cooperative game; Repeated game; Bargaining set
    JEL: C71 C73
    Date: 2008–04–17
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:8798&r=net

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