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on Network Economics |
| By: | Alexander Elbittar; Rodrigo Harrison; Roberto Muñoz |
| Date: | 2007–11–19 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cla:levarc:122247000000001708&r=net |
| By: | Timothy S. Simcoe; Stuart J.H. Graham; Maryann Feldman |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the intellectual property strategy of firms that participate in the formal standards process. Specifically, we examine litigation rates in a sample of patents disclosed to thirteen voluntary Standard Setting Organizations (SSOs). We find that SSO patents have a relatively high litigation rate, and that SSO patents assigned to small firms are litigated more often than those of large publicly-traded firms. We also estimate a series of difference-in-differences models and find that small-firm litigation rates increase following a patent's disclosure to an SSO while those of large firms remain unchanged or decline. We interpret this result as evidence of a "platform paradox" -- while small entrepreneurial firms rely on open standards to lower the fixed cost of innovation, these firms are also more likely to pursue an aggressive IP strategy that may undermine the openness of a new standard. |
| JEL: | L0 L17 L26 O34 |
| Date: | 2007–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:13632&r=net |
| By: | Nicholas Economides (Stern School of Business, New York University); Joacim Tåg (Swedish School of Economics and Business Administration, FDPE, and HECER) |
| Abstract: | We discuss the benefits of net neutrality regulation in the context of a two-sided market model in which platforms sell Internet access services to consumers and may set fees to content and applications providers “on the other side” of the Internet. When access is monopolized, we find that generally net neutrality regulation (that imposes zero fees “on the other side” of the market) increases total industry surplus compared to the fully private optimum at which the monopoly platform imposes positive fees on content and applications providers. Similarly, we find that imposing net neutrality in duopoly increases total surplus compared to duopoly competition between platforms that charge positive fees on content providers. We also discuss the incentives of duopolists to collude in setting the fees “on the other side” of the Internet while competing for Internet access customers. Additionally, we discuss how price and non-price discrimination strategies may be used once net neutrality is abolished. Finally, we discuss how the results generalize to other two-sided markets. |
| Keywords: | net neutrality, two-sided markets, Internet, monopoly, duopoly, regulation, discrimination |
| JEL: | L1 D4 L12 L13 C63 D42 D43 |
| Date: | 2007–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:net:wpaper:0745&r=net |
| By: | Santiago Carbó-Valverde (Department of Economic Theory and Economic History, University of Granada); José Manuel Liñares-Zegarra (Department of Economic Theory and Economic History, University of Granada); Francisco Rodríguez-Fernández (Department of Economic Theory and Economic History, University of Granada) |
| Abstract: | Theoretical contributions on network industries have been numerous. However, there is a lack of sufficient empirical evidence which would assist related policymaking. This is the case of payment cards markets. This paper employs a unique database to analyze changes in market power and consumers' willingness to pay resulting from the introduction of payment cards in a multiproduct banking technology. Our findings indicate that any rise in bank market power from payment cards is associated to a greater increase in consumers' willingness to pay. Any antitrust intervention which does not take into account such welfare effects could be misguided. |
| Keywords: | Card payments, bank market power, willingness to pay, multiproduct technology, network industries. |
| JEL: | D12 D21 G21 |
| Date: | 2007–11–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gra:fegper:01/07&r=net |
| By: | Ann Kjos |
| Abstract: | On January 19, 2007, the Payment Cards Center of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia sponsored a workshop led by Marc Abbey, managing partner at First Annapolis Consulting, to discuss the merchant-acquiring side of the payment cards industry. Abbey described the often overlooked acquiring industry as a dynamic growth business that is an integral part of the payment cards industry. He outlined several factors that have affected the evolution of the industry and described the current state of industry dynamics in terms of growth, competition, and business economics. In addition, Abbey discussed two recent developments: the emergence of data security standards and the new public structure of payment networks, which have drawn the focus of lawmakers, policymakers, and consumers to the merchant-acquiring business |
| Keywords: | Payment systems |
| Date: | 2007 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedpdp:07-12&r=net |