nep-net New Economics Papers
on Network Economics
Issue of 2007‒11‒17
five papers chosen by
Yi-Nung Yang
Chung Yuan Christian University

  1. Platform Competition in Pay-TV Market By Kasuga, Norihro; Manabu, Shishikura; Masanori, Kondo
  2. Peer Influence in Network Markets: An Empirical Investigation By Block, J.H.; Koellinger, P.
  3. An Overview of Coalitions and Networks Formation Models for Economic Applications By Marco A. Marini
  4. Consumer Networks and Firm Reputation: A First Experimental Investigation By Gabriele K. Lünser; Jean-Robert Tyran
  5. Comparing the Networks of Ethnic Japanese and Ethnic Chinese in International Trade By Kumagai, Satoru

  1. By: Kasuga, Norihro; Manabu, Shishikura; Masanori, Kondo
    Abstract: In this paper, we undertake an empirical analysis of the current Japanese pay-TV market, where cable TV carriers and CS digital satellite carriers are the main players. After examining the factors for subscribing to pay-TV and the competitive situation in the market, we have the following findings; (1) Cable TV carriers promote high value-added service provision, such as bundling internet access, and these activities result in competitive superiority over CS carriers. (2) Cable TV carriers receiving bigger investment from local governments tend to gain higher rates of subscription, although they provide smaller numbers of channels with a low charge. (3) The number of terrestrial broadcasting channels which are transmitted via pay-TV carriers can have a large impact on competitive advantage when getting subscribers in the pay-TV market.
    Keywords: Platform Competition; Cable Television; Communication Satellite; Pay-TV; subscriber penetration; high-value added service
    JEL: L82 R22 L51
    Date: 2007–11–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:5694&r=net
  2. By: Block, J.H.; Koellinger, P. (Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), RSM Erasmus University)
    Abstract: We analyze the effect of peer influence on the diffusion of an innovative network good. We argue that the adopters of a network good have an incentive to convince others to purchase the same product because their utility depends on the number of other users. This peer-effect influences individuals? adoption decisions alongside the more familiar installed-base-effect, based on the individual?s own insight that a larger number of installed units increases his/her benefit of adopting. We test empirically which effect dominates with Instant Messaging, an innovative network good. We arrive at surprising results with far-reaching implications for research and management. The diffusion of Instant Messaging was to a large extent driven by the peer-effect, but the installed-base-effect seemed to play no role. We perform our estimation with a discrete time hazard rate model that controls for unobserved heterogeneity.
    Keywords: Innovation Diffusion;Peer Influence;Network Markets;Hazard Rate Model;Instant Messaging;
    Date: 2007–09–14
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:eureri:300011789&r=net
  3. By: Marco A. Marini (Department of Economics, University of Urbino, Urbino, (Italy))
    Abstract: This paper presents some recent developments in the theory of coalition and network formation. For this purpose, a few major equilibrium concepts recently introduced to model the formation of coalition structures and networks among players are brie?y reviewed and discussed. Some economic applications are also illustrated to give the ?avour of the type of predictions such models are able to provide.
    Keywords: Coalitions, Networks, Core, Games with Externalities, Endogenous Coalition Formation, Pairwise Stability, Stable Networks, Link Formation.
    JEL: C70 C71 D23 D43
    Date: 2007
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rcr:wpaper:07_07&r=net
  4. By: Gabriele K. Lünser (University College London); Jean-Robert Tyran (Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen)
    Abstract: Arguing that consumers are the carriers of firms’ reputations, we examine the role of consumer networks for trust in markets that suffer from moral hazard. When consumers are embedded in a network, they can exchange information with their neighbours about their private experiences with different sellers. We find that such information exchange fosters firms' incentives for reputation building and, thus, enhances trust and efficiency in markets. This efficiency-enhancing effect is already achieved with a rather low level of network density.
    Keywords: trust; consumer networks; moral hazard; information conditions; reputation
    JEL: C72 C92 D40 L14
    Date: 2007–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kud:kuiedp:0728&r=net
  5. By: Kumagai, Satoru
    Abstract: In this paper I re-examined the trade enhancing effects of ethnic Chinese networks, found by Rauch and Trindade (2002), on a newer and extended data set. The effects are estimated by the gravity equation with the product of the population ratio (or absolute number) of the ethnic Chinese in both the importing and exporting countries, and are reaffirmed positive and statistically significant. I also compared the effects of two different ethnic Japanese networks, i.e., the networks of long-term Japanese stayers in foreign countries, and the networks of permanent Japanese residents in foreign countries. It is found that the former has stronger trade enhancing effects than the latter. This shows that the effects of ethnic networks on international trade can be generalized beyond the ethnic Chinese, and the ’cohesiveness’ of the ethnic network matters to the trade enhancing effects of the network.
    Keywords: Trade, Networks, East Asia, China, Japan, International trade, Overseas Chinese, Overseas Japanese
    JEL: F10
    Date: 2007–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jet:dpaper:dpaper113&r=net

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