nep-net New Economics Papers
on Network Economics
Issue of 2006‒11‒25
five papers chosen by
Yi-Nung Yang
Chung Yuan Christian University

  1. Heterogeneity in Nash Networks By Sudipta Sarangi; Pascal Billand; Christophe Bravard
  2. Payment networks in a search model of money By Antoine Martin; Michael Orlando; David Skeie
  3. Strategic Interaction in the Sex Market By Morrow, John; Sivan, Yoav
  4. Entry and Exit Strategies in Migration Dynamics By Sergio Vergalli
  5. Connections and Competences in the Governance of the Value Chain. How Industrial Countries Maintain their Competitive Advantage. By Paolo Crestanello; Giuseppe Tattara

  1. By: Sudipta Sarangi; Pascal Billand; Christophe Bravard
    Abstract: Heterogeneity in Nash networks can arise due to differences in the following four variables: (i) the value of information held by agents, (ii) the rate at which information decays or loses its value as it traverses the network, (iii) the prob- ability with which a links transmits information, and (iv) the cost of forming a link. In this paper we examine Nash networks, efficient networks and the existence of equilibrium networks under different heterogeneity conditions for the two-way flow model of networks.
  2. By: Antoine Martin; Michael Orlando; David Skeie
    Abstract: In a simple search model of money, we study a special kind of memory that gives rise to an arrangement resembling a payment network. Specifically, we assume that agents can pay a cost to access a central database that tracks payments made and received. Incentives must be provided to agents to access the central database and to produce when they participate in this arrangement. We also study policies that can loosen these incentive constraints. In particular, we show that a "no-surcharge" rule has good incentive properties. Finally, we compare our model with that of Cavalcanti and Wallace.
    Keywords: Payment systems ; Money ; Econometric models
    Date: 2006
  3. By: Morrow, John; Sivan, Yoav
    Abstract: There have been few attempts to empirically explain the pursuit of short term relationships and sex in a formal context. Previous work has lamented the paucity of empirical studies which utilize incentive driven behavior to draw conclusions and recommend policy. We provide an empirical approach derived from a game theoretic model of social interaction and apply it to a population of high interest. Specifically, we apply the approach to a population of sexually active men who have sex with men (MSM) in a large metropolitan area and derive qualitative conclusions regarding how individuals behave in the marketplace for sex.
    Keywords: sex; matching; dating; mating; social networks; network formation
    JEL: D02 C78
    Date: 2006–01–31
  4. By: Sergio Vergalli (University of Brescia)
    Abstract: This work is devoted to study the role of combined entry and exit strategies in the migration process. We develop a real option model in which the community of immigrants in the host country is described as a club and the immigrants benefits is a U-shaped function, depending on the dimension of the district. There exist two threshold levels: the first one triggers the migration choice, while the second triggers the return to the country of origin. The theoretical results show that the phenomenon of hysteresis is amplified by the existence of a community both in the entry case and in the exit case. Furthermore, the community can reduce the minimum wage level required to trigger both exit and entry: this fact could explain why in some cases we observe migration inflows with a low wage differential and also with underunemployment. We show also some possible further extensions of the model: in one case we introduce a possible way to select the entrants’ skills and in another case we show some theoretical implementations to include possible policy shocks in the migrant’s choice.
    Keywords: Migration, Real Option, Theory of Clubs, Network Effect
    JEL: F22 H49 O15 R23
    Date: 2006–10
  5. By: Paolo Crestanello (Poster e Crei, Vicenza); Giuseppe Tattara (Department of Economics, University Of Venice Ca’ Foscari)
    Abstract: The aim of our paper is to analyse the governance of value chains operating in the traditional sectors of clothing and footwear, focusing particularly on production de-localization from the Italian region of Veneto to the nearby country of Rumania After describing and ‘quantifying’ the internationalization process between Veneto and Rumania we turn to discuss the possible consequences of this process, both for the region of origin and the recipient area. We highlight, through the concepts of linkages and competences how the production internationalization process may determine a progressive weakening of the network of linkages that characterize the home region, and discuss the main obstacles to a successful transfer of know-how and technologies to the host system. From this discussion emerges the vision of some policy measures to amplify possible positive effects and counter negative consequences of the fragmentation of production, both in the home and in the host country.
    Keywords: Internationalisation, Industrial districts, Delocalisation, Organization of Production
    JEL: F23 L22 L23 L67
    Date: 2006

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