nep-net New Economics Papers
on Network Economics
Issue of 2006‒04‒22
six papers chosen by
Yi-Nung Yang
Chung Yuan Christian University

  1. Equilibrium Size in Network with Indirect Network Externalities: a Comment By Roberto Roson
  2. New Networks, Competition and Regulation By Pio Baake; Ulrich Kamecke
  3. Ownership Structure of Cable Networks and Competition in Local Access By Duarte Brito; Pedro Pereira
  4. A Social Network Analysis of Occupational Segregation By Sebastian Buhai; Marco van der Leij
  5. Strong Ties in a Small World By Marco van der Leij; Sanjeev Goyal
  6. The Legal Regulation of Software Interoperability in the EU By Boris Rotenberg

  1. By: Roberto Roson (Department of Economics, University Of Venice Cà Foscari)
    Abstract: This commentary critically reviews a recent paper by Baraldi (2004). It shows that results obtained there are not robust, and may mot hold after the introduction of minor changes in the model structure. It is claimed that this is not a technical point, but relates to the fundamental nature of markets with indirect externalities.
    Keywords: Network Externalities, Two-Sided Networks
    JEL: L10 L40
    Date: 2006
  2. By: Pio Baake; Ulrich Kamecke
  3. By: Duarte Brito (Universidade Nova de Lisboa); Pedro Pereira (Autoridade da Concorrência)
    Abstract: In this paper, we discuss the role of cable television networks and their ownership structure in promoting competition in the local access market. First, we show that the dual ownership of a local telephone network and a cable network, compared with separate ownership, may increase or decrease incentives to invest in upgrading the cable television network. Second, we argue that separate ownership of the two networks is important to promote competition in local access.
    Keywords: Cable Networks, Local Access, Competition
    JEL: L43 L96
    Date: 2005–04
  4. By: Sebastian Buhai (Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, and Aarhus School of Business); Marco van der Leij (Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam)
    Abstract: This paper proposes a simple social network model of occupational segregation, generated by the existence of inbreeding bias among individuals of the same social group. If network referrals are important in getting a job, then expected inbreeding bias in the social structure results in different career choices for individuals from different social groups, which further translates into stable occupational segregation equilibria within the labour market. Our framework can be regarded as complementary to existing discrimination or rational bias theories used to explain persistent observed occupational disparities between various social groups.
    Keywords: Social Networks; Occupational Segregation; Labour Market
    JEL: A14 J31 J70 Z13
    Date: 2006–02–01
  5. By: Marco van der Leij (Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam); Sanjeev Goyal (Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, and University of Essex)
    Abstract: In this paper we test the celebrated `Strength of weak ties' theory of Granovetter (1973). We test two hypotheses on the network structure in a data set of collaborating economists. While we find support for the hypothesis of transitivity of strong ties, we reject the hypothesis that weak ties reduce distance more than strong ties do. We relate this surprising result to two different views of society. Whereas the classical view has been that society consists of different communities with strong ties within communities and weak ties between, the community of economic researchers has an interlinked star structure with strong ties between the stars. In such a world, strong ties are more important than weak ties.
    Keywords: network structure; social network; social capital; economic sociology; coauthorship; research; collaboration
    JEL: A14 Z13
    Date: 2006–06–10
  6. By: Boris Rotenberg
    Abstract: Abstract: The primary aim of this paper is to point to the need for a European debate on the tension between the fundamental right to freedom of expression and the fundamental right to property in European software regulation. The analysis reveals that the analogous application of existing fundamental rights case law of the European Court of Human Rights as in Chassagnou and Appleby would probably unduly favour private property rights in software over other individual and societal interests in the form of software expression. Courts will need more guidance to find the right balance, in view of the unique nature of software, particularly so with regard to the foundational concept of software interoperability.
    Keywords: European law; media; networks; standardisation; fundamental/human rights
    Date: 2005–11–18

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