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on Network Economics |
| By: | Jean J., GABSWEWICZ (UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)) |
| Abstract: | We analyse the optimal pricing choice of an incumbent firm that sells a good with network externalities and is threatened by the entry of a higher quality variant. In the framework of a vertical differentiation model, we find a necessary and sufficient condition under which quality improvement occurs as a result of this competition. |
| Keywords: | Vertical product differentiation; network externalities; quality improvement |
| JEL: | L11 L12 L15 |
| Date: | 2005–01–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ctl:louvec:2005064&r=net |
| By: | Jean J., GABSZEWICZ (UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)); Filomena, GARCIA |
| Abstract: | We obtain explicitly the optimal path of prices for a monopolist operating in a network industry during a finite number of periods. We describe this optimal path as a function of network intensity and horizon length and show that the prices are increasing in time and that, for very low network intensity, or very high horizon length, the monopolist will offer the good at zero price in the initial period. |
| Date: | 2005–12–15 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ctl:louvec:2005063&r=net |
| By: | Kaie Kerem (School of Economics and Business Administration, Tallinn University of Technology); Vello Vensel (School of Economics and Business Administration, Tallinn University of Technology) |
| Abstract: | Business firms operate in a certain environment in which they interact with one another, with individuals, governmental organisations, financial institutions and various other interest groups. Operation of respective economic and social networks (both voluntary and private market determined) may have an important effect on the overall business environment. This paper presents and analyses some results of the special sample survey of Estonian firms undertaken in 1994-2003. Our main attention in this paper is focused on business supporting services provided by various institutions and on the operation of disputes’ resolution mechanism, using the concept of social networks. It is argued that the state enforcement mechanism is working weakly in the still unstable legal environment and firms have to use different self-enforcement mechanisms (through social networks) to resolve disputes. Social networks are also used for obtaining additional financing for investment. The success of the operation of social networks depends on the government economic policy. |
| Keywords: | economic and social networks, social capital, business supporting services, enforcement mechanism, value creation. |
| JEL: | Z13 P30 K42 |
| Date: | 2005 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ttu:wpaper:129&r=net |
| By: | Cook, Joseph; Plott, Charles R. |
| Date: | 2005–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:clt:sswopa:1240&r=net |
| By: | Kariuki, Gatarwa; Place, Frank |
| Abstract: | "Dimensions of the nature, scope, and complexity of collective action in Kenya have evolved over many years. In studying collective action, the aim is to understand why and how people participate in networks of trust. The purpose of this study was to investigate the different objectives that farmers pursue through collective action with the aim of understanding the patterns of people's participation in collective action, identify factors that influence people to join groups, and identify the costs and benefits of participating in activities of groups. The study was carried out in four sites spread across the highlands of central Kenya. Data was collected from a total of 442 households, focusing on whether members of those households belonged to groups and if so, what type of groups these were and their activities. In addition we looked at how these groups functioned and identified some of the contributions members make to these groups and the benefits from the same. The analysis shows that collective action is used to accomplish a range of activities for different socioeconomic categories and that the majority of households in central Kenya engage in some form of group activity.... The study suggests that where institutions and policies that promote individual or private sector growth are weak, collective action can help to overcome these weaknesses and connect individuals in these institutions and policies." from Author's Abstract |
| Keywords: | Collective action ,Trust ,Community participation ,cost benefit analysis ,Household surveys , |
| Date: | 2005 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fpr:worpps:43&r=net |
| By: | Badstue, Lone B.; Bellon, Mauricio R.; Berthaud, Julien; Ramírez, Alejandro; Flores, Dagoberto; Juárez, Xóchitl; Ramírez, Fabiola |
| Abstract: | "This project explored the possible role of collective action among small-scale farmers in managing and maintaining genetic resources in a center of crop diversity. It focused on the local institutions that ensure the supply of seed of diverse maize landraces to small-scale farmers in the Central Valleys of Oaxaca, Mexico. The key hypothesis was that the medium-to-long-term supply of a diverse set of varieties to any individual small-scale maize farmer depends on an agreement among a group of farmers to manage and supply the seed of these landraces to each other, if the need arises, and that this constitutes a form of collective action. Six communities were studied, three of them in-depth. Methodologies used included in-depth semi-structured interviews with key informants, focus group discussions, and a tracer study—following the flows of seed among different farmers. The results show that, while there is a well-developed local seed supply system based on sets of social relationships and involving multiple types of transactions, there is no evidence of collective action. Most farmers rely on and prefer to select and save seed from their own harvests. There are seed flows, however, and most seed transactions take place among people with social links, but not within a well-defined group. There are no specialized suppliers of seed, either individuals or groups. Most transactions are bilateral and while the most common transaction is the sale and purchase of seed, this is not done for profit but out of a sense of moral obligation. The system is based on the creation of trust, which is needed because seed is not transparent—that is, it is not possible to fully predict the plant phenotype that may result from a given seed simply by looking at the seed. Farmers demand different types of maize and they believe that there is a strong genotype-by-environment interaction, hence “foreign” maize types may not be appropriate for them. At the same time, farmers also find occasional experimentation beneficial and believe that they can slowly modify the characteristics of “foreign” landraces. In this system, there are strong incentives to be conservative, but also to try new landraces and experiment. The local seed system of these farmers is resilient but able to innovate as well. Interventions to support the conservation of landraces on farm, based on specialized networks for seed that rely on collective action, may not work.." Author's Abstract |
| Keywords: | Central America ,Europe and North America ,Small farmers ,Collective action ,Informal seed systems ,Crop diversification ,Seed supply ,Trust , |
| Date: | 2005 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fpr:worpps:38&r=net |
| By: | Gero Carletto (Agricultural and Development Economics Division, Food and Agriculture Organization); Benjamin Davis (Agricultural and Development Economics Division, Food and Agriculture Organization); Marco Stampini |
| Abstract: | Using data from the 2003 Albania Panel Survey, the paper sets out to achieve two main objectives. First, we fully characterize the evolution of Albanian international migration since the fall of Communism in 1990. We distinguish between permanent and temporary migration, and between the two principal destinations, Greece and Italy. Second, we explore, using multivariate analysis, what individual, household and community level factors influence the current decision to migrate internationally, focusing on the role of previous personal experience and family networks. We find evidence of important changes over time in the pull and push factors that drive migration flows. While early on in the transition political and economic factors were predominant, over time personal experience and household migration networks assumed a fundamental role, facilitating growth in migration even in times of the relatively stable economic conditions. Other individual, household, and community factors have an important role in the decision to migrate, and these factors vary by type of migration and destination. Furthermore, the spatial configuration of migration is also changing: both temporary and permanent migration are expanding into new parts of the country. The results have important policy implications. First, policies aimed at controlling migration are likely to be less effective where networks have already developed or where engrained patterns of repeat migration are established. Second, despite increasing legality, migration, particularly for newcomers, is still difficult, risky and often illegal, which fosters a climate of exploitation and abuse. Third, we find that highly educated individuals have a higher propensity to migrate permanently, which constitutes a serious potential risk in terms of brain drain. |
| Keywords: | Albania, Families, Migration, Population dynamics, Rural urban migration, Social groups, Sociology, Urban rural migration |
| JEL: | F22 P2 |
| Date: | 2005 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fao:wpaper:0503&r=net |
| By: | Paul, BELLEFLAMME (UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)); Pierre, PICARD |
| Abstract: | The effects of (private, small-scale) piracy on the pricing behavior of producers of information goods are studied within a unified model of vertical differentiation. Although information goods are assumed to be perfectly differentiated, demands are interdependent because the copying technology exhibits increasing returns to scale. We characterize the Bertrand-Nash equiliria in a duopoly. Comparing equilibrium prices to the prices set by a multiproduct monopolist, we show that competition drives prices up and may lead to price dispersion. Competition reduces total surplus in the short run but provides higher incentives to create in the long run. |
| Keywords: | Information goods; piracy; copyright; pricing |
| JEL: | L13 L82 L86 K11 O34 |
| Date: | 2005–09–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ctl:louvec:2005057&r=net |
| By: | Angelo Zago (Dipartimento di Scienze economiche, Università di Verona) |
| Keywords: | Quality, Procurement, Contracts, Efficienty, Stochastic Production Frontier |
| JEL: | C21 L15 L24 |
| Date: | 2005–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ver:wpaper:27&r=net |