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on Network Economics |
| By: | Eftichios S. Sartzetakis (University of Macedonia (Greece)and University College of the Cariboo) |
| Abstract: | This paper develops a simple model of the automobile market, in which significant network and environmental externalities are present, and examines consumers' choice of technology. There are two types of technology: one that currently dominates the market but imposes significant environmental costs, and one that is expected to be introduced and has zero environmental costs. We find that, in the absence of policy intervention, the benefits of the installed base and the price diferentials in favour of the existing technology will deter new users from adopting the clean technology. We consider diferent tax policies that will induce adoption provided it is welfare warranted. First, we analyze a tax policy on the dirty technology with the tax revenues generated being used for general purposes.Under this case, we find that the tax, to induce adoption, will be greater than the marginal environmental damage. Second, we consider the tax revenue generated from the dirty technology to be earmarked towards a future subsidy to the clean technology. In this case, the tax is found to be lower than the case where revenues are used for general purposes and more interesting is the fact that the tax can be set equal to the marginal damage. Finally, we examine the case where the government credibly commits a revenue neutral tax/subsidy policy prior to the introduction of the clean technology and we find that the tax and the subsidy expenditures required could be lower relative to the case without precommitment. |
| Date: | 2004 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cea:doctra:e2004_82&r=net |
| By: | Bergman, Mats (Dept. of Economics, Stockholm University) |
| Abstract: | Two-sided network effects in card payment systems are analysed under different market structures, e.g., competition, one-sided monopoly, bilateral monopoly and duopoly; with and without an interchange fee; for the so-called Baxter case of non-strategic merchants. A partial ranking of market structures according to their welfare effects is provided. Fixed central (card) system costs are introduced and analysed under free entry and duopoly. It is shown that under free entry, a per-transaction distribution of fixed costs is preferrable to dividing the fixed cost in equal proportions between the paritcipants. Under duopoly, (and no entry) a fixed division of central costs will yield lower prices. |
| Keywords: | Two-sided markets; card payentd; payment systems; acquiring; issuing; market structure |
| JEL: | G21 L11 L44 |
| Date: | 2005–01–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:sunrpe:2005_0001&r=net |
| By: | Theresa M. Greaney |
| Abstract: | This paper examines network effects on trade by comparing the trade patterns of foreign affiliates in the United States with the trade patterns of U.S.-owned firms. The evidence strongly supports the following hypotheses: 1) foreign affiliates behave differently from U.S. firms in their trade patterns; 2) in particular, foreign affiliates display strong home biases in their trade patterns; and 3) among the foreign affiliates, Japanese affiliates demonstrate by far the strongest home bias in their trade patterns. Controlling for income and distance effects, foreign affiliates from Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland traded on average 17 times more with their respective home countries and those from the United Kingdom traded 30 times more with the United Kingdom, while Japanese affiliates traded a whopping 130 times more with Japan. |
| Keywords: | Network effects, Foreign affiliates, Trade patterns |
| JEL: | F14 F23 |
| Date: | 2004–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hst:hstdps:d04-57&r=net |
| By: | Dolfsma, W. (Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), RSM Erasmus University) |
| Abstract: | Fashion is the quintessential post-modernist consumer practice, or so many hold. In this contribution, I argue that, on the contrary, fashion should be understood as a means of communicating one's commitment to modernist values. I introduce the framework of the Social Value Network, to relate such values to institutionalised consumption behaviour, allowing one to signal to others. Modernist values are not homogenous, and are in important ways contradictory, giving rise to the dynamics of fashion that can be observed. |
| Keywords: | consumption;modernism;fashion;identity;symbolic goods; |
| Date: | 2004–06–23 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:eureri:30001459&r=net |