nep-mst New Economics Papers
on Market Microstructure
Issue of 2022‒03‒21
two papers chosen by
Thanos Verousis


  1. From Zero-Intelligence to Queue-Reactive: Limit Order Book modeling for high-frequency volatility estimation and optimal execution By Tommaso Mariotti; Fabrizio Lillo; Giacomo Toscano
  2. Paying to Match: Decentralized Markets with Information Frictions By Marina Agranov; Ahrash Dianat; Larry Samuelson; Leeat Yariv

  1. By: Tommaso Mariotti; Fabrizio Lillo; Giacomo Toscano
    Abstract: The estimation of the volatility with high-frequency data is plagued by the presence of microstructure noise, which leads to biased measures. Alternative estimators have been developed and tested either on specific structures of the noise or by the speed of convergence to their asymptotic distributions. Gatheral and Oomen (2010) proposed to use the Zero-Intelligence model of the limit order book to test the finite-sample performance of several estimators of the integrated variance. Building on this approach, in this paper we introduce three main innovations: (i) we use as data-generating process the Queue-Reactive model of the limit order book (Huang et al. (2015)), which - compared to the Zero-Intelligence model - generates more realistic microstructure dynamics, as shown here by using an Hausman test; (ii) we consider not only estimators of the integrated volatility but also of the spot volatility; (iii) we show the relevance of the estimator in the prediction of the variance of the cost of a simulated VWAP execution. Overall we find that, for the integrated volatility, the pre-averaging estimator optimizes the estimation bias, while the unified and the alternation estimator lead to optimal mean squared error values. Instead, in the case of the spot volatility, the Fourier estimator yields the optimal accuracy, both in terms of bias and mean squared error. The latter estimator leads also to the optimal prediction of the cost variance of a VWAP execution.
    Date: 2022–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2202.12137&r=
  2. By: Marina Agranov (California Institute of Technology); Ahrash Dianat (University of Essex); Larry Samuelson (Yale University); Leeat Yariv (Princeton University)
    Abstract: We experimentally study decentralized one-to-one matching markets with transfers. We vary the information available to participants, complete or incomplete, and the surplus structure, supermodular or submodular. Several insights emerge. First, while markets often culminate in efficient matchings, stability is more elusive, reflecting the difficulty of arranging attendant transfers. Second, incomplete information and submodularity present hurdles to efficiency and especially stability, their combination drastically diminishes stability's likelihood. Third, matchings form "from the top down" in complete-information supermodular markets, but exhibit many more and less-obviously ordered offers otherwise. Last, participants' market positions matter far more than their dynamic bargaining styles for outcomes.
    Keywords: matching, incomplete information, stability, experiments
    JEL: C78 D82 D83
    Date: 2021–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pri:econom:2021-74&r=

This nep-mst issue is ©2022 by Thanos Verousis. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
General information on the NEP project can be found at https://nep.repec.org. For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <director@nep.repec.org>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected.
NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Massey University in New Zealand.