nep-mst New Economics Papers
on Market Microstructure
Issue of 2020‒09‒21
four papers chosen by
Thanos Verousis


  1. Limit Order Book (LOB) shape modeling in presence of heterogeneously informed market participants By Mouhamad Drame
  2. Rise of the Machines? Intraday High-Frequency Trading Patterns of Cryptocurrencies By Alla A. Petukhina; Raphael C. G. Reule; Wolfgang Karl H\"ardle
  3. Price formation and optimal trading in intraday electricity markets By Olivier F\'eron; Peter Tankov; Laura Tinsi
  4. Which Trading Agent is Best? Using a Threaded Parallel Simulation of a Financial Market Changes the Pecking-Order By Michael Rollins; Dave Cliff

  1. By: Mouhamad Drame
    Abstract: The modeling of the limit order book is directly related to the assumptions on the behavior of real market participants. This paper is twofold. We first present empirical findings that lay the ground for two improvements to these models.The first one is concerned with market participants by adding the additional dimension of informed market makers, whereas the second, and maybe more original one, addresses the race in the book between informed traders and informed market makers leading to different shapes of the order book. Namely we build an agent-based model for the order book with four types of market participants: informed trader, noise trader, informed market makers and noise market makers. We build our model based on the Glosten-Milgrom approach and the most recent Huang-Rosenbaum-Saliba approach. We introduce a parameter capturing the race between informed liquidity traders and suppliers after a new information on the fundamental value of the asset. We then derive the whole 'static' limit order book and its characteristics -- namely the bid-ask spread and volumes available at each level price -- from the interactions between the agents and compare it with the pre-existing model. We then discuss the case where noise traders have an impact on the fundamental value of the asset and extend the model to take into account many kinds of informed market makers.
    Date: 2020–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2009.02808&r=all
  2. By: Alla A. Petukhina; Raphael C. G. Reule; Wolfgang Karl H\"ardle
    Abstract: This research analyses high-frequency data of the cryptocurrency market in regards to intraday trading patterns related to algorithmic trading and its impact on the European cryptocurrency market. We study trading quantitatives such as returns, traded volumes, volatility periodicity, and provide summary statistics of return correlations to CRIX (CRyptocurrency IndeX), as well as respective overall high-frequency based market statistics with respect to temporal aspects. Our results provide mandatory insight into a market, where the grand scale employment of automated trading algorithms and the extremely rapid execution of trades might seem to be a standard based on media reports. Our findings on intraday momentum of trading patterns lead to a new quantitative view on approaching the predictability of economic value in this new digital market.
    Date: 2020–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2009.04200&r=all
  3. By: Olivier F\'eron; Peter Tankov; Laura Tinsi
    Abstract: We develop a tractable equilibrium model for price formation in intraday electricity markets in the presence of intermittent renewable generation. Using stochastic control theory we identify the optimal strategies of agents with market impact and exhibit the Nash equilibrium in closed form for a finite number of agents as well as in the asymptotic framework of mean field games. Our model reproduces the empirical features of intraday market prices, such as increasing price volatility at the approach of the delivery date and the correlation between price and renewable infeed forecasts, and relates these features with market characteristics like liquidity, number of agents, and imbalance penalty.
    Date: 2020–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2009.04786&r=all
  4. By: Michael Rollins; Dave Cliff
    Abstract: This paper presents novel results generated from a new simulation model of a contemporary financial market, that cast serious doubt on the previously widely accepted view of the relative performance of various well-known public-domain automated-trading algorithms. Various public-domain trading algorithms have been proposed over the past 25 years in a kind of arms-race, where each new trading algorithm was compared to the previous best, thereby establishing a "pecking order", i.e. a partially-ordered dominance hierarchy from best to worst of the various trading algorithms. Many of these algorithms were developed and tested using simple minimal simulations of financial markets that only weakly approximated the fact that real markets involve many different trading systems operating asynchronously and in parallel. In this paper we use BSE, a public-domain market simulator, to run a set of experiments generating benchmark results from several well-known trading algorithms. BSE incorporates a very simple time-sliced approach to simulating parallelism, which has obvious known weaknesses. We then alter and extend BSE to make it threaded, so that different trader algorithms operate asynchronously and in parallel: we call this simulator Threaded-BSE (TBSE). We then re-run the trader experiments on TBSE and compare the TBSE results to our earlier benchmark results from BSE. Our comparison shows that the dominance hierarchy in our more realistic experiments is different from the one given by the original simple simulator. We conclude that simulated parallelism matters a lot, and that earlier results from simple simulations comparing different trader algorithms are no longer to be entirely trusted.
    Date: 2020–09
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2009.06905&r=all

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