New Economics Papers
on Market Microstructure
Issue of 2006‒07‒09
three papers chosen by
Thanos Verousis


  1. Stock price informativeness, cross-listings and investment decisions By Foucault, Thierry; Gehrig, Thomas
  2. Price Manipulation in an Experimental Asset Market By Veiga Helena; Vorsatz Marc
  3. Competing With the NYSE By William O. Brown, Jr.; J. Harold Mulherin; Marc D. Weidenmier

  1. By: Foucault, Thierry; Gehrig, Thomas
    Abstract: In this paper, the authors show that a cross-listing allows a firm to make better investment decisions because it enhances stock price informativeness.
    Keywords: Cross-listings; cross-listings premium; price informativeness; investment decisions; flow-back; ownership.
    JEL: D92 G11
    Date: 2006–04–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ebg:heccah:0840&r=mst
  2. By: Veiga Helena; Vorsatz Marc (METEOR)
    Abstract: We analyze in the laboratory whether an uninformed trader is able to manipulate the price of a financial asset. To do so, we compare the results of two different experimental treatments. In the Benchmark Treatment, twelve subjects trade a common value asset that takes either a high or a low value. Information is distributed asymmetrically, only three outof twelve subjects know the actual value of the asset. The Manipulation Treatment is identical to the Benchmark Treatment apart from the fact that we introduce a computer program as an additional trader. This manipulation program buys a fixed number of shares in the beginning of a trading period and sells them afterwards again. Our results show that the last contract price is significantly higher in the Manipulation Treatment if the asset takes a low value and that there are no price differences between the two treatments if the value of the asset is high. Moreover, this simple manipulation program is, at least in some instances, profitable.
    Keywords: financial economics and financial management ;
    Date: 2006
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:umamet:2006023&r=mst
  3. By: William O. Brown, Jr.; J. Harold Mulherin; Marc D. Weidenmier
    Abstract: We study the stock exchange rivalry between the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the Consolidated Stock Exchange (Consolidated) from 1885 to 1926 using a new database of bid-ask spreads and stock data collected from The New York Times and other primary sources. The magnitude of this important, but largely forgotten rivalry was substantial. From 1885 to 1895, the ratio of Consolidated to NYSE volume averaged 40 percent and reached as high as 60 percent. The market share of the Consolidated averaged 23 percent for approximately 40 years. The Consolidated focused on the relatively liquid securities on the NYSE as measured by bid-ask spreads and trading volume. Our results suggest that NYSE bid-ask spreads fell by more than 10 percent when the Consolidated began to trade NYSE stocks while bid-ask spreads for our quasicontrol group of stocks trading on the Boston Stock Exchange remain unchanged. The effect persisted over the entire history of the stock market rivalry until a series of scandals and investigations of the Consolidated by state regulators led to the demise of the exchange in the 1920s. The analysis suggests three conclusions: (1) the NYSE has faced significant long-run competition (2) the NYSE may be susceptible to a similar level of competition in the future and (3) that the Consolidated may have improved the efficiency of stock prices by contributing to the price discovery process.
    JEL: G1 G2 N2
    Date: 2006–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12343&r=mst

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