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on Monetary Economics |
| By: | Miquel Faig; Belen Jerez |
| Abstract: | Inflation, as a tax on money, induces buyers to reduce their money balances. Sellers are aware of this, so to attract costumers, they post price offers that reduce the need for buyers to carry precautionary money balances. We study this effect of inflation in a competitive search environment where buyers experience preference shocks after they are matched with a seller. With full information, equilibrium price offers consist of a flat fee which is independent of the quantities purchased. With private information of buyers' preferences, equilibrium price offers are restricted by incentive compatibility constraints. As a result, the price schedule that maps quantities purchased onto payments must be increasing. As inflation rises, these price schedules become relatively flat, so the marginal cost of purchasing goods is low. Consequently, buyers that are not liquidity constrained (with a low desire to consume) purchase inefficiently large quantities. Meanwhile, buyers with a high desire to consume typically purchase inefficiently low quantities because, as their money balances fall, they become liquidity constrained. This is in contrast with the full information benchmark where inflation reduces the quantities purchased by all buyers. |
| Date: | 2005–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cte:werepe:we051708&r=mon |
| By: | Carin van der Cruijsen; Maria Demertzis |
| Abstract: | In contrast to previous empirical attempts to examine the effect ofincreasing central bank transparency on macroeconomic magnitudes, we investigate how the link between inflation and inflation expectations alters with increasing transparency. Our motivation stems from the belief that changes in the institutional features or operations of the Central Bank affect, first and foremost, the way that private agents form their expectations about the future behaviour of the Central Bank, and only through them, inflation. We apply the framework used by Levin et al (2004) who differentiate between inflation targeters and countries that do not have explicit quantitative objectives. They discover that inflation targeters benefit from a weaker link between inflation and expectations, and the more so for longer horizons. We, in turn, examine whether this observation still holds as central banks become more transparent. Our attempt is facilitated by the recent development of quantitative measures for transparency, used in the main text. We find that our results provide some evidence to substantiate the beneficial impact of transparency, on helping fix private sector expectations. |
| Keywords: | Central Bank Transparency; Infl;ation Expectations; Monetary Policy |
| JEL: | E31 E52 E58 |
| Date: | 2005–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dnb:dnbwpp:031&r=mon |
| By: | Ya-Hwei Yang; Jia-Dong Shea |
| Abstract: | From 1999 to 2003, Taiwan faced a deflationary situation. The reasons for this deflation can be attributed to both domestic and global factors. Domestic changes including local political unrest, tensions with China, outbound investment to China, a weakened financial system, and a deteriorating government financial situation, provided the backdrop for the economic slowdown and corresponding deflation. A number of global factors, especially the bursting of the Internet and IT bubbles in late 2000 and the rise of China%u2019s economy, also heavily influenced both global and Taiwanese prices. This paper adopts a simplified aggregate demand and aggregate supply model to derive a deterministic equation of the GDP deflator (PGDP), and then applies quarterly data covering the period from 1982 to 2003 to estimate the PGDP equation using 2SLS. The empirical results are used to identify the sources of PGDP deflation in Taiwan. In addition, the phenomenon of price divergence appears since 2002 where the WPI increased and the CPI decreased. The causes of the WPI-CPI divergence are also investigated in this paper. |
| JEL: | E0 E3 E5 |
| Date: | 2005–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11244&r=mon |
| By: | Martin Feldstein |
| Abstract: | This paper begins by discussing the inherent conflict between the simultaneous existence of a single currency for the countries of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the independent fiscal policies of those countries. The Stability and Growth Pact was an attempt to reconcile that conflict. I describe how EMU governments have chosen to ignore the Stability Pact's constraint on budget deficits and how they sought to undermine it by changing the rules themselves. The final part of the paper describes the actual resolution of the issue by the agreement reached at the end of March 2005 by the European Council. The new policy effectively abandons the Stability Pact and leaves the way open to much larger sustained deficits. |
| JEL: | F4 |
| Date: | 2005–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11249&r=mon |