By: |
Francesco Decarolis;
Maris Goldmanis;
Antonio Penta |
Abstract: |
The transition of the advertising market from traditional media to the
internet has induced a proliferation of marketing agencies specialized in
bidding in the auctions that are used to sell ad space on the web. We analyze
how collusive bidding can emerge from bid delegation to a common marketing
agency and how this can undermine the revenues and allocative efficiency of
both the Generalized Second Price auction (GSP, used by Google and
Microsoft-Bing and Yahoo!) and the of VCG mechanism (used by Facebook). We
find that, despite its well-known susceptibility to collusion, the VCG
mechanism outperforms the GSP auction both in terms of revenues and efficiency. |
Keywords: |
Collusion, digital marketing agencies, facebook, google, GSP, internet auctions, online advertising, VCG |
JEL: |
C72 D44 L81 |
Date: |
2019–04 |
URL: |
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:upf:upfgen:1657&r=all |