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on Marketing |
| By: | Metali, Dr |
| Abstract: | The main purpose of this article is to examine the attitudes of Algerian consumers toward online shopping, and whether these attitudes vary by demographics. Data were collected via an online questionnaire within Algeria between January and March 2014. The sample consists of (530) Algerian Internet users (aged 18 and over). The results showed that most Algerian consumers do not intend to buy goods and services online, despite the increasing number of Internet users. And lastly, the study suggests that there is no significant difference in consumer attitudes among demographics, with the exception of occupation, where the results showed that students and merchants are more likely to adopt online shopping. |
| Keywords: | Internet users, e-marketing, consumers' attitudes, online shopping, online shopping intention |
| JEL: | M3 M31 |
| Date: | 2016–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:77675&r=mkt |
| By: | Motta, Massimo; Tarantino, Emanuele |
| Abstract: | It has been suggested that mergers, by increasing concentration, raise incentives to invest and hence are pro-competitive. To study the effects of mergers, we rewrite a game with simultaneous price and cost-reducing investment choices as one where firms only choose prices, and make use of aggregative game theory. We find no support for that claim: absent effciency gains, the merger lowers total investments and consumer surplus.Only if it entails suffcient effciency gains, will it be pro-competitive. We also show there exist classes of models for which the results obtained with cost-reducing investments are equivalent to those with quality-enhancing investments. |
| JEL: | K22 D43 L13 L41 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mnh:wpaper:42805&r=mkt |
| By: | Karle, Heiko; Peitz, Martin; Reisinger, Markus |
| Abstract: | For many products, platforms enable sellers to transact with buyers. We show that the competitive conditions among sellers shape the market structure in platform industries. If product market competition is tough, sellers avoid competitors by joining different platforms. This allows platforms to sustain high fees and explains why, for example, in some online markets, several homogeneous platforms segment the market. Instead, if product market competition is soft, agglomeration on a single platform emerges, and platforms fi ght for the dominant position. These insights give rise to novel predictions. For instance, market concentration and fees are negatively correlated in platform industries, which inverts the standard logic of competition. |
| Keywords: | endogenous segmentation; intermediation; market structure; price competition; Two-sided markets |
| JEL: | D43 L13 |
| Date: | 2017–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12435&r=mkt |
| By: | Karpov, Aleksandr |
| Abstract: | The paper develops a model of price competition in presence of consumers with limited attention. Education and obfuscation marketing strategies are studied. It is shown that firms in highly competitive industries have incentives to obfuscate, but firms in low competitive industries have not. |
| Keywords: | bounded rationality,hotelling linear city model,consideration set,limited attention,unawareness |
| JEL: | D03 D11 D43 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ifwedp:201789&r=mkt |
| By: | Guhl, Daniel (Humboldt University Berlin); Klapper, Daniel (Humboldt University Berlin); Massner, Katharina (LMU); Spann, Martin (LMU); Stich, Lucas (LMU); Yegoryan, Narine (Humboldt University Berlin) |
| Abstract: | Psychology and economics (the mixture of which is known as behavioral economics) are two fundamental disciplines underlying marketing. Various marketing studies document the non-rational behavior of consumers, even though behavioral biases might not always be consistently termed or formally described. In this review, we identify empirical research that studies behavioral biases in marketing. We summarize the key findings according to three classes of deviations (i.e., non-standard preferences, non-standard beliefs, and non-standard decision-making) and the marketing mix instruments (i.e., product, price, place, and promotion). We thereby introduce marketing researchers to the theoretical foundation of and terminology used in behavioral economics. For scholars from behavioral economics, we provide ready access to the rich empirical, applied marketing literature. We conclude with important managerial implications resulting from the behavioral biases of consumers, and we present avenues for future research. |
| Keywords: | marketing; behavioral economics; behavioral biases; review; |
| Date: | 2017–10–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rco:dpaper:51&r=mkt |
| By: | Gregory S. Crawford; Lachlan Deer; Jeremy Smith; Paul Sturgeon |
| Abstract: | Increased competition for viewers’ time is threatening the viability of public-service broadcasters (PSBs) around the world. Changing regulations regarding advertising minutes might increase revenues, but little is known about the structure of advertising demand. To address this problem, we collect a unique dataset on monthly impacts (quantities) and prices of UK television channels between 2002 and 2009 to estimate the (inverse) demand for advertising on both public and commercial broadcasters. We find that increasing PSB advertising minutes to the level permitted for non-PSBs would increase PSB and industry revenue by 10.5% and 6.7%. |
| Keywords: | Advertising, public service broadcasting, television markets, inverse demand |
| JEL: | D2 L1 L5 M3 |
| Date: | 2017–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zur:econwp:268&r=mkt |
| By: | Daniel Herold (Justus-Liebig-University Giessen) |
| Abstract: | An information exchange between two producers selling independent products to the same retailer can have ambiguous effects on market efficiency and surplus. When a retailer's costs are unobservable the producers may have an incentive to communicate about their negotiations with that retailer. If each producer is allowed to place one offer the producers will have no incentive to exchange information. However, the retailer may communicate that he refused the first offer to the other firm which subsequently might place a lower offer. When one firm is allowed to place a second offer, two equilibria involve communication between the producers. In a separating equilibrium an information exchange ensures that agreement will always be found. In a hybrid equilibrium, the likelihood that agreement is found is less likely. |
| JEL: | L41 L42 L13 |
| Date: | 2017 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mar:magkse:201750&r=mkt |
| By: | Sara Ellison; Christopher M. Snyder; Hongkai Zhang |
| Abstract: | We study price dynamics for computer components sold on a price-comparison website. Our fine-grained data—a year of hourly price data for scores of rival retailers—allow us to estimate a dynamic model of competition, backing out structural estimates of managerial frictions. The estimated frictions are substantial, concentrated in the act of monitoring market conditions rather than entering a new price. We use our model to simulate the counterfactual gains from automated price setting and other managerial changes. Coupled with supporting reduced-form statistical evidence, our analysis provides a window into the process of managerial price setting and the microfoundation of pricing inertia, issues of growing interest in industrial organization and macroeconomics. |
| JEL: | L11 C73 D21 L81 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_6285&r=mkt |
| By: | Ann-Kathrin Rothenbächer (Johannes Gutenberg-University Mainz, Germany) |
| Abstract: | This paper addresses the periodic vehicle routing problem with time windows (PVRPTW). Therein, customers require one or several visits during a planning horizon of several periods. The possible visiting patterns (schedules) per customer are limited. In the classical PVRPTW, it is common to assume that each customer requires a specific visit frequency and offers all corresponding schedules with regular intervals between the visits. In this paper, we permit all kinds of schedule structures and the choice of the service frequency. We present an exact branch-and-price-and-cut algorithm for the classical PVRPTW and its variant with flexible schedules. The pricing problems are elementary shortest path problems with resource constraints. They can be based on one of two new types of networks and solved with a labeling algorithm, which uses several known acceleration techniques such as the ng-path relaxation and dynamic half-way points within bidirectional labeling. For instances whose schedule sets fulfill a certain symmetry condition, we present specialized improvements of the algorithm such as constraint aggregation and symmetry breaking. Computational tests on benchmark instances for the PVRPTW show the effectiveness of our algorithm. Furthermore, we analyze the impact of different schedule structures on run times and objective function values. |
| Keywords: | Vehicle Routing, Multi Period, Branch-and-Price-and-Cut, Service Choice, Flexible Schedules |
| Date: | 2017–08–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jgu:wpaper:1714&r=mkt |