|
on Marketing |
|
Issue of 2017‒07‒16
eight papers chosen by João Carlos Correia Leitão Universidade da Beira Interior |
| By: | Caprice, Stéphane |
| Abstract: | This article examines (i) how retailers position private label products, (ii) why private labels are sold in some product categories but not in others, and why some national brand products may have difficulty in accessing retailers' shelves, (iii) why some private label products are positioned as "premium" brands, and (iv) how consumers' surplus and total welfare are affected by private labels. We find that private label positioning leads to less differentiation in product category, which structurally changes a retailer's product line in return. Consumer welfare and total welfare are lower. |
| Keywords: | Private Label; National brand; Product Line. |
| JEL: | L13 L81 |
| Date: | 2017–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:31759&r=mkt |
| By: | de Cornière, Alexandre; Taylor, Greg |
| Abstract: | Motivated by recent investigations over Google's practices in the smartphone industry, we study bundling in markets for devices that allow consumers to use applications. The presence of applications on a device increases demand for it, and application developers earn revenues by interacting with consumers. A firm that controls multiple applications can offer them to device manufacturers either individually or as a bundle. We present a novel mechanism through which anticompetitive bundling can be profitable: Bundling reduces rival application developers' willingness to pay manufacturers for inclusion on their devices, and allows a multiapplication developer to capture a larger share of industry profit. Bundling can also strengthen competition between manufacturers and thereby increase consumer surplus, even if it leads to foreclosure of application developers and a loss in product variety. |
| Keywords: | Antitrust; Bundling; Mobile telecommunications |
| JEL: | L4 L86 |
| Date: | 2017–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12129&r=mkt |
| By: | Cornière (de), Alexandre; Taylor, Greg |
| Abstract: | Motivated by recent investigations over Google's practices in the smartphone industry, we study bundling in markets for devices that allow consumers to use applications. The presence of applications on a device increases demand for it, and application developers earn revenues by interacting with consumers. A firm that controls multiple applications can offer them to device manufacturers either individually or as a bundle. We present a novel mechanism through which anticompetitive bundling can be profitable: Bundling reduces rival application developers' willingness to pay manufacturers for inclusion on their devices, and allows a multiapplication developer to capture a larger share of industry profit. Bundling can also strengthen competition between manufacturers and thereby increase consumer surplus, even if it leads to foreclosure of application developers and a loss in product variety |
| Date: | 2017–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:31806&r=mkt |
| By: | Rasheed, Muhammad Taseer; Aujla, Khalid Mehmood; Hussain, Abid; Qureshi, Abdul Hayee; Hasan, Tariq |
| Abstract: | Roses have reasonable demand in Pakistan. The study was conducted in rose growing pockets of Islamabad and Rawalpindi districts. The objective of the study was to determine costs and returns of rose producers and marketing intermediaries. Random sampling technique was used to collect the data from thirty farmers and ten retailers. In the study area, per acre yield of roses was 1010 kg per annum. Average establishment cost of rose gardens was Rs. 0.17 million per acre. Total cost of production was calculated to be Rs. 0.26 million per acre per annum. Gross and net returns of rose farmers were calculated to be Rs. 0.32 million and Rs. 0.06 million per acre, respectively. Benefit cost ratio of roses production was 1.24, thus returns from roses’ production are high enough, and it is an attractive farming activity in the study area. Marketing channel for roses was identified as producers, retailers, and consumers. Marketing costs of producers and retailers were Rs. 54.1 and Rs. 17.3 per kg, respectively. Shares of producers and retailers in consumer rupee were 77.4% and 22.6%, respectively. Farmers in the study area obtain low yield of roses than their counterparts in irrigated areas of the country, mainly to due to traditional non-recommended production practices. Thus, farmers should be trained to use recommended production technology for production of roses. |
| Keywords: | Benefit cost ratio, Consumer’s rupee, Establishment cost, Islamabad, Maintenance cost, Net margins, Rawalpindi, Roses, |
| JEL: | Q12 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:79707&r=mkt |
| By: | Noriaki Matsushima; Shohei Yoshida; Noriaki Matsushima; Shohei Yoshida |
| Abstract: | We consider a downstream oligopoly model with one dominant and several fringe retailers, who purchase a manufacturing product from a monopoly supplier. We then examine how the supplier's outside option influences the relation between the dominant retailer's bargaining power and the equilibrium retail price. If the market demand shrinks due to a breakdown of bargaining between the supplier and the dominant retailer, who works as a sales promoter for the product, there is a negative relation between the bargaining power and the retail price. |
| Date: | 2016–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dpr:wpaper:0981r&r=mkt |
| By: | Mark D. Manuszak; Krzysztof Wozniak |
| Abstract: | We study the pricing of deposit accounts following a regulation that capped debit card interchange fees in the United States and provide the first empirical investigation of the link between interchange fees and granular deposit account prices. This link is broadly predicted by the theoretical literature on two-sided markets, but the nature and magnitude of price changes are key empirical issues. To examine the ways that banks adjusted their account prices in response to the regulatory cap on interchange fees, we exploit the cap's differential applicability across banks and account types, while accounting for equilibrium spillover effects on banks exempt from the cap. Our results show that banks subject to the cap raised checking account prices by decreasing the availability of free accounts, raising monthly fees, and increasing minimum balance requirements, with different adjustment across account types. We also find that banks exempt from the cap adjusted prices as a competitive response to price changes made by regulated banks. Not accounting for such competitive responses underestimates the policy's impact on the market, for both banks subject to the cap and those exempt from it. |
| Keywords: | Equilibrium effects ; Financial supervision and regulation ; Interchange fees ; Retail banking and debit cards ; Two-sided markets |
| JEL: | G21 G28 L51 |
| Date: | 2017–07–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedgfe:2017-74&r=mkt |
| By: | Aaron Edlin; Catherine Roux; Armin Schmutzler; Christian Thöni |
| Abstract: | We study the anticompetitive effects of predatory pricing and the efficacy of three policy responses. In a series of experiments where an incumbent and a potential entrant interact, we compare prices, market structures and welfare. Under a laissez-faire regime, the threat of post-entry price cuts discourages entry, and allows incumbents to charge monopoly prices. Current U.S. policy (Brooke Group) does not help. A policy suggested by Baumol (1979) lowers post-exit prices, while Edlin’s (2002) proposal reduces pre-entry prices and encourages entry. While both policies show outcomes after entry that are less competitive than under Laissez-Faire, they nevertheless increase consumer welfare. |
| Keywords: | Predatory pricing, entry deterrence, firm strategy, antitrust law, experiment |
| JEL: | D21 K21 L12 L13 C91 |
| Date: | 2017–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zur:econwp:258&r=mkt |
| By: | Rey, Patrick; Salant, David |
| Abstract: | We study the design of auctions for the allocation of essential inputs, such as spectrum rights, transmission capacity or airport landing slots, to firms using these inputs to compete in a downstream market. When welfare matters in addition to auction revenues, there is a trade-off: provisions aimed at fostering post-auction competition in the downstream market typically result in lower prices for consumers, but also in lower auction proceeds. We first characterize the optimal auction design from the standpoints of consumer and total welfare. We then examine how various regulatory instruments can be used to implement the desired allocation. |
| Keywords: | Auctions; Market design; Essential inputs; Regulation; Antitrust. |
| JEL: | D43 D44 D47 D61 L13 L42 L43 L51 |
| Date: | 2017–06–07 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:31784&r=mkt |