nep-mkt New Economics Papers
on Marketing
Issue of 2015‒10‒25
eight papers chosen by
João Carlos Correia Leitão
Universidade da Beira Interior

  1. Willingness to pay for quality attributes of fresh beef. Implications on the retail marketing By Berges, Miriam; Casellas, Karina; Rodríguez, Ricardo; Errea, Damián
  2. Price Discrimination by a Two-sided Platform: with Applications to Advertising and Privacy Design By Doh-Shin Jeon; Byung-Cheol Kim; Domenico Menicucci
  3. How Limiting Deceptive Practices Harms Consumers By Salvatore Piccolo; Piero Tedeschi; Giovanni Ursino
  4. Rôle de la proximité et de l’identification dans la fidélité des consommateurs au point de vente dans différents circuits de distribution By Costa, S.; Hérault-Fournier, C.; Sirieix, L.
  5. Testing for Endogenous Sunk Costs in the Retail Industry By Roman, Hernan
  6. The Production of Information in an Online World By Julia Cagé; Nicolas Hervé; Marie-Luce Viaud
  7. A Model of Non-Stationary Dynamic Price Competition with an Application to Platform Design By Andrew Sweeting
  8. Dynamics of Compatibility under Switching Costs By Doh-Shin Jeon; Domenico Menicucci; Nikrooz Nasr

  1. By: Berges, Miriam; Casellas, Karina; Rodríguez, Ricardo; Errea, Damián
    Abstract: In recent decades, the demand for food worldwide has undergone significant changes that have highlighted the issue of the quality and safety food crisis associated with consumption of fresh meat, consumer concerns about the quality and safety of these products has been safety of fresh meat consumption are not The aim of this work is to investigate the consumers' perceptions of safety and identify factors that help explain the willingness to pay safety of the product, including, a hypothetical hygiene certification in handling and retailing. The results indicate a positive and statistically significant for the following attributes of fresh meat WTP: personalized attention in a butcher counter, the presence of a "safety certification" in the place of purchase and the bright red color on the product.
    Keywords: Preferencias del Consumidor; Disposición a Pagar; Carne; Atributos de Calidad;
    Date: 2015–08
  2. By: Doh-Shin Jeon (Toulouse School of Economics and CEPR. Manufacture de Tabacs, 21 allees de Brienne - 31000 Toulouse, France.); Byung-Cheol Kim (School of Economics, Georgia Institute of Technology. 221 Bobby Dodd Way, Atlanta, GA 30332, USA.); Domenico Menicucci (Dipartimento di Scienze per l’Economia e l’impresa, Universit`a degli Studi di Firenze. Via delle Pandette 9, I-50127 Firenze (FI), Italy)
    Abstract: We study price discrimination by a monopoly two-sided platform who mediates interactions between two different groups of agents. We adapt a canonical model of second-degree price discrimination `a la Mussa and Rosen (1978) to a two-sided platform by focusing on non-responsiveness, a clash between the allocation the platform wants to achieve and the incentive compatible allocations. In this framework we address the key question of when a price discrimination on one side complements or substitutes a price discrimination on the other side. We offer two applications on advertising platforms and also highlight the role of commitment in eliciting personal information for targeted advertising.
    Keywords: price discrimination, two-sided markets, non-responsiveness, privacy, advertising, positive/negative sorting
    JEL: D4 D62 D82 M3
    Date: 2015–10
  3. By: Salvatore Piccolo (Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore); Piero Tedeschi (Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore); Giovanni Ursino (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore; Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza, Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore)
    Abstract: There are two competing sellers of an experience good, one offers high quality, one low. The low-quality seller can engage in deceptive advertising, potentially fooling a buyer into thinking the product is better than it is. Although deceptive advertising might seem to harm the buyer, we show that he could be better off when the low-quality seller can engage in deceptive advertising than not. We characterize the optimal deterrence rule that a regulatory agency seeking to punish deceptive practices should adopt. We show that greater protection against deceptive practices does not necessarily improve the buyer-welfare.
    Keywords: Misleading Advertising, Deception, Bayesian Consumers, Asymmetric Information
    JEL: L13 L15 L4
    Date: 2015–05
  4. By: Costa, S.; Hérault-Fournier, C.; Sirieix, L.
    Abstract: This paper analyses the influence of closeness and identification on customer store loyalty, in short and long marketing channels. Based on a survey (N=1625) we show that(1)relationship closeness and process-based closeness positively influence identification;(2)identification positively influences commitment and store loyalty (trust being a mediator)and,(3)the channel is a moderator in the structural model. ....French Abstract : Cet article étudie le rôle de la proximité et de l’identification dans la fidélité des consommateurs au point de vente, en circuit court et en circuit long. A partir d’une enquête auprès de 1625 consommateurs, il montre (1) l’influence des proximités relationnelle et de processus sur l’identification ;(2)l’influence de l’identification sur l’engagement affectif et la fidélité, via la confiance ;(3)l’effet modérateur du type de circuit.
    JEL: M31 Q13
    Date: 2015
  5. By: Roman, Hernan
    Abstract: This paper uses data from retail industries in Chile to test Shaked and Sutton's (1987) hypothesis of endogenous sunk costs. I find that industries which are less likely to have endogenous sunk costs display a signicant negative relationship between market size and concentration. In contrast, in the supermarket industry, where investment in advertising is presumed to be more intense, the tests show that concentration does not vary with market size and is bounded away from zero.
    Keywords: Endogenous Sunk costs, concentration
    JEL: L11 L81
    Date: 2010
  6. By: Julia Cagé (Sciences Po Paris, Department of Economics, 28 rue des Saints Pères, 75007 Paris, France); Nicolas Hervé (Institut National de l’Audiovisuel (INA), Département de la Recherche, 4 avenue de l’Europe, 94366 Bry sur Marne, France); Marie-Luce Viaud (Institut National de l’Audiovisuel (INA), Département de la Recherche, 4 avenue de l’Europe, 94366 Bry sur Marne, France)
    Abstract: Information is costly to produce but cheap to reproduce. Who are the main providers of original news in the online world, and are they rewarded for this? What are the benefits of breaking out a story, and how does information propagate? This paper addresses these issues by exploiting a unique dataset including all online content produced by general information media outlets in France during year 2013. Tracking every piece of content produced by these outlets, we develop a topic detection algorithm to construct the set of news stories. We study the timeline of each story and distinguish between original reporting and copy-and-paste. We then merge this content data with data on investment in news gathering and daily audience to investigate the costs and benefits of information production. This paper offers a typology of online media outlets and associated business models. We first highlight the specific role played by news agencies. AFP has the largest news desk and is the main provider of original information, reflecting the use of an adequate copyright system. We then find a quasi-linear relationship between the number of journalists, the quantity of original news production, and online audience. This positive correlation hold for all the media outlets independently of their offline support; hence the relevance of a transmedia approach. However online audience does not translate into significant revenues. This illustrates the need to develop new paywall or copyright models.
    Keywords: Internet, information production, paywall, copyright, online audience
    JEL: L11 L15 L82 L86
    Date: 2015–09
  7. By: Andrew Sweeting (Department of Economics, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742, USA)
    Abstract: I develop a tractable framework for conducting platform design counterfactuals in settings where many sellers compete and set prices dynamically, using approaches developed in the recent literature on Oblivious Equilibria. As an initial application, I use the model to study a simple platform design counterfactual using data from the secondary event ticket market on where the perishability of the product being sold results in sellers facing a dynamic and non-stationary pricing problem. Currently, most transactions happen at low prices close to the event. Motivated by some simple theoretical examples, I investigate how the dynamics of prices, the timing of transactions, platform revenues and participant surplus would be a affected if a commission structure that encouraged earlier transactions was introduced.
    Keywords: dynamic pricing, platform, non-stationary equilibrium, perishable goods
    JEL: C7 C63 L13 L11
    Date: 2015–09
  8. By: Doh-Shin Jeon (Toulouse School of Economics and CEPR, 21 allees de Brienne, 31000 Toulouse, France); Domenico Menicucci (Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'impresa, Università degli Studi di Firenze, Via delle Pandette 9, I-50127 Firenze (FI), Italy); Nikrooz Nasr (Toulouse School of Economics, 21 allees de Brienne, 31000 Toulouse, France)
    Abstract: We study firms’ choices of compatibility in a dynamic setting. Current compatibility choice shapes the distribution of consumers’ switching costs and thereby affects competition and compatibility choice in the future. Given today’s market shares, the dynamics of compatibility is asymmetric in that firms are more likely to embrace compatibility tomorrow if products are compatible today but no such inertia exists for incompatibility. However, this asymmetry disappears when the market shares are endogenous. Contrary to what happens in a static setting, when consumer lock-in arises due to a significant switching cost, firms make their systems incompatible in order to soften future competition, which hurts consumers and tends to reduce welfare.
    Keywords: (In)Compatibility, Dynamics, Lock-in, Switching Cost
    JEL: D43 L13 L41
    Date: 2015–04

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