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on Marketing |
| By: | Fabio Pinna; Stephan Seiler |
| Abstract: | We estimate the effect of consumer search on the price of the purchased product in a physical store environment. We implement the analysis using a unique data set obtained from radio frequency identification tags, which are attached to supermarket shopping carts. This technology allows us to record consumers' purchases as well as the time they spent in front of the shelf when contemplating which product to buy, giving us a direct measure of search effort. Controlling for a host of confounding factors, we estimate that an additional minute spent searching lowers price paid by $2.10 which represents 8 percent of average trip-level expenditure. |
| Keywords: | Consumer search, in-store marketing, path data |
| JEL: | D12 D83 L11 L15 |
| Date: | 2014–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cep:cepdps:dp1296&r=mkt |
| By: | Susan Athey (Stanford University); Emilio Calvano (CSEF, Università di Napoli Federico II); Joshua S. Gans (University of Toronto and NBER) |
| Abstract: | We provide a model of online advertising display markets where consumer attention may be divided among multiple publishers and, consequently, their advertising attention may be allocated to different platforms. We demonstrate that this gives rise to a mixture of single- and multi-homing advertisers and some consequent matching inefficiency between advertisers and consumers. Thus, as the number of switching consumers expands (associated with, say, the internet’s impact on news publishers), ad prices fall and a number of other competitive effects arise. We demonstrate that increased switching leads advertisers to favor reach over frequency and creates an incentive for contracting and technology improvements that can guarantee impressions to advertisers. Finally, we analyze the strategic choice of ad capacity, showing that, in general, increased switching leads to greater equilibrium ad capacity and lower prices. |
| Keywords: | advertising, media, newspapers, matching, multi-homing, singlehoming, tracking, two-sided markets, platforms |
| JEL: | L11 L82 |
| Date: | 2014–10–28 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sef:csefwp:379&r=mkt |
| By: | Malte Krüger |
| Abstract: | Card payment systems are sometimes accused of taking from the poor and giving to the rich. The argument is as follows: High card fees are leading to higher retail prices for both, card users and cash users. However, high income card holders are receiving rewards when purchasing by card. The result may be a net transfer of, mostly low-income, cash users to, mostly high-income, card users. In this article a model with monopolist product differentiation is used to show that rich card holders may actually be paying for their card rewards themselves. In this case, there is perverse distribution effect. |
| Keywords: | Two-sided markets, card rewards, cross-subsidy, pricing strategies |
| JEL: | L15 L41 G29 |
| Date: | 2014–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rmn:wpaper:201408&r=mkt |
| By: | Tim Brühn (University of Giessen); Annette Meinusch (University of Giessen); Georg Götz (University of Giessen) |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes the incentives of a monopolistic matchmaker to generate user-specific information in order to increase match-quality and profits. By merging two-sided-markets with two-sided-matching we derive a micro-foundation of cross-side externalities dependent on the number of potential matches and the accuracy-level of user-specific information. Incentives to invest into identification technologies are determined by the scalability of the (fixed) investments and the resulting effect on match-quality. We show that these effects work into opposing directions, i.e., while scalability works in favor for platforms with large customer bases, the effect of identification on match-quality is greater for small scale platforms. |
| Keywords: | two-sided markets, two-sided matching, advertising, segmentation and identification |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mar:magkse:201448&r=mkt |
| By: | Carl Benedikt Frey (James Martin Fellow, Oxford Martin Programme on the Impacts of Future Technology, United Kingdom (UK).); Atif Ansar (Lecturer at the Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford and an Associate Fellow of the Saïd Business School, UK.); Sacha Wunsch-Vincent (Economics and Statistics Division, WIPO) |
| Abstract: | Brands are ever more visible and central to the functioning of modern economies. Firms, institutions, government and non-governmental actors as part of civil society spend an everincreasing amount on the right branding of their organization, and/or their products. The demand for trademarks has thus grown substantially. Mirroring this trend, “Markets for brands” - as defined in this paper - play an important but underappreciated economic role in today’s global economy. Trademarks and brands are increasingly the object of commercial transactions; they can be purchased, franchised or licensed. The ability to use Market for Brands allows companies to diversify their business, to access competences, and to generate new revenues without substantial investments. In recent years, firms in emerging economies have been more active users of these markets by licensing or acquiring established global brands. Yet, despite their apparent importance, little is known about the size of these markets, and how relevant these are for firms in countries with different stages of development. This paper first defines and provides a taxonomy for different brand markets. Second, it analyzes the economic rationale of such markets. Finally, it provides evidence on their magnitude, also assessing their relative importance of the different brand-related transaction types in developed and emerging economies alike. |
| Keywords: | Brands, branding, trademarks, licensing, franchising, mergers and acquisitions, emerging economies, intellectual property |
| JEL: | F23 M3 O3 O34 |
| Date: | 2014–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wip:wpaper:21&r=mkt |