nep-mkt New Economics Papers
on Marketing
Issue of 2013‒09‒25
four papers chosen by
Joao Carlos Correia Leitao
University of Beira Interior and Technical University of Lisbon

  1. Generation Y preferences for employer brand benefits By Chloé Guillot-Soulez; Sébastien Soulez
  2. How Major League Baseball Clubs Have Commercialized Their Investment in Japanese Top Stars By Isao Okada; Stephen A. Greyser
  3. Développement des espaces logistiques urbains. CDU et ELP dans l'europe du sud-ouest By Jesus Gonzalez-Feliu; Nicolas Malhéné; Eleonora Morganti; Anna Trentini
  4. Umbrella Effects By Roman Inderst; Frank Maier-Rigaud

  1. By: Chloé Guillot-Soulez (CEREFIGE - Centre Européen de Recherche en Economie Financière et Gestion des Entreprises - Université Nancy II : EA3942 - Université de Metz); Sébastien Soulez (CEREFIGE - Centre Européen de Recherche en Economie Financière et Gestion des Entreprises - Université Nancy II : EA3942 - Université de Metz)
    Abstract: This paper studies the preoccupations of young graduates from Generation Y transitioning from education to employment. Reviewing job search and employer brand literature, we update graduates' preferences for employer brand benefits in their initial job search. Using conjoint analysis on a French sample (N = 592), we demonstrate that, even if on the whole they prefer job security and a relaxed work atmosphere, their expectations are heterogeneous. The results also show that the Internet is far from being the first medium used by these young 'digital natives' graduates for the job search. This research lead to discuss the relevance of the concepts of Generation Y and generational segmentation and provide important information to assist jobseekers and career counselors in improving the speed and quality of employment, and to help recruiters to improve recruitment.
    Keywords: employer brand; generation Y; recruitment
    Date: 2013
  2. By: Isao Okada (The Mainichi Newspapers); Stephen A. Greyser (Harvard Business School)
    Abstract: When a Major League Baseball club signs a Japanese star player, it obviously tries to commercialize its investment in the player. The initial focus is on home attendance (ticket sales) and television audiences, plus merchandise sales. These elements are similar to those considered for any high-performing players. However, for Japanese stars, there is also the potential to attract significant fandom from the local Japanese community. This represents an opportunity for truly incremental local revenue for the team. In addition, teams try to attract revenue from Japan-such as from corporate sponsors, advertising signage at the home field, and visiting Japanese fans traveling to the U.S. to see these stars perform. In addition to treating team efforts at growing local Japanese community support, this paper examines seven factors for success in attracting revenues from Japanese companies and fans: pitcher or position player, player's popularity, non-stop flights from Japan, distance from Japan, non-sport tourist attractions in a city, size of Japanese community in the city and player's and team's performance. The most important factor, however, is the player's talent and popularity in terms of performance in both Japan and the U.S. and his media exposure in Japan including endorsement contracts. In addition, if a MLB club signs a Japanese position star player and is based in a city which is endowed with a variety of non-baseball tourist attractions, this would have a further advantage for the team. The field-based research reported here is derived largely from analysis of team experiences with five principal Japanese baseball stars-Hideo Nomo, Ichiro Suzuki, Hideki Matsui, Daisuke Matsuzaka, and Kosuke Fukudome.
    Date: 2013–09
  3. By: Jesus Gonzalez-Feliu (LET - Laboratoire d'économie des transports - CNRS : UMR5593 - École Nationale des Travaux Publics de l'État [ENTPE] - Université Lumière - Lyon II); Nicolas Malhéné (EIGSI - EIGSI - EIGSI); Eleonora Morganti (IFSTTAR/AME/SPLOTT - Systèmes Productifs, Logistique, Organisation des Transports et Travail - IFSTTAR - PRES Université Paris-Est); Anna Trentini (EIGSI - EIGSI - EIGSI)
    Abstract: Dans cet article, nous étudions l'organisation de plusieurs plateformes logistiques implantées en zone urbaine pour tenter de caractériser les facteurs clés de ces infrastructures. Nous focalisons notre attention sur les Centres de Distribution Urbaine (CDU) et les Espaces Logistique de Proximité (ELP) et analysons les stratégies de coopération mises en œuvre pour assurer leur pérennité.
    Keywords: Centres de Distribution Urbaine; Espaces Logistiques de Proximité; stratégies de coopération; jeu d'acteurs.
    Date: 2013
  4. By: Roman Inderst (Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität, Frankfurt/Main); Frank Maier-Rigaud (IESEG School of Management (LEM-CNRS))
    Abstract: We analyse the key determinants of umbrella effects, which arise when the price increase or quantity reduction of a cartel diverts demand to substitute products. Umbrella effects arise irrespective of whether non cartelists act as price takers (“competitive fringe”) or respond strategically to the increased demand. Sizable umbrella effects can also arise when non-cartelists are outside the relevant market (in the sense of a SSNIP test), provided that the cartel’s price increase is substantial. Further, a shift of demand to non-cartelists, triggering a price increase, can be induced also when their purchasers themselves benefit from higher demand as rivals purchase from the cartel and pass-on the respective price increase. To identify the actual damage it is thus key to take into account the overall adjustments among cartel members and outsiders as well as their respective, potentially competing purchasers. We also discuss how future analysis of the endogenous formation of cartels with partial market coverage should inform theories of the determinants of umbrella effects.
    Keywords: umbrella effect, partial cartel, pass-on, cartel effect, quantification of damages, merger effects, private enforcement, standing, market definition, cellophane fallacy, antitrust
    JEL: K21 L13 L41
    Date: 2013–07

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