nep-mkt New Economics Papers
on Marketing
Issue of 2013‒05‒24
seven papers chosen by
Joao Carlos Correia Leitao
University of Beira Interior and Technical University of Lisbon

  1. The Impact of Social Media on Consumer Demand: The Case of Carbonated Soft Drink Market By Liu, Yizao; Lopez, Rigoberto
  2. Hypertargeting, Limited Attention, and Privacy: Implications for Marketing and Campaigning By Florian Hoffmann; Roman Inderst; Marco Ottaviani
  3. The Limits of Price Discrimination By Dirk Bergemann; Benjamin Brooks; Stephen Morris
  4. Implementierung des Marketing-Intelligence Konzepts in B-to-B Unternehmen By Helm, Roland; Gritsch, Stephanie
  5. An Empirical Analysis of Competitive Nonlinear Pricing By Gaurab Aryal
  6. Formation and adaptation of reference prices in grain marketing: An experimental study By Mattos, Fabio; Poirier, Jamie
  7. Going green: Agent-based modeling of the diffusion of dynamic electricity tariffs By Anna Kowalska-Pyzalska; Katarzyna Maciejowska; Katarzyna Sznajd-Weron; Rafal Weron

  1. By: Liu, Yizao; Lopez, Rigoberto
    Abstract: This article estimates the impact of social media exposure on consumer valuation of product characteristics. We apply the Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) model of market equilibrium to sales data for 18 carbonated soft drink brands sold in 12 cities over 17 months (June 2011 to October 2012) and social media conversations on Facebook, Twitter and YouTube. Empirical results show that social media exposure is a significant driver of consumer behavior through altering evaluation of product characteristics and purchase choices.
    Keywords: Social Media, Demand, Consumer behavior, Internet, Carbonated soft drinks, Consumer/Household Economics, Demand and Price Analysis, Industrial Organization, D12, M37, L66,
    Date: 2013
  2. By: Florian Hoffmann; Roman Inderst; Marco Ottaviani
    Abstract: Using personal data collected on the internet, fi?rms and political campaigners are able to tailor their communication to the preferences and orientations of individual consumers and voters, a practice known as hypertargeting. This paper models hypertargeting as selective disclosure of information to an audience with limited attention. We characterize the private incentives and the welfare impact of hypertargeting depending on the wariness of the audience, on the intensity of competition, and on the feasibility of price discrimination. We show that policy intervention that bans the collection of personally identi?able data (for example, through stricter privacy laws requiring user consent) is bene?ficial when consumers are naive, competition is limited, and fi?rms are able to price discriminate. Otherwise, privacy regulation often back?fires. Keywords: Hypertargeting, selective disclosure, limited attention, consumer privacy regulation, personalized pricing, competition. JEL Classi?fication: D83 (Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief), M31 (Marketing), M38 (Government Policy and Regulation).
    Date: 2013
  3. By: Dirk Bergemann (Cowles Foundation, Yale University); Benjamin Brooks (Dept. of Economics, Princeton University); Stephen Morris (Dept. of Economics, Princeton University)
    Abstract: We analyze the welfare consequences of a monopolist having additional information about consumers' tastes, beyond the prior distribution; the additional information can be used to charge different prices to different segments of the market, i.e., carry out "third degree price discrimination." We show that the segmentation and pricing induced by the additional information can achieve every combination of consumer and producer surplus such that: (i) consumer surplus is non-negative, (ii) producer surplus is at least as high as profits under the uniform monopoly price, and (iii) total surplus does not exceed the efficient gains from trade. As well as characterizing the welfare impact of price discrimination, we examine the limits of how prices and quantities can change under price discrimination. We also examine the limits of price discrimination in richer environments with quantity discrimination and limited ability to segment the market.
    Keywords: First degree price discrimination, Second degree price discrimination, Third degree price discrimination, Private information, Privacy, Bayes correlated equilibrium
    JEL: C72 D82 D83
    Date: 2013–05
  4. By: Helm, Roland; Gritsch, Stephanie
    Keywords: Marketing Intelligence; market-/resource-based view of strategy; Marktorientierung; Vertrieb
    Date: 2013–05–13
  5. By: Gaurab Aryal
    Abstract: In this paper I estimate a model of competitive nonlinear pricing with multidimensional adverse selection. I model competition using a Stackelberg duopoly and solve the multidimensional screening problem by aggregating the multidimensional type into a single dimensional type. I study identification and estimation of the utility and cost parameters and the joint density of consumer types. The truncated marginal densities of the aggregated types can be nonparametrically identified but not the joint density. I use the classic Cramér-von Mises and Vuong’s test to select one parametric family of copula to estimate the joint density from the unspecified marginals. Using a unique data for advertisements collected from two Yellow Pages Directories in Central Pennsylvania I find that: (a) Joe copula characterizes the joint density of adverse selection; (b) there is a substantial heterogeneity among advertisers; (c) the estimated density rationalizes why there is more competition at the lower end of the ads than at the upper end; (d) consumers treat the ads as substitutes; and (e) a counterfactual exercise suggests that there is a substantial (3.8% of the sales) loss of welfare due to asymmetric information.
    Keywords: Competitive Nonlinear Pricing, Multidimensional Screening, Identification, Advertisement, Copula
    JEL: C14 D22 D82 L11 L13
    Date: 2013–05
  6. By: Mattos, Fabio; Poirier, Jamie
    Abstract: This study examines formation and adaptation of reference prices by Manitoban grain producers. Research shows that preferences are reference‐dependent and marketing decisions are affected by reference prices. Results suggest that Manitoban producers’ reference prices are formed primarily by an average of recent prices and the highest price to‐date in the marketing window. Reference prices are found to adapt in the same direction as market prices, with adaptation to increasing prices being larger than adaptation to decreasing prices. When deciding to sell grain, producers are more likely to sell when they expect prices to decrease over the next month and when their reference price adjusts downwards towards the current price.
    Keywords: grain marketing, reference prices, Agribusiness, Crop Production/Industries, Institutional and Behavioral Economics, Risk and Uncertainty, C93, D03, D81, Q13,
    Date: 2013–04
  7. By: Anna Kowalska-Pyzalska; Katarzyna Maciejowska; Katarzyna Sznajd-Weron; Rafal Weron
    Abstract: Using an agent-based modeling approach we show how personal attributes, like conformity or indifference, impact the opinions of individual electricity consumers regarding switching to innovative dynamic tariff programs. We also examine the influence of advertising, discomfort of usage and the expectations of financial savings on opinion dynamics. Our main finding is that currently the adoption of dynamic electricity tariffs is virtually impossible due to the high level of indifference in today's societies. However, if in the future the indifference level is reduced, e.g., through educational programs that would make the customers more engaged in the topic, factors like tariff pricing schemes and intensity of advertising will became the focal point.
    Keywords: Dynamic pricing; Time-of-use tariff; Demand response; Diffusion of innovations; Agent-based model; Spinson
    JEL: C63 O33 Q48 Q55
    Date: 2013–05–17

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